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I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

The Autonomy of Church and State

Since the end of World War II, two visions of the proper
relationship between church and state have vied for preeminence in
U.S. law: one emphasizing the separation of church and state,1 and
the other finding greater space for the accommodation of religion in
public life.2 A third approach has prevailed in much of Europe,
allowing for a much thicker interrelationship, engagement, and
cooperation between church and state.3
1. For a representative sample of defenses of separationism, see THOMAS CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986); DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND
THE COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS (1991); LEONARD LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEO PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967); Mark V. Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of
Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The
Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986). For a recent comprehensive critique
of separation, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
2. For a representative sample of defenses of accommodationism, see CHESTER JAMES
ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT FORMATION AND EARLY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); GERARD V. BARDLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982);
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP.
CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990).
3. See generally CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION]. As
will be readily apparent, I have benefited from and relied extensively upon Carolyn Evans’s
excellent book about the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning
freedom of religion or belief. I highly recommend her book for anyone interested in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on this topic. See also MALCOLM D.
EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 6–171 (1997); BAHIYYIH
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In this Article, I will argue that each of these approaches has
more in common with the other two than might appear on the
surface. I will suggest that a single concept, autonomy, underlies
each of these viewpoints, but that each of these visions of the proper
relationship between church and state is animated by a strikingly
different conception of what autonomy means and what is required
for its exercise.4 Separation is animated by a conception of autonomy
calling for stark independence of church and state.5 Engagement or
cooperation is animated by a conception of autonomy calling for
interdependence of church and state.6 In this view, the autonomy of
both church and state depends upon mutual cooperation and
support. Accommodation is animated by a conception of autonomy
calling, somewhat counter intuitively, for what I term interindependence.7 According to this conception, autonomy requires
independence, but also requires inclusion, and rests upon respect and
empowerment. In addition, the law in this area is concerned with
three distinct sets of autonomy interests—the autonomy of churches,
the autonomy of the state, and the autonomy of individuals.8
G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROTECTION 63–247 (1996); Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael Navarro-Valls, The
Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in FACILITATING
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 209–38 (Tore Lindholm, W. Cole.
Durham, Jr. & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004).
4. In arguing that competing conceptions of autonomy underlie the separationist,
accommodationist, and cooperationist viewpoints, I do not mean to suggest that courts
consistently utilize the framework of autonomy for analyzing disputes in this area. For the
most part, they have not and do not. Rather, my argument is that different conceptions of
autonomy do in fact underlie these competing positions, and advocates of separation,
accommodation, or cooperation have an obligation to defend as superior the particular
conception of autonomy that animates their position.
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. Others have emphasized the importance of autonomy in analyzing the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, and I am indebted to their insights and analysis. See, e.g.,
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v.
Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1291 (1980); Gerard V. Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the Constitutional
Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057 (1989); Jesse H. Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673
(1980); Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001); Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment
Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L.
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Outcomes of cases involving the relationship of church and state
or individual religious liberty are often determined by the underlying
conception of autonomy adopted or assumed in a particular case,
coupled with the understanding that autonomy interests are taken as
preeminent. Unfortunately, both the Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights only intermittently appear to
appreciate the centrality of the concept of autonomy in this area of
the law. Often a particular conception of autonomy lies in the
shadows of a case, but that conception is neither made explicit nor
defended. Neither the Supreme Court nor the European Court of
Human Rights does an adequate job of acknowledging and
analyzing the autonomy interests that are implicated by a particular
case, especially when the autonomy of the state lies at the heart of
the case. The result of these failures is a body of law that is deeply
unsatisfying. The U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, vacillates
between different conceptions of autonomy and varying doctrinal
tests, which results in church-state and religious liberty jurisprudence
that is widely criticized as inconsistent, incoherent, and
incomprehensible.9
The goal of this Article is twofold. First, I hope to explain the
differences between these three conceptions of autonomy and how
they manifest themselves in the church-state and religious liberty
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
European Court of Human Rights. I argue that these competing
conceptions of autonomy animate and undergird, though not always
explicitly, current law regarding the relationships among church,
state, and individual. Second, the Article aims to explain the
differences between these three conceptions of autonomy and, by
identifying the philosophical ground underlying each of these

REV. 347 (1984); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy,
Autonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1579 (1987); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV.
91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981);
Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A
Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249
(1986).
9. See infra note 14.
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conceptions, to help focus and further the discussion concerning
which conception of autonomy provides the best model for guiding
jurisprudence in this area of the law. The strengths, weaknesses,
limits, and implications of the separationist, cooperationist, and
accommodationist positions can more readily be assessed if the
respective visions of autonomy underlying each of these positions are
made explicit and subjected to scrutiny. I conclude, that in order to
bring coherence and consistency to the case law, courts must do a
better job of identifying and analyzing the autonomy interests at
stake in a particular case and articulating and defending a conception
of autonomy that will guide the resolution of the dispute. If a
particular conception of autonomy (either one that I identify and
describe here, or some other, better conception) provides a superior
account of what individual and institutional autonomy entails and
what the conditions are in which autonomy can thrive, then this
conception will have a strong claim to provide a better doctrinal
rubric than existing tests and approaches for analyzing and deciding
cases in this difficult and controversial area of the law.10
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II is a brief survey of the
historical background of church-state issues and the jurisprudential
frameworks for resolving them in the United States (under the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment) and in Europe (primarily under Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights). Part III discusses three
conceptions of autonomy—independence, interdependence, and interindependence. Parts IV and V address how these conceptions of
autonomy manifest themselves in the religious liberty and churchstate jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court
of Human Rights. Specifically, Part IV focuses on institutional
autonomy and is divided into two parts, the first addressing issues
concerning the autonomy of churches, and the second addressing
issues concerning the autonomy of the state. And Part V focuses on
liberty issues that implicate individual autonomy.

10. As may become evident, I believe the inter-independence conception of autonomy to
be the most forceful and appealing account of autonomy; however, my purpose here is not to
persuade readers of the superiority of this conception of autonomy but to explain the
differences between these competing conceptions of autonomy, the philosophical
underpinnings and assumptions of each, and the ways in which these conceptions animate and
guide the attitudes of separation, accommodation, and cooperation.
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Part VI focuses upon several significant current issues in the
United States involving the interaction of church and state and how
these different conceptions of autonomy suggest resolving those
issues. These issues include (1) school prayer, (2) vouchers and other
forms of indirect aid to churches, (3) charitable choice, or the ability
of religiously affiliated institutions to qualify for receiving state
funding for social welfare programs, (4) the posting of the Ten
Commandments and other religious monuments in public spaces,
and (5) the constitutionality of including the phrase “under God” in
the Pledge of Allegiance.
I conclude in Section VII that, while the Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights have utilized a variety of doctrinal
constructs to evaluate issues involving religious liberty and the
interaction of church and state, autonomy is the most important and
useful concept in analyzing such controversies. In order to bring
coherence and consistency to this area of the law, courts should first
identify the autonomy interests at stake in a case, then articulate and
defend a conception of autonomy that explains the conditions that
will facilitate the relevant autonomy interests. In so doing, the stage
will be set for a more successful approach to deciding cases involving
the interactions of church and state as well as cases involving claims
based upon individual freedom of religion or belief.
B.

The United States and Europe: Why Compare?

One might reasonably suppose that a comparative analysis of
U.S. and European approaches to religious liberty issues might be of
little value because the jurisprudential, historical, and philosophical
contexts in which issues involving the freedom of religion or belief
are adjudicated in the United States and Europe are so dissimilar.11
The most obvious difference between Europe and the United States
is that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes both
a free exercise clause and a nonestablishment clause,12 whereas the
concept of nonestablishment is inapplicable in the European context
where there is a wide spectrum of views about the proper

11. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
12. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend I.
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relationship between the dominant church and the state, and several
countries still have established or quasi-established state churches.13
Additionally, the religious liberty jurisprudence of both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is often
criticized as being confused and chaotic.14 To a large extent such
criticisms are valid and reflect the reality that the issues and problems
in this area are extremely vexing and difficult to resolve. The fact that
the jurisprudence of both the United States and Europe on matters
of religious liberty is so severely criticized might be thought to be an
additional reason why a comparative analysis is unlikely to shed
much, if any, illumination.
But in spite of—indeed in large measure due to—these
differences and difficulties, a comparative analysis is valuable because,
among other reasons, in examining and comparing the approaches
taken towards similar issues, it becomes easier to identify the

13. Some commentators suggest that because the U.S. Establishment Clause dictates
the separation of church and state, and because no such consensus exists in Europe, there is
little benefit from comparing the approaches taken in the United States and Europe. For
example, Carolyn Evans asserts that “the large and sophisticated literature that has developed
around religious freedom in the United States is of limited use when considering why religious
freedom is important in Europe and what values underlie its adoption by so many States with
different religious backgrounds.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 22.
14. For an example of criticism concerning the religious liberty jurisprudence in the
United States, consider MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1988) (finding the constitutional law of religion to be
“incoherent”); Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 400 (2002) (arguing that religious liberty jurisprudence
has departed from a true understanding of the Establishment Clause, “has become illogical, has
undermined the values of both democracy and community, and has exacerbated political
divisiveness”); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in
American First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 64 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000)
(expressing the virtual consensus that the law of religious freedom in this country is “chaotic,
controversial and unpredictable”).
An example of the criticism of religious liberty jurisprudence in Europe is available in
Carolyn Evans’ work. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 2. Professor Evans
concludes that the bodies responsible for protecting the freedom of religion and belief under
the European Convention have
approached their task in an incoherent and inconsistent manner. The principles
which they have developed to assist in interpreting articles relevant to freedom of
religion or belief have generally been favourable to States and have given little
consideration to the importance of freedom of religion and belief, both to those
whose freedom is being denied, and to the development of pluralistic and tolerant
democracies where the risk of serious persecution based on religion or belief is less
likely to occur.
Id.
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assumptions and philosophical viewpoints that underlie the
respective approaches, which might otherwise go unnoticed. And in
spite of the fact that the U.S. Constitution is much older than the
European Convention, almost all of the religious liberty
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been developed since World
War II, so the time frame in which these issues have been addressed
by the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human
Rights is quite similar.15
C.

Caveats

Several important caveats must be stated at the outset. First, I
will try to sketch with broad strokes the similarities and differences in
the jurisprudential, historical, and philosophical approaches to
religious liberty issues in the United States and Europe. This is a
broad, complex topic, and I am mindful that identifying general
themes and characteristics always results in oversimplification.16 In
addition, my focus will be primarily upon the differing philosophical
underpinnings that inform the development of the law in this area.
This focus will also contribute to the relatively general nature of my
observations and conclusions.
Second, I do not maintain that the Supreme Court or the
European Court of Human Rights has utilized autonomy
consistently as an analytical rubric in church-state and freedom of
religion or belief cases, much less that these courts have been
sensitive to the different conceptions of autonomy that undergird

15. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT xi (2001) (“Prior to 1940 the Supreme Court of the United States had never
upheld a claim of free exercise of religion, had never found any governmental practice to be an
establishment of religion, and had never applied the religion clauses of the First Amendment to
the states. . . . Beginning in 1940 the Court changed all that.”). The European Convention
entered into force in September 1953, and currently, forty-four states are parties to the
Convention. See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, at
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
16. To illustrate, a leading U.S. casebook on the religion clauses of the First
Amendment includes citations to over 600 cases. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A.
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY xxiii–xxxviii (1996). Moreover, a
summary of cases decided under the European Convention through the year 2000 includes
references to sixteen cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights and sixty cases
heard by the European Commission on Human Rights that relate just to Article 9, the primary
provision of the European Convention that addresses religious liberty issues. See BARBARA
MENSAH, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CASE SUMMARIES 1179–80 (2002).
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cases in this area of the law. Rather, the Supreme Court, as well as
the European Court of Human Rights, has utilized a variety of
doctrinal tests and approaches in this area, resulting in a varied and
fragmented set of outcomes that are difficult to reconcile and fit
together. I do argue, however, that autonomy, both of institutions
and of individuals, represents the deep, fundamental issue at stake in
cases involving church-state relations and individual freedom of
religion or belief. Since autonomy is the core issue in church-state
relations, I suggest that explicit considerations of autonomy provide
a more helpful analytical framework than the doctrinal tests the
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights have
employed in this area of the law.
Third, in an important sense the comparison between the U.S.
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is
artificial because one institution is the court of last resort of a
sovereign state, whereas the other institution is a court created by a
multilateral treaty involving over forty European countries, each with
different histories, political systems, and constitutional and legal
systems. The European Court of Human Rights is a remarkable and
unprecedented institution, a revolutionary attempt to create a panEuropean court in which individual petitioners have standing to
pursue a claim against their states.17 From the perspective of the
states involved, the European Court of Human Rights represents a
significant leap of faith to place what has historically been viewed as
one of the primary rights of sovereignty into the hands of a
multinational body over which each state in a particular case has
relatively little control.18 Given the political sensitivities involved, it is
nothing short of amazing that an institution such as the European
Court of Human Rights even exists, and it is to be expected that the

17. See LUKE CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE
CONVENTION 1–15 (1996) (discussing the development, challenges, growth, and adjustments
that the Convention and Court of Human Rights have made as the number of contracting
countries expands and the number of cases explodes); MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 87–96 (discussing the remarkable role and growth of the
court and its effect on bringing human rights violations to light).
18. The European Court of Human Rights is composed of a number of judges equal to
the number of contracting states (currently forty-four). There is no restriction on the number
of judges of the same nationality, and thus, there is no guarantee to a country of judicial
representation on the court. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background,
Organisation and Procedure, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
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Court has exhibited a relatively high degree of deference to states
and what might be viewed as timidity on their part.19 Such criticisms,
while having some merit, must be viewed within the wider context of
the remarkable fact that the institution exists at all and operates as
well as it does. Additionally, each European state has its own legal
and often constitutional protections of religious liberty and other
human rights, so the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights represents something more like a shared minimum
standard rather than an accurate picture of the full extent of human
rights protection in any particular state.20
II.

A.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE AND HUMAN RIGHT

The Grandparent and Neglected Stepchild of Human Rights

Religious liberty is at once the grandparent and the neglected
stepchild of international human rights norms.21 Recognized at least
since the first century A.D., religious liberty, in this now secular era,
has lost some of its urgency, perhaps due to the marginalization of
religious belief, at least among academic and policy elites, and

19. See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 125–36 (2003) (discussing the jurisdiction and role of the
European Court of Human Rights and its struggle to balance State versus European
standards).
20. For example, in the first case decided by the European Court of Human Rights
involving a religious liberty claim, Kokkinakis v. Greece, the court stated, “[A] certain margin of
appreciation is to be left to the contracting states in assessing the existence and extent of the
necessity of an interference, but this margin is subject to European supervision. . . .” 17 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 397, 422 (1994) (Westlaw).
21. Professor Cole Durham has described religious liberties as the “‘neglected
grandparent’ of human rights.” See W.C. Durham, Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A
Comparative Analysis, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (J.D. van der Vyver & J. Witte, Jr. eds., 1996); see also Judith A. Berling, Is
Conversation About Religion Possible? (And What Can Religionists Do To Promote It?), 61 J.
AM. ACAD. RELIGION 1, 2 (1993) (“Religious Studies, the stepchild of a Supreme Court
decision in the 1960s, is a newcomer to the university, whose presence is still questioned or
threatened in a number of institutions.”); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not
Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 366 (1999) (“Religious
speech is not some stepchild of constitutional law: It is fully protected by the Free Speech
Clause, and once the government sets up a generally open subsidy program, it can’t
discriminate against religious speech in operating the program. And education is, of course,
predominantly speech.”).
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perhaps due to the inevitable conflicts that arise between religious
rights and other important human rights.22
But because of the fundamental importance of religious liberty
and the horrific problems with religious fanaticism, the once
neglected grandparent has again moved to the fore. As Arcot
Krishnaswami observed over forty years ago in his influential study of
religious liberty,
[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is
probably the most precious of all human rights, and the imperative
need today is to make it a reality for every single individual
regardless of the religion or belief that he professes, regardless of
his status, and regardless of his condition in life.23

Nevertheless, whether viewed with a wide historical lens from
antiquity—through the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages—or

22. JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 44–45 (1998).
By the first century A.D. there is in the Mediterranean world a religion, which will
spread widely in the West, that carries the concepts of a God, living, distinct from
and superior to any human being, society, or state; of obligations to that God,
distinct from and superior to any society or state; of authorized teachers who can
voice these obligations and judge any society or state; of an inner voice of reason
that is one way God speaks as well as by His authorized teachers. According to these
concepts as taught by this religion, each person, individually and not as part of a
family, tribe, or nation, will have to account to God as Judge for every thought and
deed. Collectively, these concepts are at the core of liberty of conscience and liberty
of religion.
Id.; see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, The Right to Religious
Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 865, 873 (1976) (“Even so fundamental a freedom as that of religious inquiry, belief and
communication must, of course, be exercised and protected with due regard for the
comparable rights of others and for the aggregate common interest in the preservation of all
basic human rights.”). Critics of religious liberties often create an opposition between
“fundamentalism” and human rights, and lump all religious liberties concerns into the category
of fundamentalism. See, e.g., Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious
Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United
Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 273 (1997) (“Religious fundamentalism
poses the most acute problems for women’s equality, but many conservative religious groups
share substantial areas of doctrine with the fundamentalists. The two groups are often
differentiated solely by the political activism of fundamentalists rather than by significantly
different religious beliefs. This political activism throws into sharp relief the conflicts between
rights of religious freedom and women’s rights of liberty and equality.”).
23. ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
60.XIV.2 (1960), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 2 (Tad
Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998).
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through a prism focused on the terrible middle years of the last
century and the attempted extermination of the Jewish people, or
with a focus on the events of September 11, 2001, religion has
served as a factor in much of the pain and suffering that human
beings inflict upon one another.24 Given the importance of religious
liberty and the dangers associated with religious fanaticism and
hatred, finding and developing appropriate approaches that allow for
freedom of religion or belief while guarding against atrocities such as
those mentioned above must be counted as one of the most pressing
and vexing problems facing the world today.25
24. Some commentators blame virtually all of the world’s ills on religion. See, e.g., Linda
L. Ammons, What’s God Got To Do With It? Church and State Collaboration in the
Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207 (1999) (arguing
that Judeo-Christian doctrines, ideologies, and institutions promote the subordination of
women and condone domestic violence); Fawaz A. Gerges, Islam: Enduring Myths and
Changing Realities: Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America, 588 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 73, 81 (2003) (asserting that in the eyes of the United States, “terrorism is
basically religiously inspired, lacking any nationalist inspiration”); JAMES A. HAUGHT, HOLY
HORRORS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MURDERS AND MADNESS (1990)
(documenting that “[f]rom the times of religiously motivated battles recorded in the Old
Testament through the days of the Crusades and the Jihad to the present day, much blood has
been spilt in the name of religion and religious reclamation and dominance”); William P.
Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 844 (1993) (suggesting that, in
accordance with Dostoevsky’s view, “the needs of humanity can lead to the creation of a
church, which in order to make people happy, denies freedom and invites intolerance and
persecution”). John Locke presents a contrasting, optimistic view of religion by asserting that
religious activity of some kind is necessary for peaceful coexistence in a political community.
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27, 51 (J. Tully ed., 1983). Other
commentators also have focused on the positive aspects of religion and religious practice. See,
e.g., Lisa G. Shah, Faith in Our Future?, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 183 (2001) (proposing that a
neutral and informed exposure to religious principles in U.S. public schools would help
alleviate increasing problems with drugs, alcohol, suicide, rape, and abortion); Rodney K.
Smith, Is American Progressive Constitutionalism Dead? Ethical and Historical Themes in
Progressive Constitutionalism: The Role of Religion in Progressive Constitutionalism, 4 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 51, 74–75 (1999) (arguing that “religion and religious exercise are positive and
warrant special protection” because religion presents a unique way of knowing, which is based
on faith rather than on reason and the scientific method).
25. See William E. Nelson, Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 102–03 (1995).
[T]he world bears constant witness to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and religious
fanaticism, and even in America, intolerance and fear of difference appear to be
increasing. Whether we like it or not, the central task for anyone who today believes
in equality is to end discrimination based on ethnicity and culture. Emphasis upon
the experience of Catholics and Jews in mid-twentieth-century New York establishes
that this task can be accomplished. Emphasis, in contrast, upon the intellectual
conceptions needed to accomplish it shows how much work remains to be done.
Id. Gerard Bradley asserts that
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Historical Background and Jurisprudential Framework

1. The United States
The pursuit of religious liberty was one of the most powerful
forces driving early settlers to the American continent and remained
a powerful force at the time of the founding of the American
republic.26 According to James Madison, who drafted the Bill of
Rights, the free exercise of religion is a right “precedent both in
order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of Civil
Society.”27
The extensive jurisprudence of the United States regarding
religious liberty is primarily based upon the interpretation of sixteen
words of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”28 The first provision,
somewhat misleadingly labeled the “Establishment Clause,” among
other things forbids the United States from having a state church.29
The second provision, known as the “Free Exercise Clause,” protects
individuals and churches from governmental coercion.30
[t]here are other reasons for a renewed look at the relationship among Christianity,
separation of church and state, and religious liberty in contemporary American
society. One is that the debate of recent memory is pretty much spent. Accusations
against secular humanists by fundamentalists, and by secular humanists against
fundamentalists have become tiresome, as are charges of godliness and fanaticism.
Scholarly criticism of the Supreme Court’s church-state corpus has grown so caustic,
and is so widespread, that almost any new departure would be welcome.
Bradley, supra note 8, at 1060–61.
26. See generally NOONAN & GAFFNEY, supra note 15, at 158–200 (Foundation Press
2001).
27. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, 4 vols., 1:163–64 (William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall eds., 1865).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church.”).
30. Justice Kennedy described the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as follows:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms.
Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even when the government
participates, for the very object of some of our most important speech is to persuade
the government to adopt an idea as its own. The method for protecting freedom of
worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In
religious debate or expression the government is not a prime participant, for the
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free
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The First Amendment, along with the other rights included in
the Bill of Rights, originally only applied against the federal
government. It was not until after the Civil War and the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment that the First Amendment was
“incorporated” against the states—that is, found by the Supreme
Court to apply to the actions of state governments as well as the
federal government.31 As they have been interpreted, the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to both the federal
government and to state governments, and are sometimes in tension
with each other—the Establishment Clause prohibiting the
government from taking actions that benefit religion and the free
exercise clause protecting religion, which is itself a benefit.32
Debates rage about the original purpose and intent of the
Framers in adopting the religion clauses.33 Echoing Father Thomas
Curry, Professor Fredrick Gedicks has argued that in the founding
era, an “establishment of religion” was understood to “refer to a
church which the government funded and controlled and in which it
used its coercive power to encourage participation, like the Anglican
Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with
no precise counterpart in the speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson of
history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that
in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious
views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts
at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that
religious faith is real, not imposed.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–92 (1992) (internal citations omitted). But see Mark V.
Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 72 (2001) (asserting
that “[c]ontemporary constitutional doctrine may render the Free Exercise Clause redundant”
because “[m]uch religious activity is speech, pure and simple, and therefore protected by the
Free Speech Clause”).
31. The Free Exercise Clause was first applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Establishment Clause was first applied to the states in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2002).
33. See Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial
Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 362 (1993)
(“What does the ‘Quest for Originalism’ in the church-state debate say about the ‘Case for
Originalism’ in the larger interpretive debate? If the historical data is plentiful, as both sides
maintain, and if the two sides can look at the evidence and reach two very different
conclusions, then one might argue that there is no clear-cut, definitive ‘Framers’ intent.’ Or, if
there is an obvious Framers’ intent, then some scholars cannot see it, or choose not to, because
of their own political predilections.”).
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Church in England or the Roman Catholic Church in southern
Europe.”34 It appears that there were three primary concerns that
drove the adoption of the Establishment Clause. First, there was
concern about the church exercising the coercive power of
government, including the power to enforce criminal laws that
reflected the church’s denominational and moral requirements.35
Second, early Americans worried about direct financial support of the
church in aid of its worship, rituals, and other denominational
activities, through general tax revenue.36 Third, they were also
concerned with control by the state over the church, particularly in
its definition of doctrine and selection of leaders.37 These concerns
seem to indicate that the Founders did not view what I term
interdependence as a viable conception of autonomy within the
United States.
Concern for the autonomy both of the church and of the state is
at the heart of each of these three concerns.38 From this perspective,
if churches perform governmental functions, the autonomy of the
state is threatened; if the state funds churches, the autonomy of
churches is threatened, and the autonomy of the state may be
jeopardized as well if a powerful church receives all or a predominant
share of state funding since that church might exert considerable
power in the political process; and if the state controls church
doctrine, the autonomy of the church is undermined. Indeed, the
primary purpose underlying the Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is the preservation of
autonomy—of the state, of religious institutions, and of individuals.39
This purpose, however, has often gone unrecognized and has been
obscured by doctrinal constructions utilized by the Supreme Court.
As a result, jurisprudence under the religion clauses is fragmented

34. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 1091 (2002) (citing THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO
CHRISTENDOM 16, 37, 109 (2001)); see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 191–92
(1986).
35. Gedicks, supra note 8, at 1098.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1; MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(1965); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953).
39. See infra Parts IV–VI.
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and inconsistent.40 Confusion and incoherence is supplemented by
the fact that autonomy is a complex concept that bears multiple
interpretations.
Since the end of the Second World War, two visions of the
relationship between church and state have vied for preeminence in
the United States, one emphasizing the ideal of “separation” of
church and state,41 and the other finding greater space for the
“accommodation” of religion and public life.42 As I will argue in
greater detail below, the separationist and accommodationist
positions each reflect very different conceptions of autonomy, with
separationism favoring a conception of autonomy based upon strict
independence and accommodationism favoring a conception of
autonomy based upon the ideal of inter-independence.
Separationists argue that “the original purpose of the
establishment clause was to create an absolute separation of the
spheres of civil authority and religious activity by forbidding all forms

40. Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been notable for its apparent inconsistency
and incoherence. For example, in the 1980s the Supreme Court ruled that religiously affiliated
organizations could participate in a federally funded program to provide counseling to
pregnant teenagers, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), but that it was unconstitutional
for public school teachers to travel to parochial schools to provide remedial English and math
instruction to needy children on the premises of their own school, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985). Although the Court reversed Aguilar twelve years later in Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997), “the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up to Agostini has been a
conglomeration of mixed messages,” Daniel P. Whitehead, Note, Agostini v. Felton: Rectifying
the Chaos of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 639, 645 (1999). The
Supreme Court has also ruled that the government is required to compensate Sabbatarians
who refuse to work on Saturdays, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), but not required
to accommodate those who can demonstrate dire financial consequences from Sunday closing
laws, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Court’s inconsistent religion clauses
jurisprudence has produced a debate about the constitutional validity of religion-based
exemptions. See William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionality of Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990); Michael McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990);
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemption, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990).
41. For an elaboration and defense of the separationist position, see, supra note 1. For a
historical perspective on the impact of separationist ideas on the American Founders, see Arlin
M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559
(1989).
42. For an elaboration and defense of the accommodationist position, see, supra note 2.
For an overview of the birth and growth of the accommodationist perspective, see Steven G.
Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990).
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of government assistance or support for religion.”43 This view was
perhaps most forcefully articulated by Justice Hugo Black in the
1947 case, Everson v. Board of Education,44 in which he stated that,
“[T]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.”45
A conception of autonomy based upon the idea of independence
has had a strong influence upon much of the religion-clauses
jurisprudence in the United States.46 Most famously, Jefferson’s
metaphor of a “wall of separation”—dividing religion on the one
hand and the state on the other—is a clear example of a vision of
autonomy that rests upon stark independence.47 On this view, the
domain of the state and the domain of churches are divided into
respective spheres, and the mandate of the First Amendment
prevents either from intruding upon the precincts of the other.48
Territorial metaphors prevail, and the wall becomes an apt symbol
for the ideal relationship—even if imperfectly realized—between
church and state.49 Because, according to this view, autonomy

43. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 47–48.
44. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (permitting state reimbursement of
costs of busing children to parochial schools). Perhaps ironically, in spite of its strongly
separationist rhetoric, the outcome in Everson was accommodationist, permitting state aid to
parents to pay for busing their children to religious schools.
45. Id. at 15.
46. As noted below, a counter-theme in U.S. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
accommodation. See infra text accompanying notes 51–52.
47. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 332 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). President Thomas Jefferson, in
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, declared “a wall of separation between Church
and State.” Id. For commentary on Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” see, for example, Daniel L.
Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of
Separation” Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 627 (1999); Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science
Guide Legal Argumentation? The Role of Metaphor in Constitutional Cases, 25 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 357 (1994); Jeffrey W. Stiltner, Note, Rethinking the Wall of Separation: Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District—Is This the End of Lemon?, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 823 (1994).
48. The “theory of a high and impregnable wall of separation between government and
religion mandates that the public sphere must be secular. Religion is swept away and confined
to the private sphere of home, family, church and other places of worship.” Laurie Messerly,
Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS J. OP. 151, 156 (2003).
49. Another territorial metaphor of the garden and the wilderness was popularized by
Roger Williams. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 293 (2002). Carter describes the garden and wilderness metaphor as follows:
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requires independence, the religion clauses mandate “mutual
noninterference by church and state in each other’s affairs.”50
In contrast, accommodationists argue that governmental aid to
religious institutions is permitted as long as it is imparted in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.51 Accommodationists explicitly reject
Jefferson’s wall-of-separation metaphor. For example, in a dissenting
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[t]he
‘wall of separation between church and state’ is a metaphor based on
bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to
judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.”52
To a large extent, the history of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, especially over the past thirty years, has been a story of
the struggle for dominance between the separationist and
accommodationist viewpoints.53 One problem with both
For Williams, the garden was the place of God’s people, the community of people of
faith, who gathered together to determine what the Lord required of them,
nurturing and building their religious understanding in relative tranquility. Outside
the garden was the unevangelized world, what Williams called the wilderness. And
between the two, separating the wilderness from the garden, was a high hedge wall,
constructed to protect the people of the garden in their work of religious nurture.
The hedge wall existed to keep the wilderness out, not to keep the people of the
garden hemmed in. It was the vital work of the garden, not the less vital work of the
wilderness, that the wall was built in order to protect.
Id. at 296. Adams and Emmerich assert that the
American Founders were influenced profoundly by philosophers and theologians
who reflected on the religious conflicts that occurred in the wake of the
Reformation. From Martin Luther and John Calvin they inherited the view that
God had instituted “two kingdoms”—a heavenly one where the church exercised its
spiritual authority and an earthly one where the civil magistrates exercised temporal
authority.
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 41, at 1561; see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, supra note 1
(discussing Roger Williams’ use of the wall metaphor); HOWE, supra note 38.
50. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (2d ed. 1999).
51. See Peter J. Weishaar, School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB.
L. REV. 543, 545 (1994) (“The ‘nonpreferential accommodationists’ . . . claim that the
religion clauses of the Constitution permit various forms of nonpreferential government
support for religion. They argue that government may aid all religions, as long as it does not
prefer one religion over another.”).
52. 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (striking down a state statute
authorizing a moment of silence in public schools on grounds that there is no secular purpose
underlying the statute).
53. See Raymond W. Mitchell, A Small Departure from the Truth: When Private
Religious Speech Runs Afoul of the Establishment Clause, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 867 (1992).
Courts and commentators have noted that in the contemporary debate over the
meaning of the Establishment Clause and the appropriate standard of review, both
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“separation” and “accommodation” as doctrinal rubrics is that
neither concept contains a principle to explain its limits. Thus,
regardless of the analytical starting point, one is left without clear
guidance with respect to the questions of how much separation or
how much accommodation is required or permitted. The Supreme
Court has utilized a number of different doctrines—including the socalled Lemon test,54 variations of that test emphasizing
“endorsement,”55 and tests focusing upon “coercion”56—as
constitutional tests for differentiating between permissible and
impermissible interactions between church and state. None of these
doctrinal approaches, however, has received widespread support, and
none appears up to the task of providing a satisfying analytical

sides in the debate have scoured primary sources in an effort to assemble an
historical record permitting them to claim the legacy of the Framers’ original intent.
This debate has generally broken down into two opposing factions: separationists
and accommodationists.
Id. at 869.
54. The Lemon test, as it has come to be known, stipulates: “[first, a statute] must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
55. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
According to Justice O’Connor’s reformulation, “[T]he purpose prong of the Lemon test asks
whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” Id. at 690. The
effect prong requires that “a government practice not have the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Id. at 692. Justice
O’Connor’s approach is endorsed in Arnold H. Loewy, Rethininking Government Neutrality
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s
Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986). The “endorsement” test was later adopted by a
majority of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
56. The “coercion” test was used by the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(holding that public school graduation prayer violates the Establishment Clause).
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does
not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It
is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends
to do so.”
Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). With regard to school
prayer specifically, “[W]hat to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to
the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a
religious orthodoxy.” Id. at 592.
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framework for addressing problems that arise under either the
Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.57
2. Europe
The potential ways in which the relationship between church and
state is organized are virtually limitless, ranging from near
identification of the church and the state (for example, Iran)58 to an
adversarial posture where church and state are viewed as antagonists
(for example, the former USSR).59 While no members of the Council
of Europe fall in either of these extremes, “nevertheless a wide
variety of relationships exist between religions and States in”
Europe.60
Several European states, such as France.61 and Turkey,62 adopt a
strong separationist and secularist conception of the state. At the

57. See, e.g., Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New
Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1984) (arguing that after the
Lynch decision, “the Court’s apparent trend toward basing establishment clause analysis on the
pervasiveness or historical significance of government-supported religious activities represents
an undesirable move away from strict examination of the questionable law or activity under the
Lemon test”); David Felsen, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 395 (1989) (arguing that the Court’s use of the
Lemon test has resulted in an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is confused and
unprincipled); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (suggesting that the Lemon test should be
radically altered); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83 (1986) (pointing to the Lemon test’s internal inconsistencies); Amy
Louise Weinhaus, The Fate of Graduation Prayers in Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 957, 957–58 (1993) (“Weisman departs from the settled framework which has
guided Establishment Clause analysis for more than twenty years and creates uncertainty as to
the proper legal standards applicable in church-state jurisprudence.”).
58. See SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION IN IRAN (1988) (charting the historic rise of modern Iran from the
Constitutional Revolution of the early 1900s to the present day Islamic Republic); H. E.
CHEHABI, IRANIAN POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS MODERNISM: THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT
OF IRAN UNDER THE SHAH AND KHOMEINI (1990); NIKKI R. KEDDIE, MODERN IRAN:
ROOTS AND RESULTS OF REVOLUTION (2003); DAVID MENASHRI, POST-REVOLUTIONARY
POLITICS IN IRAN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POWER (2001).
59. See PEDRO EVENS, CROSS AND THE COMMISSAR: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR 42–54 (1987) (tracing the relationship of the Soviet
government and religion over four historical periods, ending in 1987).
60. The following brief summary of the variety of relationships between church and
state in Europe is largely drawn from EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 19–22.
61. See LA CONSTITUTION [Const.] art. 77 (Autonomy) (Fr.). Article 2(1) of the
French Constitution states, “France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic.
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other end of the spectrum, in Greece, there is a very close supportive
relationship between the Greek Orthodox Church and the state;63 in
Iceland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is still established as the
National Church, which according to the Constitution is to be
“supported and protected by the State”;64 and, in Italy, the Catholic
Church lost its status as the state religion only in 1984, and the
constitution continues to recognize that the “State and the Catholic
Church are each within its own ambit, independent and
sovereign.”65 The Church of England remains the established church
of the United Kingdom.66 The Spanish Constitution specifically
states that there is no established church,67 but Spain has entered
into a Concordat with the Catholic Church that grants the church
significant financial and other privileges that are not available to all
other religions in the state. Ireland does not have an established
church, although the dominance of the Catholic Church is evident in
a number of constitutional provisions (such as abortion and
blasphemy), and the constitution states that the “State acknowledges
that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall
hold his name in reverence and shall respect and honour religion.”68
Other states, such as Germany69 and the Ukraine,70 have
constitutional provisions requiring separation of church and state,
It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction as to origin, race, or
religion. It respects all beliefs.” Const. art. 2(1).
62. See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURK. pt. II, ch. I, art. 24 (Freedom of Religion
and Conscience) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and
conviction.”)
63. See CONST. OF GREECE sec. II, arts. 3 (Relations of Church and State) & 13
(Religion).
64. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ICE. arts. 63 & 64 (detailing the relationship between
church and state).
65. COSTIZIONE [Cost.] arts. 7 (Relation Between State and Church) & 8 (Religion)
(Italy).
66. While the United Kingdom has no constitution, it does publish an authoritative
statement of legal framework on its International Constitutional Law Web site,
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/uk00000_.html. See U.K. LEGAL SYS. sec. 18 (Freedom
of Religion).
67. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] arts. 16 (Religion, Belief, No State Church) & 44 (Religion)
(Spain).
68. IR. CONST. art. 44 (Religion).
69. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4 (Faith, Religion, Conscience, Creed)
(F.R.G.).
70. CONST. OF UKRAINE art. 35 (detailing the relationship between the individual, the
state, and the church).
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although the level of cooperation between the state and the
dominant church is much greater than in the United States.
Despite the wide variety of attitudes toward the proper
relationship between church and state, “almost all member States
have adopted constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion and allowing for freedom of
religion. The provisions take different forms but demonstrate a
reasonably strong level of consensus that freedom of religion is an
important, European-wide principle.”71
The primary pan-European basis for protecting religious freedom
in Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention” or
“Convention”).72 One distinctive characteristic of the European
Convention is that it provides a forum of last resort for individuals,
not just states, to press claims against states who are party to the
Convention.73
The main provision of the European Convention dealing with
freedom of religion or belief is Article 9.74 Article 9 establishes a twotier structure for protecting religious liberties. First-tier rights, at

71. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 22.
72. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. Various
European States have separate provisions addressing religious liberty, which often provide
greater protection of religious liberty than that provided under the European Convention.
Thus, the decisions under the European Convention should be viewed as a floor of protection
rather than a description of the entire edifice protecting religious freedom and belief, which
varies from state to state.
73. Prior to November 1998, a petition to the European Commission on Human
Rights could be filed by “any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set
forth in [the European Convention].” Id. at art. 25.
74. Article 9 reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id. at art. 9. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is identical to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is very similar to Article 18, Paragraph 3 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although the reference to “necessary in a
democratic society” is missing.
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least in theory, are absolute and include “the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion,” as well as the “freedom to
change [one’s] religion or belief.”75 Second-tier rights involve
“manifestations” of religion or belief “in worship, teaching, practice
and observance,” in “public or private,” “either alone or in
community with others,” which may be subject to limitations
provided that such limitations meet certain conditions, including
conditions that (1) such limitations are “prescribed by law,”76 (2)
such limitations are necessary in a democratic society,77 and (3) such
limitations serve a legitimate aim in that they either (a) are necessary
in the interests of public safety and for the protection of public
order,78 (b) are necessary for the protection of health,79 (c) are
75. Id. at art. 9, para. 1.
76. To date, no Article 9 case has succeeded because a restriction on freedom of religion
or belief was not prescribed by law. Generally, the European Court of Human Rights has
explicitly held that the legislation under which State action was taken was prescribed by law,
despite strong criticism of this approach by some dissenting members of the court. EVANS,
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 139.
77. The European Commission on Human Rights and European Court of Human
Rights engage in a balancing test to determine whether a limitation is necessary, and the court
has developed the notion of a “margin of appreciation,” which is quite deferential to state
determinations of necessity. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22
(1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the
vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on
the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them.”). The court also
sometimes conducts a “proportionality” analysis to determine whether a restriction is necessary
in a democratic society. See, e.g., Nat’l Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
578, 595 (1979–80), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (determining proportionality based upon
whether “the disadvantage suffered by the applicant is excessive in relation to the legitimate
aim pursued by the Government”); Larissis and others v. Greece, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
363 (1998–V), 27 E.H.R.R. 329 (1999) (Lexis) (upholding convictions of military officers for
unlawful proselytizing of men under their command on grounds that this was proportionate to
the end of preventing abuses to the rights and freedoms of others).
78. As Professor Evans explains, “There is clearly a need to allow restrictions to protect
public order and safety, as some religious groups may be involved in inciting or organizing acts
of violence.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 150; see, e.g., Omkaranda and
the Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, 25 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 105 (1981),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (imprisonment of leader of religious group which he led in acts of
criminal violence); X v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 62 (1975),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (right of free expression does not include right to incite others to
desert army, to murder officers, and to supply weapons to the enemy). Nevertheless, “the
public order limitation also has the potential to be interpreted very widely to allow States to
intervene in religious practices at any time that they become inconvenient or annoying to those
in power.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 150; see, e.g., Hakansson v.
Sweden, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1983), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (upholding the conviction
of man who loudly proclaimed the evils of alcohol on grounds that doing so was necessary to

1240

3SCH-FIN

1217]

12/1/2004 7:07 PM

The Autonomy of Church and State

necessary for the protection of morals,80 or (d) are necessary for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.81
In the language of the European Court of Human Rights,
Article 9’s first-tier protections apply to the forum internum, and the
second-tier protections apply to the forum externum. Given the
wording of Article 9(1), one might expect there to be a large sphere
of religious freedom that is absolute, including the right to change
one’s religion, and cannot be subject to derogation by the limitations
on “manifestations” of religion that are contemplated in Article 9(2).
But while the “Court has emphasized the importance of freedom of
religion or belief, in particular at the level of the internal, individual
conscience,” it has not “given much consideration to the content of
the freedom.”82
protect public order); ISKON and others v. United Kingdom, 76-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 90, 91 (1994), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (enforcing local planning laws against a
Hindu temple to restrict uses to which the temple could be put and the number of people who
could attend); Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347, 1369
(1996–IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw) (Martins, J., concurring) (noting that while
the requirement of prior authorization for building a place of worship may be appropriate in
some circumstances, it could also be used to disguise intolerance).
79. “There have been a number of cases that have come before the [European]
Commission [on Human Rights] that suggest that the State does have a right to force
protection of health even on those who have a serious religious reason for rejecting the
protection.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 156.
80. Although “[a]llowing a State to justify restrictions on the right to manifest a religion
or belief by reference to morality potentially poses serious problems,” Professor Evans notes
that “the [European] Court [of Human Rights] and [European] Commission [on Human
Rights] have tended to grant States a wide margin of appreciation” in such cases. Id. at 159–
60.
81. Conflicts with the rights and freedoms of others might involve conflicts between the
religious beliefs of one party and the religious beliefs of another party, or might involve a
conflict between a religious belief of one party and a nonreligious right or freedom of another
party. One area where the possibility and likelihood of conflict appears to be particularly high is
between conservative or traditional religious groups or believers on the one hand, and equality
rights of women on the other hand. Professor Evans notes that “[a]lthough it has not been a
particular issue in the Convention case law, there is significant potential for conflict between
the rights of women and the right to freely practice a religion that may include practices that
emphasize the subordinate status of women.” Id. at 161 n.147. Evans also notes that
“sometimes the vague way in which ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ is used suggests that
the limitations clause may have a wider scope than the rights under the Convention.” Id. at
161.
82. Id. at 68. Evans notes that “[a]t the most basic level, [the freedom of religion]
could be considered simply the right to hold opinions silently (on religious or other important
issues) without interference by the State.” Id. If so, the “content of the right is minimal,”
perhaps limited to limitations “against the dehumanizing techniques adopted in a police state.”
Id.
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The court has tended to analyze religious liberty issues, even
those involving the right to change one’s religion, under the rubric
of the scope of permissible limitations upon manifestations of
religious belief permitted by Article 9(2).83 At other times, the court
simply assumes that a case involves a “manifestation” of religious
belief without considering whether the case might involve a tier-one
nonderogable right of conscience or religion.84 For example, in
Buscarini v. San Marino,85 a Grand Chamber of the court held that a
requirement that members of the parliament of San Marino “take an
oath swearing on the Gospels” to perform their duties violated
Article 9 since it “required them to swear allegiance to a particular
religion.”86 But the court did not analyze the requirement under
Article 9(1)’s absolute protection of “the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.”87 Rather, the court held that the
required oath was an impermissible limitation under Article 9(2)
because the oath was not necessary in a democratic society.88 Rather
than consider the effect of requiring a non-Christian to make an oath
on a Christian Bible, the court chose to focus on the manifestation
such a requirement made concerning a particular religion.
In addition to Article 9, Article 14 of the European Convention
contains a broad nondiscrimination provision prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion, among other grounds.89
Article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention provides
that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to an education” and
requires states when exercising functions in relation to education and
teaching to “respect the rights of parents to ensure such education

83. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R.
397 (1994) (Westlaw).
84. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 68.
85. Buscarini and others v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 30
E.H.R.R. 208 (2000) (Westlaw).
86. Id. at para. 34.
87. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 9, para. 1.
88. Buscarini, App. No. 24645/94, at paras. 35–40; see also EVANS, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION, supra note 3, at 68.
89. Article 14 of the European Convention reads, “The enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set out in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a minority, property, birth or other status.” European Convention, supra note
72, at art. 14.
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and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.”90
The history of the interpretation and application of the European
Convention can be divided into two chapters, before and after
November 1998, when Protocol 11 to the Convention took effect.
Prior to November 1998, two bodies existed to “ensure the
observance of the engagements undertaken” by the Contracting
Parties—the European Commission of Human Rights (the
“Commission”) and the European Court of Human Rights (the
“European Court”).91 The role of the Commission and the
European Court was quite complex. In order for a petition to the
Commission to be admissible, an applicant must have exhausted all
domestic remedies,92 the application could not be anonymous,93 and
the petition could not be “incompatible with the provisions of the
present Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right
of petition.”94 If the Commission found a case to be admissible, then
it attempted to negotiate a friendly settlement between the parties,95
and if a solution was not achieved, it prepared a report giving its
opinion whether or not there had been a breach of the

90. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Mar.
20 1952, protocol I, art. II. Carolyn Evans explains that “[t]his Article was one of the most
controversial in the Convention and had to be included in a separate Protocol because
agreement on its wording could not be reached in time for the signing of the main
instrument.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 6. The European Convention
contains other provisions that might be relevant to the protection of religious freedom or
belief, including Article 8 (concerning private and family life), Article 10 (concerning freedom
of expression), and Article 11 (concerning freedom of peaceful assembly), but these provisions
are beyond the scope of this paper.
91. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 19.
92. Id. at art. 35, para. 1.
93. Id. at art. 35, para. 2(a).
94. Id. at art. 35, para. 3. According to Carolyn Evans,
[t]he power to determine that petitions were ill-founded allowed the Commission
summarily to dismiss cases that were not procedurally inadmissible but that would
clearly fail if taken to the merits phase. It allowed the Commission to weed out weak
and hopeless cases at an early stage in order to expedite proceedings and avoid
wasting time on cases with little or no merit.
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 9.
95. European Convention, supra note 72, at arts. 28 & 30. Such settlements were
reached in a number of freedom of religion cases. See, e.g., Pentidis and others v. Greece, 39
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 983, 990 (1997-III), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int; Hazar, Hazar and
Acik v. Turkey, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 111 (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
(friendly settlement).
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Convention.96 Commission reports were not binding upon states,
and states (but originally not the petitioners)97 could refer the matter
either to a Committee of Ministers98 or to the European Court, both
of which had the right to make a final decision whether a state had
breached an obligation under the European Convention, and to
make decisions, including awarding “just satisfaction” to injured
petitioners, which were binding upon the Contracting Parties.99
When the Council of Europe adopted Protocol 11, it abolished the
Commission, limited the role of the Council of Ministers, and
established a new court, which is able to sit in smaller panels,
enabling it to deal with a larger number of cases.100
In comparison with the United States, one distinctive feature of
church-state relations in Europe is that in many countries a much
greater degree of cooperation or engagement of religion and the
state is deemed appropriate. I will argue that like separation and
accommodation, this cooperationist viewpoint is based upon a

96. European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 31.
97. Id. at art. 38 (original text). With the adoption of Protocol 9, petitioners as well as
states gained the right to bring a case to the European Court, although a panel of the court
was authorized to evaluate petitions to determine whether they raised a “serious question
involving the interpretation or application of the Convention.”
98. If a State referred a matter to the Committee of Ministers and the Committee
determined that there was a breach of the Convention, this conclusion was binding upon the
parties, but the Committee never overruled the Commission in relation to any Article 9
complaints, and so it is largely irrelevant to the interpretation of Article 9. See EVANS,
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 9.
99. See European Convention, supra note 72, at arts. 50–53.
100. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 10. The Plenary Court, comprised
of a number of judges equal to the number of member states, sits only for administrative
matters, European Convention, supra note 72, at art. 21 (as amended). Committees of three
judges can decide by unanimous vote whether a case is admissible, id. at art. 28 (as amended),
and Panels of seven judges decide the admissibility of cases that are not unanimously decided
by Committees and also hear the merits of cases, id. at art. 29 (as amended). When a Chamber
believes a matter is sufficiently significant, it may refer the case to a Grand Chamber of
seventeen judges, id. at art. 30 (as amended). Parties may also request a Grand Chamber to
consider cases, id. at art. 43 (as amended). Some commentators have suggested that
[s]ome cases that have been summarily dismissed . . . require analysis . . . [, especially]
cases that are found to be inadmissible on the basis that they are manifestly illfounded . . . because often the failure of the Commission to deal seriously with these
cases demonstrates its conservative approach to Article 9. Also, some members of
the Court have suggested that sometimes the technical provisions that can be used
to deem a case inadmissible (such as failure to exhaust domestic remedies) have been
used by the Court to avoid looking into difficult or controversial areas.
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 10 (citing case).
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particular conception of autonomy, one which emphasizes
interdependence.101
In Europe, the state is much less likely to be seen as an enemy of
freedom and is much more likely to be seen as the champion or
promoter of freedom. This is true with respect to liberty in general,
as well as religious liberty in particular. For example, in describing
the German experience with industrialization, Leonard Krieger
suggests that the experience “set up the relationship between
individuals and the authoritarian state in which the state was both
favorable and necessary to the material side of personal freedom and
in which the individual, consequently, was both beholden to the
state and, to evade this dependence, withdrawn from it.”102 Much
the same could be said about the relationship of the individual and
the state with respect to spiritual freedom. According to Krieger, the
Reformation resulted in
increased ecclesiastical powers of Lutheran and Catholic princes
alike, a development which received theoretical expression for
Lutheran princes in the doctrine of the jus episcopale. Ultimately
both the fact and the doctrine, which conferred upon the prince
the prime responsibility and the supreme power for the
organization and maintenance of religion in his territories, were to
contribute signally to the extension of authority which led to the
organization of the sovereign state . . . .103

This resulted in what became a “familiar mixing of [the prince’s]
private and public capacities,” and the prince became “the agent of
spiritual freedom for his society as well as of political power over
it.”104

101. Carolyn Evans argues that “one of the reasons that the [European] Court and
Commission have not developed an adequate jurisprudence on religious freedom is that they
have not taken seriously the importance of understanding the rationale for religious freedom.”
Id. at 33. Evans suggests that “[t]he argument from autonomy seems to be the best approach
for the [European] Court to take to interpreting Article 9.” Id. While I agree with Professor
Evans that the concept autonomy appears to provide a promising basis for interpreting Article
9, as I argue throughout this paper, I believe that a certain conception of autonomy does
actually underlie much of the European Court’s and the Commission’s approach to issues of
religious freedom and belief, but that the conception of autonomy adopted by the court is
quite different than the liberal conception favored by Evans. See infra Part III.A–C.
102. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
TRADITION 39 (1957).
103. Id. at 48.
104. Id. at 49.
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The history of the relationship between church and state in
Europe is extraordinarily complex and far beyond the scope of this
paper.105 But even today in Europe, in contrast with America, people
are much less likely to view the state as an enemy or threat to
religious freedom and more likely to view it as a protector and
facilitator of religious freedom.106 The clearest evidence of this
difference in view between the United States and Europe can be seen
in the jurisprudence concerning the institutional autonomy of the
state and the institutional autonomy of the church.
III. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY
In Part II of this Article, I suggested that three very different
approaches to adjudicating issues involving religious liberty and the
relationship between church and state—separation, cooperation, and
accommodation—are each based upon competing conceptions of a
single concept, autonomy. In Parts IV and V of this Article, I will
illustrate how these three conceptions of autonomy influence
jurisprudence relating to a wide variety of issues involving
institutional autonomy (both of churches and of the state) and
individual autonomy. In Part VI, I will consider the implications of
these conceptions of autonomy for a few current areas of controversy
in the United States. Before turning to these tasks, however, I must
sketch the basic contours of these competing conceptions of
autonomy. Each of these conceptions is based upon very different
visions of what autonomy is and what conditions make its exercise
possible.
The etymology of the term autonomy is from the Greek autos
(self) and nomos (rule or law). The term was first applied by the
Greeks to the concept of the city-state.107 A city was autonomous if
105. See CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (J.F.
Maclear ed., 1995); PHILIP S. GORSKI, THE DISCIPLINARY REVOLUTION: CALVINISM AND
THE RISE OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2003); NEGOTIATING SECULAR AND
ECCLESIASTICAL POWER: WESTERN EUROPE IN THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES (Arnoud-Jan A.
Bijsterveld et al. eds., 1999); see also CHURCH AND STATE IN POSTWAR EASTERN EUROPE: A
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY (Paul Mojzes ed., 1987).
106. On the other hand, in states such as France and Turkey, where the emergence of a
liberal democratic state was in large measure a struggle against a state dominated by a
particular religious orthodoxy, the degree of separation of church and state that is deemed
necessary to protect religious freedom is very high.
107. I will treat autonomy as a concept that is meaningful for both individual human
beings and for institutions (both churches and the state). This view reflects both the history
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its citizens made their own laws and the city was not under the
control of an outside power. In his study of autonomy, Gerald
Dworkin notes that the term autonomy is used “in an exceedingly
broad fashion.”
It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative
in Berlin’s terminology), sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or
sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is
equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence,
responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of
self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from obligation,
with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one’s own
interests. It is even equated by some economists with the
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions,
to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other
persons, to thoughts, and to principles. About the only features
held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a
feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.108

Professor Dworkin concludes, “[i]t is very unlikely that there is a
core meaning which underlies all these various uses of the term.”109
There are, however, a number of central ideas that seem to be a part
of all—or nearly all—accounts of autonomy. These ideas are selfdirection, independence, and the ability to choose and implement a
life plan.
One disputed issue—perhaps the disputed issue—in the
philosophy of autonomy is the role or place for the influence of
others on the individual or entity that is autonomous. What is the
role of community in the exercise of individual autonomy? Is the
state’s obligation to stay out of the way, or does it have an
affirmative duty to create conditions that will facilitate the
development of human autonomy? And must the state remain
neutral regarding various conceptions of the good life, or can it take
measures that will favor some conceptions of the good life over
others?

and current usage of the term autonomy, but as will be clear from the discussion below, the
conditions for exercising autonomy may be different in individual and institutional contexts.
Institutional autonomy is discussed infra at Part IV, and individual autonomy is discussed
infra at Part V.
108. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988).
109. Id.
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The conditions that must prevail in order for individuals or
institutions to be able to lead autonomous lives is a matter of
considerable disagreement. I will briefly outline three possibilities—
independence, interdependence, and inter-independence—none of
which is meant to describe the views of any particular author, but
each of which illustrates broadly different approaches to
understanding the conditions that must prevail in order for one to
live an autonomous life.
The first conception is based upon an ideal of absolute
independence. According to this vision, the key condition for being
able to exercise autonomy is to be left alone, free from the influence
or interference of others. The basic idea is that people should
compose their own lives and be able to do so free from coercion in
matters of fundamental importance. At an institutional level, the
ideal of separation of church and state reflects this ambition, and the
guiding metaphor is of a “wall of separation” between church and
state, dividing each area into its own sphere of activity and influence,
in which it will remain untouched by the other.
The second conception of autonomy is based upon an ideal of
interdependence. According to this vision, autonomy is possible only
within thickly contextualized social structures, where each person or
institution has significant obligations to others that must be met in
order for those others to have the ability to exercise autonomy.
The third conception of autonomy is based upon an ideal of
inter-independence, a somewhat counterintuitive idea, which on the
one hand requires neither separation nor isolation, but which on the
other hand reserves a larger place for independence than does a
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence.
A. Independence
The first conception, or really group of conceptions, of
autonomy centers on the idea of independence. Echoing Kant’s
argument for the fundamental importance of independence of the
will, Joel Feinberg has stated, “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no
one else rules I.”110
This conception of autonomy receives its classic articulation by
John Stuart Mill in his essay, On Liberty, and was forcefully
110. Joel Feinberg, The Idea of a Free Man, in EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
REASON 161 (1972).
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articulated in the Eighteenth century by philosophers and politicians
such as Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat Condorcet, Thomas
Paine, and Benjamin Constant. In its strongest formulation,
autonomy requires complete independence from all other
influences.111 According to Isaiah Berlin, while personal freedom will
have limits based upon protecting the liberties of others,
a certain vacuum round him has to be created, a certain space
within which he may be allowed to fulfill what might be called his
reasonable wishes. One should not criticize these wishes. Each
man’s ends are his own; the business of the State is to prevent
collisions; to act as a kind of traffic policeman and night watchman
. . . ; simply to see to it that people do not clash with each other
too much in the fulfilling of those personal ends about which they
themselves are the ultimate authorities. Liberty means nonencroachment; liberty therefore means non-impingement by one
person on another.”112

Autonomy is contrasted, in Kant’s terminology, to heteronomy,
the determination of one’s will by forces outside oneself.113 Strong

111. Immanuel Kant and Jean-Paul Sartre, although very different in their ethical views,
share a conception of autonomy that depends upon individuals living in a social context that
affords complete moral independence. Kant encourages us to resist the “self-imposed
immaturity” of trusting in the authority of others. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF
MORAL COMPLEXITY 78 (1987); see also IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 440–45 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981). Although Sartre did not
share Kant’s belief that all rational and autonomous agents will choose to abide a single moral
law, like Kant, Sartre conceives of autonomous action being the work of independent actors
operating in willful isolation. For Sartre the most important moral fact is the irrevocable reality
of fundamental human freedom. Only by accepting one’s radical freedom can a human being
eschew the “bad faith” of relying upon a misconceived form of psychological determinism and
recognize that the human will is the absolute origin of its acts. A human being, according to
Sartre, is capable of acting as a moral agent only when she recognizes her freedom and takes
complete responsibility for her choices. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
(Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
112. ISAIAH BERLIN, FREEDOM AND ITS BETRAYAL: SIX ENEMIES OF HUMAN LIBERTY
52–53 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). This recently published volume of Isaiah Berlin’s influential
BBC lectures has recently been posthumously published and provides an early and striking
example of Berlin’s lifelong occupation with the meaning of liberty and the various ways in
which that term has been construed.
113. KANT, supra note 111, at 440–45. William Galston observes that Kant’s view of
autonomy combines, to borrow Isaiah Berlin’s terminology, a view of ethics based on positive
freedom and a view of politics based on negative freedom. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL
PURPOSES 83 (1991).
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versions of autonomy require complete independence of the will,
what I term “stark independence.”114
Conceptions of autonomy based upon the idea of independence,
however, need not be conceptualized in such a strong manner.
Professor Joseph Raz explains that the basic idea behind the ideal of
personal autonomy is that people should compose their own lives:
“The autonomous person is a (part) author of [her] own life. The
ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive
decisions throughout their lives.”115 Professor Raz contrasts an
autonomous life with a life devoid of choices or without awareness of
choices, of coerced choices, or of simply “drifting through life
without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.”116
Professor Raz’s weaker conception of autonomy does not require
complete independence, although it does contemplate an absence of
coercion and invidious forms of psychological manipulation, as well
as the existence of, awareness of, and the wherewithal to pursue a
variety of life plans. Following Raz, Professor Carolyn Evans argues
that
Coercion in matters of fundamental importance, such as belief in
the existence of God, or an afterlife, or a religiously based set of
morals or obligations towards others, would deny people the ability
to be the authors of their own lives. The fullest personal autonomy
will exist in a society in which a person sees the availability of a
range of good choices in regard to religion or belief and is able to
make meaningful decisions about which, if any, of these choices he
or she wishes to adopt.117

A conception of autonomy based upon the idea of independence
(of both individuals and institutions) had a strong influence on much
of the religion-clause jurisprudence in the United States.118 Most
obviously, Jefferson’s metaphor of a wall of separation dividing

114. For a critique of the political morality of stark independence, see ISAIAH BERLIN,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 124 (1969); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 119 (1981); Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered
Self, 12 POL. THEORY 90–91 (1984).
115. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
116. Id. at 371.
117. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 30.
118. As noted above, a counter-theme in U.S. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
accommodation. See supra Part II.B.1.
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religion on the one hand and the state on the other is a clear
example of a vision of autonomy that rests upon independence. On
this view, the domain of the state and the domain of religion are
divided into respective spheres, and the mandate of the First
Amendment is to prevent either from intruding upon the precincts
of the other. Territorial metaphors prevail, and the wall becomes an
apt symbol for the ideal relationship—even if imperfectly realized—
between church and state. Because autonomy demands
independence, the religion clauses require “mutual noninterference
by church and state in each other’s affairs.”119
B. Interdependence
In sharp contrast to conceptions of autonomy that are based
upon various understandings of independence, another group of
conceptions of autonomy takes a markedly different tact in defining
the social conditions that must prevail in order for autonomy to
flourish. A conception of autonomy based upon conditions of thick
social interdependence maintains that autonomy is possible only when
exercised within a thick and embracing social setting, and only if one
is true to one’s “real” self or “true” nature. On this view, the
possibilities open to an autonomous agent are determined in large
measure—perhaps almost completely—by the social context within
which the agent is situated. Such conceptions of autonomy are
closely related to Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive liberty.120
These views diverge significantly from independence-based
conceptions of autonomy. A conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence will suggest that human potential or nature can be
truly realized only within a thick communal context. Religious,
nonreligious, and a variety of utopian conceptions of the good life
often posit a single truth or set of truths about human nature, the
human good (or human flourishing), and the universe that justify
significantly directing the choices available to a person, all in service
of his or her own best interests.
A wide variety of eighteenth-century philosophers held views that
either explicitly or implicitly endorsed such a conception of
autonomy. For example, Claude-Adrien Helvetius, who is often
119. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (2d ed. 1999).
120. BERLIN, supra note 114, at 118.
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viewed as a forerunner of Benthamite utilitarianism, believed that he
had discovered the single principle governing ethics and politics,
namely the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Armed
with this knowledge, he asserted that an enlightened political leader
could enact laws that would maximize pleasure and minimize pain,
without regard for human rights.121 Jean Jacques Rousseau settled
the conflict between liberty and authority by defining them as the
same thing; liberty he defined as wanting that which is good for me,
that which will satisfy my true nature. And since human nature is
unitary, what is good for one man will also be good for another. So
what one person can truly want will never collide with what another
person truly wants, and a state that forces one to be true to one’s
nature is really acting to vindicate one’s freedom.122 Johann Gottlieb
Fichte reaches a similar conclusion by focusing not upon personal
self-realization, but collective self-realization. According to Berlin,
Fichte contrasts compositum, which is a mere artificial combination,
and totum, [or] total nation, which is something organic, single,
whole, and in which the higher principle dominates, the higher
principle which may take the shape of a great nation, or of history.
And the greatest agent of this force is a divine conqueror or leader
whose business it is to play upon his nation as an artist plays upon
his instrument, to mould it into a single organic whole, as the
painter, the sculptor moulds his materials, as the composer creates
patterns of sound.123

On this view, individual autonomy is realized when it is made to
fit harmoniously with the triumphant state by acquiescing to its
destiny.124 Perhaps most influentially, such a view of autonomy was
121. BERLIN, supra note 112, at 13–20. Isaiah Berlin forcefully articulated utilitarianism’s
hostility towards rights.
To have a right which nobody may impinge upon, to have a right which nobody
may trample, to have a right to do or be or have this or that, whether anybody likes
it or not, is an obstacle to the transformation of society in the direction of the
greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Id. at 19. For a utilitarian, according to Berlin, rights are (as Bentham insisted) “nonsense on
stilts.” Id. at 25. Berlin further states, “If the sole criterion of action is happiness and
unhappiness, these odd rights which stick out in an obstinate way, and may not be smoothed
over by the legislator, must be flattened out.” Id. at 20.
122. See id. at 37–41.
123. Id. at 70.
124. “Individual freedom, which in Kant has a sacred value, has for Fichte become a
choice made by something super-personal. It chooses me, I do not choose it, and acquiescence
is a privilege, a duty, a self-lifting, a kind of self-transcendent rising to a higher level.” Id. at 71.
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developed by Hegel, who focused upon the triumph of natural
power in his dialectic of history in which liberty is seen as the
recognition of necessity, and liberty consists in aligning oneself with
what is necessary.125
While these thinkers differ dramatically in their diagnosis and
prescription of the true purpose or end of human beings, they share
something important in common: a belief that there is one true good
for humankind, and a belief that everything that a person can
rationally want can be harmonized with that vision. As such,
autonomy does not consist of having space in which there can be no
interference with human choice, be it good or bad, foolish or wise;
rather, autonomy is achieved when one realizes one’s true potential,
and it may take the strong hand of a tutoring state to educate and
direct one towards that end.
A conception of autonomy resting upon interdependence has not
been particularly influential in religious freedom jurisprudence in the
United States, primarily because of the Establishment Clause. In
contrast, in Europe where religious establishments are much more
common, an understanding of the proper relationship between the
church and the state is heavily influenced by this conception of
autonomy.
C. Inter-Independence
A third conception of autonomy, which I label somewhat
paradoxically inter-independence, seeks a middle ground between
conceptions of autonomy based upon conditions of stark
independence, as well as conceptions of autonomy based upon

According to Berlin, Fichte identifies “freedom with self-assertion, with the imposition of your
will upon others, with the removal of obstacles to your desires, and finally with a victorious
nation marching to fulfill its destiny in answer to the internal demands given to it by
transcendental reason, before which all material things must crumble.” Id. at 73.
125. Isaiah Berlin explains Hegel’s conception of human freedom as follows:
What is freedom but doing what I wish to do, getting what I want to get, obtaining
from life what I am seeking for? I can only get this if I do not run against the laws
which govern the world. If I defy them I shall be inevitably defeated. . . . If I wish to
be effective historically, I must not set myself against the laws which govern human
beings and institutions. This non-defiance is not an acquiescence which I
consciously adopt with resignation, although I would rather be free. To understand
why things cannot be otherwise is to want them not to be otherwise, because to
understand things is to understand the reasons from them.
Id. at 89.
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conditions of thick interdependence. On this view, stark independence
is unappealing because in a world where the government plays a
significant social and economic role in the lives of citizens and
institutions, requiring stark independence can easily manifest itself as
indifference or hostility rather than neutrality. Since human beings
are social creatures, we need some resources in order to be able to
develop into autonomous agents. On the other hand, thick
interdependence is unappealing because it is insufficiently respectful
of the pluralism and diversity that has come to characterize, and in all
likelihood will continue to characterize, our political communities. If
the state strongly favors or forces upon its subjects a particular
conception of the good, then this will retard the development of
autonomy.
A conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence is
difficult to conceptualize and articulate. Autonomy based upon the
idea of inter-independence will be more willing than independencebased conceptions of autonomy to recognize that human beings are
born into and raised within social contexts. When we are born, our
condition is one of near complete dependence upon others for
survival and nurture, and even as we mature and become increasingly
independent, it is evident that the possibilities available to us are in
large measure defined by the social conditions within which we find
ourselves. We do not create ourselves ex nihilio, as self-defining
adults, but emerge, through education and inculcation, as members
of particular families and communities. If my polity insists on
isolating me, insists on erecting walls of separation between me and
its social institutions, and refuses on grounds of eschewing
paternalism to educate and equip me to survive—and more, to have
a range of life options and possibilities among which I may choose
and pursue—such a state, for it would not even begin to qualify as a
society, much less a community, could not in reality be said to be
interested in my autonomy.
On the other hand, unlike conceptions of autonomy based upon
thick interdependence, a conception based upon inter-independence
will continue to insist that there must be a distinction between the
public and private spheres. Such a conception of autonomy will
recognize that autonomy is not possible if the state, or some other
authority, discerns and coerces me to follow a particular plan that
facilitates the realization of my “true” nature or potential. Even if I
have a single true nature, and a single true course of action is
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necessary for me to realize my innate potential, I cannot exercise
autonomy if I am forced to abide by a plan for realizing my natural
possibilities.
A conception of autonomy that is based upon relationships of
inter-independence will view stark independence as a false ideal:
untrue because autonomy is only possible within social settings; and
unappealing because many of humanity’s greatest achievements are
the result of collective, cooperative, and coordinated interaction.
Likewise, inter-independence will view a conception of autonomy
based upon thick interdependence as a false ideal: untrue because
autonomy cannot be forced upon us; and unappealing as an
empirical matter because history is littered with corpses left by
theocrats, idealists, tyrants, and despots of every persuasion who
were dedicated to imposing upon others their view of a single, true
vision of human nature, potential, and destiny.
Although a complete development and articulation of the
conditions for exercising an ideal of inter-independence must await
another day, a few general observations can be made.
First, inter-independence is committed to a muscular, though not
unlimited, independence. Coercion and manipulation, but not the
ability to influence and be influenced, are destructive of interindependence. A life can be meaningfully called autonomous only if it
is to a considerable extent the creation or composition of the person
living it. Space must be left for what Isaiah Berlin described as
negative freedom, a sphere within which we as individual agents are
free to direct our own lives. This commitment to independence
presupposes a distinction between private and public life, although
there will be some overlap between these spheres, and although
there will be mutual influences between them.
Second, a conception of autonomy based upon the idea of interindependence implies inclusion, being allowed to play an active role
in a collective community’s social and political life. Inclusion is
closely related to respect, for meaningful respect is not possible if one
is ignored or pushed to the margins of public life. Inter-independence
forbids exclusion. This implies the ability to influence and be
influenced by others. Ultimately, inter-independence does not
pretend that autonomous beings are, can, or should be completely
free from the presence and influence of others.
Inclusion does not rest upon a hope for complete or perfect
convergence of moral or social viewpoints. That is the false and
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dangerous dream of thick interdependence and conceptions of
autonomy based upon positive liberty.126 A commitment to an
ongoing, shared normative discourse need not rest upon the belief
that we will come up with arguments for a moral theory, religious
doctrine, or social program that no rational person can reject.
Inclusive discourse is based upon the belief that discussion and
argument in moral matters is largely about learning to understand
and respect each other and about taking responsibility for the
implications of our moral positions.127 This is not to say that moral
discourse is not about persuasion—it is—but it is not exclusively
about persuasion. Stephen Macedo, for example, acknowledges that
when “public reasonableness has done its work,” moral viewpoints
will remain “plural and divergent.”128 An ideal of autonomy based
upon inter-independence aims at a polity characterized by political
moderation and inclusion, for a form of fraternity that goes beyond
bare toleration.
Third, inter-independence relies upon a shared commitment to
mutual respect among autonomous agents. This respect will imply
tolerance, but it includes more than mere forbearance of others. The
respect grows out of both sides of the inter-independence ideal—the
independence side, as well as the relational side. Hostility,
discrimination, extreme variations in opportunity and access to social
resources, or marginalization or exclusion of individuals from shared
social and political life are all destructive of autonomy. Respect,
however, requires not merely leaving another person alone, but
helping her equip herself to live a life that can be characterized as
autonomous, and engaging her in what Stephen Macedo has called a
discourse of public reasonableness.129
This type of discourse rests upon a commitment to public
justification, which aims not only to give good reasons for state
action, but also “seeks reasons that can be widely seen to be good by
persons such as they are.”130 Macedo asks, Why public justification?
He answers:

126. See supra Part III.B.
127. See STANLEY CAVELL, Knowledge and the Basis of Morality, in THE CLAIM OF
REASON 247–73 (1982).
128. STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 71 (1990).
129. Id. at 39–77.
130. Id. at 46.
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We acknowledge, first of all, the permanent fact of pluralism:
reasonable people disagree not only about preferences and
interests, but widely and deeply about moral, philosophical,
religious, and other views. While acknowledging pluralism we,
secondly, respect as free and equal moral beings all those who pass
certain threshold tests of reasonableness: we respect those whose
disagreement with us does not impugn their reasonableness.131

This discourse of public justification requires listening to others;
letting others speak; and giving reasons to them that they can
understand and acknowledge when actions are taken that affect
them. As Macedo puts it, “[p]ublic justification embodies a complex
form of respect for persons: it respects both our capacity for a shared
reasonableness, but also ‘the burdens of reason.’”132
Fourth, inter-independence relies upon empowerment, having the
abilities necessary to exercise autonomy. Although, as Joseph Raz has
pointed out, it is part of the “special character of autonomy that one
cannot make another person autonomous,” this does not mean that
others cannot help, particularly in helping secure “the background
conditions which enable a person to be autonomous.”133 The ideal of
stark independence, while romantic, makes the mistake of assuming
that respect for others means just leaving them alone. As Raz points
out, “There is more one can do to help another person have an
autonomous life than stand off and refrain from coercing or
manipulating them,” including helping them develop the “inner
capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life.”134 The
ideal of inter-independence also avoids one of the cardinal mistakes of
an ideal of stark independence—a mistake, characteristic of arrogant
youth, of believing that we are entirely self-made persons.
In the case of personal autonomy, an individual must be
provided with an education and with enough other opportunities
and resources that he or she is empowered to exercise independence
and choice. An autonomous agent must have an adequate range of
options from which to choose projects and commitments.135 Interindependence implies mutual obligation for individuals to help
131. Id. at 47.
132. Id. at 47 (quoting John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping
Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 235–38 (1989)).
133. RAZ, supra note 115, at 407.
134. Id. at 407–08.
135. See id. at 410–12.
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develop the inner capacities—mental, emotional, and physical—of
others, which will enable them to conduct autonomous lives.
Autonomy based upon an ideal of stark independence posits that
we may have nothing in common; autonomy based upon an ideal of
thick interdependence posits that we have everything in common
even though we may not have the good sense to realize it. Interindependence posits a middle ground—that we share much, although
not everything, in common, and that while we should cherish and
nurture that common ground, we must also carve out space for each
other to exercise our independent visions of who we are and ought
to be.
Thus far, I have identified three primary attitudes towards the
proper relationship of church and state and of the scope of individual
religious freedom—separation, cooperation, and accommodation. I
have also argued that each of these attitudes is based upon a different
conception of a single concept: autonomy. Separation is based upon
a conception of autonomy that strives for independence. Cooperation
is based upon a conception of autonomy that strives for
interdependence. And accommodation is based upon a conception of
autonomy that strives for what I have called inter-independence. In
Part III, I have tried to sketch the characteristics and differences
between these three conceptions of autonomy. In doing so, I have
set the stage for an exploration of how these three conceptions of
autonomy are manifested in cases involving religious freedom issues.
In the next three parts of this Article, I will explore the
implications of these three conceptions of autonomy for issues
involving the autonomy of churches, the autonomy of the state, and
the religious autonomy of the individual. In Part IV, I will focus on
institutional autonomy—first, the autonomy of churches, and
second, the autonomy of the state. In Part V, I will turn to issues
involving religion and personal autonomy. In Part VI, I will explore
the implications of each of these conceptions of autonomy for several
current controversies in the United States involving the relationship
of church and state.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
In trying to determine the appropriate contours of interaction
between church and state, the autonomy of two types of institutions
is implicated: the autonomy of churches and the autonomy of the
state. What autonomy means and what is required for church and
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state to have autonomy will depend upon one’s conception of
autonomy. I will argue that in the United States since World War II,
two conceptions of autonomy (one based upon the independence of
church and state and the other based upon the inter-independence of
church and state) have vied for dominance. In Europe, a third
conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church
and state has been dominant in the jurisprudence of the European
Court. In Part IV.A, I will discuss a number of contexts in which the
autonomy of the church is a primary concern, and in Part IV.B, I will
focus upon situations in which the autonomy of the state is at
stake.136
A. The Autonomy of the Church
Issues concerning the autonomy of churches arise in a number of
contexts, including: whether or not a state church is permitted;
whether and the extent to which direct state aid to churches is
permissible; whether churches qualify for and are permitted to
receive tax exemptions; whether states can provide aid to religious
schools, and if so, what the limits are on that aid; whether and the
extent to which the state can influence or dictate decisions involving
church property, officials, and doctrine; whether churches are
entitled to have a distinct legal personality with standing to seek
protection of its legal rights; and whether and the extent to which
churches can qualify for exemptions from general laws.
In addition to their institutional dimension, many of these issues
have implications for individual religious liberty as well, especially the
freedom of religion or belief of people who find themselves in the
minority with respect to matters of religion or belief. Thus, to some
extent the outcomes of cases concerned with institutional autonomy
also have implications for individual autonomy.
1. State church
An established church would clearly be unacceptable under a
conception of autonomy based upon independence. It would also be
136. As will be apparent, classification is sometimes difficult and disputable. In many
instances, a particular issue will implicate both the autonomy of the church and the autonomy
of the state (for example, in the case of a state church). I have tried to classify issues according
to the autonomy interest that seems to me to be primarily implicated, but the classification of
an issue is more a matter of impression and convenience than of metaphysics.
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unacceptable under a conception of autonomy based upon interindependence, because a state church would not have the degree of
independence required to realize the inter-independence ideal of selfdirection and composition. From the perspective of interindependence, an established church would present too great a
possibility for coercion and manipulation of church affairs by political
overseers. The possibility of church self-direction would be
compromised, and the distinction between public and private spheres
would be significantly weakened.
In contrast, a conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence would permit a state religious establishment, since
the roles and purposes of the state and the church are viewed as
being complimentary and mutually reinforcing. If church-state
relations are based upon the interdependence of church and state, a
religious establishment will not necessarily be viewed as being
inimical to the autonomy of the state, to the autonomy of the
church, or to religious freedom. A shared state or national identity
may be seen as important for social and political stability, and the
role and purposes of the church and the state may be seen as being
mutually supportive and reinforcing. Religion may be viewed as the
social glue that holds society together. Overt coercion of
membership may be recognized as being inconsistent with individual
autonomy, but the existence of a church that is endorsed, supported,
and even given preferential treatment by the state may not be seen as
violating religious freedom human rights guarantees and as being
not only fully consistent with but supportive of the autonomy of
both the church and the state.
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the European
Court concerning a state church reflect different conceptions of
autonomy.
United States: The Establishment Clause clearly forbids the
United States from having a national church,137 although it did not
originally prohibit states from having state churches. By the time the
Free Exercise Clause138 and the Establishment Clause139 were

137. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black stated that, “[t]he
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church.” Id. at 15.
138. The Free Exercise Clause was first held to apply to the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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incorporated to apply to action by states as well as by the federal
government (following the Civil War and the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment), no state still had an established church.140
The prohibition in the United States of a state church is consistent
with a conception of autonomy based upon the ideal of complete
independence of church and state, as well as a conception of
autonomy based upon inter-independence.
Europe: The European Convention permits an established state
church. This conclusion was confirmed in Darby v. Sweden, in which
the European Court held that an established church does not violate
the Convention.141 The court did say, however, that a state church
cannot force people to become members or prohibit people from
leaving the church.142 The European Court’s conclusion reflects a
conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church
and state.
2. Direct state aid to churches
A conception of autonomy based upon the independence of
church and state would clearly prohibit direct state aid to churches.
Although it may be viewed as a closer call, the same outcome would
be expected from the inter-independence conception of autonomy,
since independence, even if not perfectly realized, will be jeopardized
by financial dependence of churches upon the state. While a
prohibition on both direct and indirect state aid to churches
comports with a conception of autonomy based upon independence,
some aid, especially if it is indirect rather than direct, might be
permitted by a conception of autonomy based upon interindependence. However, such aid would be scrutinized based upon
the purpose and effect such aid has upon the independence of
churches and the independence of the state. On the other hand, a
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence might easily
permit significant levels of direct aid from the state to a favored
church or group of churches.
139. The Establishment Clause was first applied to the states in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
140. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1591.
141. Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990), 13 E.H.R.R. 774 (1990)
(Lexis).
142. Id. at para. 45.
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United States: Under United States law, neither the federal nor
state governments are permitted to provide direct aid to religion,143
reflecting a conception of autonomy consistent with both
independence and inter-independence. The distinction between direct
and indirect aid, however, is not always clear, and as the recent
debate about charitable choice illustrates, separationist and
accommodationist viewpoints diverge sharply upon the permissibility
of allowing religiously affiliated organizations to participate in such
programs.144 As will be discussed in greater detail below, allowing
parochial schools to benefit from tuition voucher programs, allowing
church-affiliated entities to qualify for state funding grants for social
service programs, and allowing scholarships to be used by students
studying for the clergy are examples of state aid to religion that
could jeopardize the independence of churches to an extent that
would violate the principle of independence. Thus, on the question of
state aid to churches, in the United States there appears to be a
significant movement from a conception of autonomy based upon
independence to a conception based upon inter-independence.
Europe: In contrast, under the European Convention a relatively
high degree of cooperation, support, and preferential treatment for a
particular church is permissible. For example, in Darby v. Sweden, the
court held that the state may directly collect taxes for an established
church, and in order for an individual to be exempt from such a
requirement, the state can require a person to notify the state that
she has changed religious affiliation.145 In addition, a nonbeliever
may be required to pay the proportion of taxes to a state church that
the church uses for carrying out “secular functions,” such as keeping
records of births and deaths, performing marriages, and arranging
funerals, even if the nonbeliever opposes such involvement of the
church in secular functions.146 A large degree of direct state aid to a
particular church reflects a conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence of church and state.

143. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 9, 15 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.”).
144. Charitable choice is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.C.
145. 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
146. Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and others v. Finland, 85-A Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 29 (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. CD 69, 69 (1996) (Westlaw).
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3. Tax exemptions
Autonomy conceived as requiring strict independence of church
and state would not only permit, but also probably guarantee, taxexempt status to churches. Thus, while separation is sometimes
viewed as being hostile to religion, strict independence is not always
inimical to the interests of churches. Autonomy based upon interindependence would appear to permit a tax exemption for churches
since doing so would facilitate churches’ ability to utilize donations
to pursue their self-defined missions and would reduce troubling
entanglements of churches with the state. It is less likely, however,
that inter-independence would view tax exemptions as required in
order to preserve the autonomy of church and state, since a mild
degree of engagement between church and state would be viewed as
being permissible. Especially if churches are able to receive a
significant degree of direct or indirect financial support from the
state (for example, by being able to participate in access to state
funds through finance social service programs), the payment of taxes
as an ordinary burden of citizenship and participation in the program
of public benefits may be seen as justifying the inclusion of churches
in tax programs. Thus, under a view of autonomy based upon interindependence, certain types of generally applicable taxes, such as sales
tax on religious literature and perhaps even property taxes, would
appear to be permissible. Autonomy based upon interdependence
would not necessarily require or permit a tax exemption, since
concerns about engagement and entanglement of church and state
are much less likely to be perceived as problematic. Under
interdependence, favorable tax treatment for preferred churches
would be expected.
United States: Tax exemptions that benefit churches have been
permitted under the Establishment Clause, but such benefits must be
equally available to all churches and must be equally available to
nonreligious charitable organizations. U.S. churches are exempt
from paying taxes, not as a matter of constitutional right, but
pursuant to legislative enactment. Churches are included in the list
of charitable and other nonprofit organizations that can qualify for
tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.147 The Supreme Court has held that the tax-exempt status of

147. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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churches does not violate the Establishment Clause on the grounds
that it is a neutral benefit available to all churches and to other
nonprofit organizations.148 Churches have also been exempted from
certain generally applicable tax laws. For example, in St. Martin
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, the Supreme Court
held that a church-sponsored school was exempt from paying
unemployment compensation tax required under federal law.149
In addition, the Supreme Court has disapproved of laws that
disadvantage a particular religion but not religions generally. For
example, in Larson v. Valente, the Court struck down a state statute
requiring religious organizations that receive less than half their total
contributions from members or affiliated organizations to register
and report their income.150 The statute in question affected only the
Unification Church, and the Court stated that the exemption
scheme violated the “clearest command of the Establishment
Clause,” namely that “one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”151
The approach to tax-exemption issues in the United States has
reflected the presumptions and concerns of a conception of
autonomy based upon inter-independence. Tax exemptions are not a
matter of constitutional right as one would expect from a conception
of autonomy based on strict independence. The indirect benefits to
churches created by a tax exemption are not constitutionally
required, but neither are they constitutionally forbidden. Instead, tax
exemptions may be permissible when the autonomy interests of
churches are significantly implicated. For example, the Court has
reasoned that tax exemptions are permissible because they reduce the
entanglement of church and state, which is problematic from the
perspective of inter-independence. Requiring laws that provide an

148. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672–73 (1970). Although the Court analyzed
tax-exemptions from the perspective of neutrality (the government was exercising “benevolent
neutrality towards churches and religious exercise generally so long as none was favored over
others and none suffered interference”), autonomy would appear to be a much more
promising basis upon which to justify the Court’s outcome. While neither outcome would be
neutral towards churches (since they benefit from an exemption and are burdened by a tax
obligation), the autonomy of church and state is enhanced when the state’s taxing authority
does not cover churches.
149. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788
(1981).
150. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
151. Id. at 244.
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indirect benefit to religion not to discriminate against some religions
is also consistent with the mandate of inter-independence for mutual
respect and inclusion.
On the other hand, in cases involving commercial activities such
as the sale of religious literature, the Supreme Court has held that
the Establishment Clause does not exempt churches from paying a
generally applicable sales tax.152 If autonomy required complete
independence, such taxes should be prohibited. But when churches
are participating in the commercial world, which falls squarely within
the states’ domain, inter-independence does not prohibit being
included in a general tax mechanism.153 The concept of interindependence allows a degree of entanglement but places bounds on
the extent of entanglement between church and state that would be
permitted in an environment of interdependence. For example, in
Larson, because the Minnesota Act in question had a “valid secular
purpose” when viewed as a whole,154 the Court did not rule out the
idea that “the burdens of compliance with the Act would be
intrinsically impermissible if they were imposed evenhandedly.”155
Thus both when allowing and disallowing exemptions from taxation,
the U.S. Supreme Court has followed a path illuminated by a
conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence.
Europe: The Commission has approved of tax arrangements that
provide benefits to one or some churches to the exclusion of other
152. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
153. In Swaggart, the Court focused on the commercial nature of the literature sales
rather than the religious nature of the literature:
The sorts of government entanglement that we have found to violate the
Establishment Clause have been far more invasive than the level of contact created
by the administration of neutral tax laws.
....
. . . [T]he imposition of the sales and use tax without an exemption for
appellant does not require the State to inquire into the religious content of the items
sold or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items, because the
materials are subject to the tax regardless of content or motive. From the State’s
point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but
whether there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular
determination.
Id. at 395–96.
154. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 248 (“Appellants assert, and we acknowledge, that the State
of Minnesota has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from abusive practices in the
solicitation of funds for charity, and that this interest retains importance when the solicitation
is conducted by a religious organization.”).
155. Id. at 253.
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churches. In Iglesia Bautista ‘El Salvador’ and Ortega Moratilla v.
Spain,156 the Commission held that a tax system that gave
preferences to the Catholic Church, but not to Protestant churches,
did not violate Article 9 or Article 14. In that case, the Catholic
Church received a tax exemption from property tax, based upon a
Concordat between the Catholic Church and Spain, and a Protestant
church argued that it too should be exempt from property tax. The
Commission denied the claim that the preferential tax system
violated Article 9, on the grounds that there is no right to an
exemption from ordinary tax obligations and there were “objective
and reasonable” justifications for the difference in treatment.157
Thus, according to Professor Evans, under the jurisprudence of the
European Court, “the State may legitimately tax one Church and
not another, and give financial assistance to one Church and not
another, if there is some arrangement between the privileged Church
and the State which imposes reciprocal obligations on the two
parties.”158
This outcome reflects a conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence of church and state. From this point of view, the
state is not required to be neutral toward religion or to give equal
treatment among churches. Thus it is entirely natural for the state to
view one church as having a particularly significant role in the life of
the nation, and receiving favorable treatment from the state not only
enhances the ability of that institution to perform that distinctive and
valuable role, but also benefits the state through the social good
accomplished by the favored church. Under a conception of
autonomy based on interdependence, the state is viewed as being
competent to make differentiations based upon “objective and
reasonable” justifications for which religious institutions deserve
special treatment and support. On this view, the autonomy of both
the state and the favored church are reinforced by the mutually
symbiotic relationship between these institutions.

156. 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 256 (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
157. In the Iglesia Bautista case, the Catholic Church had undertaken such reciprocal
obligations by placing its historical, artistic, and documentary heritage at the service of the
Spanish people in exchange for benefits from the state including the property tax exemption.
Id. at 261.
158. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 83.
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4. State aid to religious schools
Autonomy conceived as requiring independence of church and
state would not permit state aid to religious schools, whether direct
or indirect. A view of autonomy based on interdependence would
have no difficulty with such aid. A view based on inter-independence
would be very skeptical of aid from the state to religious schools,
since such aid might create dependence of religious schools upon the
state and might also result in situations where church autonomy is
threatened by conditions placed by the state upon access to the aid.
Nevertheless, inter-independence might view certain types of aid as
being permissible if the programs were carefully structured and
limited. A conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence
would consider the effects of such programs upon the independence
of both church and state and the importance of inclusion and the
impact upon the distinction between public and private spheres of
life, as well as whether exclusion would evince hostility and
discrimination, and whether participation is necessary for the
empowerment required to exercise autonomy.
United States: State aid to parochial schools has been very
controversial and the subject of extensive litigation in the United
States.159 The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to construct a
coherent approach to such cases, and the result has been a complex,
convoluted, and internally inconsistent series of cases. In 1947 in
Everson v. Board of Education,160 the first case that applied the
Establishment Clause to the states, the Court upheld a state program
that reimbursed parents for the costs of busing their children to
religious schools, but the Court employed strongly separationist
rhetoric.161 This case provided the wellspring for both separationist
159. For a sampling of the sheer number of state and Supreme Court cases addressing
state aid to parochial schools, see, for example, Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Constitutionality,
Under State Constitutional Provision Forbidding Financial Aid to Religious Sects, of Public
Provision of Schoolbus Service for Private School Pupils, 41 A.L.R. 3d 344 (1972); A.G. Barnett,
Annotation, Furnishing Free Textbooks to Sectarian School or Student Therein, 93 A.L.R. 2d 986
(1964); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Public Payment of Tuition, Scholarship, or the Like, as
Respects Sectarian School, 81 A.L.R. 2d 1309 (1962).
160. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black reasoned that busing was a “public function” akin
to providing fire and police services, and did not promote a “religious function.” Id. at 17–18.
161. “Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation
between church and State.’” Id. at 16.
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and accommodationist arguments and outcomes in a long line of
cases over the next several decades.
In cases dealing with state aid to religiously affiliated schools, the
Supreme Court has vacillated between a conception of church-state
autonomy requiring separation and independence and a conception
based upon inter-independence, allowing for greater accommodation
and inclusion. Some cases have reflected a view of autonomy based
upon stark independence of church and state. For example, in Lemon
v. Kurtzman,162 the Court held that states may not reimburse
religious schools for the salaries of teachers of various secular subjects
and that the state may not provide state-approved instructional
materials to religious schools.163 The Court also held that the
Establishment Clause was violated by state salary supplements to
teachers at religious schools who taught only subjects offered in
public schools using materials used in public schools.164 It also struck
down grants to parochial schools that served low-income families to
maintain and repair school facilities,165 as well as small (fifty-dollar)
tax credits for low-income parents of children attending religious
schools. In addition, the Court struck down payments for statemandated examinations prepared by teachers at religious schools,166
and instructional materials such as maps, films, and laboratory
equipment, provided to religious schools.167 Finally, the Court struck
down programs providing therapeutic services, such as remedial
speech and hearing therapy, on the premises of religious schools168
and the reimbursement of bus transportation for children attending
religious schools to participate in educational field trips.169
In recent years, the Supreme Court has moved away from a
strongly separationist stance with respect to state aid to religious
schools and has permitted certain types of aid that are generally

162. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
163. Id. at 606–07.
164. Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
165. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973);
see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (reimbursements).
166. Id.
167. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 476 (1973).
168. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
169. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 225.
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available to both religious and nonreligious private schools.170 The
concerns of inter-independence have been evident in a number of
cases. For example, in Board of Education v. Allen,171 the Supreme
Court upheld a state policy allowing public school boards to lend
textbooks to religious schools.172 The Court allowed remedial
instruction off school grounds,173 later allowed remedial services on
religious school premises174 (reversing two earlier cases175), allowed
state reimbursement to religious schools for instructional materials
such as maps and films176 (reversing earlier cases177), therapeutic
services such as speech and hearing therapy at religious schools178
(reversing an earlier case179), and reimbursement to religious schools
for the costs of bus transportation for educational field trips180

170. See infra Part VI.B in which I discuss the Supreme Court’s move away from a
separationist stance with vouchers and other forms of indirect aid to churches. For an
interesting perspective on Supreme Court “flip-flops” on Establishment Clause issues, see
Christopher E. Smith, Supreme Court Surprise: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Move Toward
Moderation, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 459 (1992).
171. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
172. Id. at 243. In dissent, Justice Black advocated the view that the Establishment
Clause requires complete independence of church and state.
It is true, of course, that the New York law does not as yet formally adopt or
establish a state religion. But it takes a great stride in that direction and coming
events cast their shadows before them. The same powerful sectarian religious
propagandists who have succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help
religious schools carry on their sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will
continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of
their particular brand of religion.
Id. at 251.
173. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248 (1977).
174. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997).
175. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412–13 (1985) (holding that the use of federal
funds to pay salaries of public school employees who taught in religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding
that a school district’s programs that provided classes to nonpublic students in leased
classrooms at nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause).
176. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000).
177. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (holding that a state’s loan of
instructional materials, such as maps and laboratory equipment, violated the Establishment
Clause); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250 (same).
178. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
179. Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 (holding that state expenditures for auxiliary services “gave
rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state”).
180. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
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(reversing an earlier case181). These cases represent a significant
movement on the part of the Court from a conception of autonomy
based upon independence to a conception of autonomy based upon
inter-independence.
The Court exhibited a similar movement as it became
increasingly willing to allow state funds to flow to the benefit of
religious institutions. In Tilton v. Richardson, the Supreme Court
allowed a program providing federal construction grants to churchrelated colleges for facilities devoted exclusively to secular
educational purposes.182 Later, the Court approved a state revenuebond program permitting church-related colleges to borrow funds
for constructing buildings at low interest.183 The Supreme Court has
also allowed private religious colleges to participate in a state
program providing noncategorical grants for nonsectarian use,184
permitted a blind student to participate in a state vocational
rehabilitation assistance program that paid the student’s tuition to a
private Christian college,185 allowed the state to provide an
interpreter to a deaf student at a sectarian school,186 and given
religiously affiliated organizations permission to participate in a
federally funded program to encourage innovative services to deal
with the problems of adolescent pregnancy.187 The Supreme Court
has become more accepting of aid that reaches religiously affiliated
schools indirectly. For example, if vouchers are given to parents to
spend at the school of their choice for the education of their
children, the Supreme Court has allowed parents to direct that aid to
religiously affiliated schools.188
In sum, in the United States in cases involving state aid to
religious schools, there has been a general trend over the past thirty
years away from a conception of autonomy based upon independence
towards a conception based upon inter-independence.

181. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255 (holding that state funding of field trips created excessive
entanglement and therefore violated the establishment clause).
182. 403 U.S. 672, 675 (1971).
183. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
184. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
185. Witters v. Wa. Dept. of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
186. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
187. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
188. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

1270

3SCH-FIN

1217]

12/1/2004 7:07 PM

The Autonomy of Church and State

Europe: Under the European Convention, states may subsidize
religious schools and may pay for certain types of religious education
in both public and private schools if it so desires, but the state
cannot be required to provide funds to private religious schools.189
According to Carolyn Evans, “The concern of the drafters of the
Convention was not (compared with the framers of the United
States Constitution) to keep the State out of religion, including
religious education, but rather to ensure that the State was not
subject to financial demands that it did not wish to meet.”190
However, the European Court has stated that the state has an
obligation to respect the beliefs of parents within the public school
system, even in areas not directly related to denominational
instruction, and that it is not enough to allow parents to opt out of
public schooling altogether and send their children to religious
schools.191 The opportunity to opt out of specific religious
instruction, however, has been held to satisfy the requirements of
Article 9, even when doing so results in teacher and peer pressure to
participate.192
189. See W and KL v. Sweden, 45 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143, 148–49 (1985),
9 E.H.R.R. CD 247 (1987) (Westlaw) (allowing a state to means-test for grants available to
students at private school even though aid was automatic in State schools); X and Y v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 9461/81, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 210 (1982) (holding that a
State need not subsidize education at a private school even when parents feel their children
must be educated there to receive an education consistent with their philosophical views); X. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 7782/77, 14 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 179, 180 (1978)
(allowing the State to provide less subsidies to a nondenominational private school than it did
to a non-State-run schools).
190. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89.
191. See, e.g., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 25, para. 53 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that a State could impose an
integrated “sex education” curriculum in spite of parental objections based upon religious
belief, but requiring the State to convey information in “an objective, critical and pluralistic
manner” and prohibiting the state from pursuing “an aim of indoctrination that might be
considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions”); see also
Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982), 4 E.H.R.R. 293
(1982) (Westlaw) (extending the requirement that schools respect parents’ wishes in a case of
parents wishing to prevent their children from being subjected to corporal punishment).
192. See Bernard and others v. Luxembourg, 75 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 57
(1993); C.J., J.J. and E.J. v. Poland, 84-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (holding that religious instruction was “voluntary” when a student
was required to wait in the corridor, received frequent questioning from teachers and pressure
from a teacher and other students to take the classes, and eventually capitulated, against her
father’s wishes, and joined the class). Professor Evans notes that the Commission
did not explore how voluntary a decision by a child in such a situation of social
pressure could really be. It also refused to deal in any detail with the claim by the
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The approach taken by the European Court in cases involving
state aid to religious schools reflects a conception of autonomy based
upon the interdependence of church and state. State subsidies to
religiously affiliated schools are permitted, although some concern is
expressed for the autonomy interests of dissenters who wish to opt
out of religious instruction.
5. Church property, officials, doctrine
One area where the differing attitudes toward institutional
autonomy are most striking is in controversies that arise with respect
to church property, personnel, and doctrine. A conception of
autonomy based upon independence, and to a slightly lesser extent a
conception based upon inter-independence, would be highly
suspicious of state involvement in the direction of the internal affairs
of a church. In contrast, a conception based upon interdependence
would be much less sensitive to negative impacts upon autonomy
from state involvement in such affairs.
United States: The Supreme Court has demonstrated a high
(although not absolute) degree of protectiveness of churches from
interference by the state in controversies involving church property,
officials, and doctrine. In an early case involving a property dispute
between two groups claiming ownership of the same church
property, the Court deferred to the Church’s own internal rules for
determining which group had the legitimate claim, an approach that
the Court has generally followed in subsequent cases.193 However, in
a more recent case that did not involve an ownership dispute over
church property, City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court upheld a general
statute on historic preservation that prevented a church from adding

other applicant student (whose school offered the option of instruction in ethics as
an alternative to religious instruction) that widespread social discrimination against
non-Catholics, for example in the Labour market, meant that there was pressure to
take religious instruction rather than ethics.
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 96.
193. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94
(1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). But see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595
(1979) (allowing a state to resolve a church property dispute based upon “neutral principles of
law”); The Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890) (upholding the seizure of church property of Mormons on grounds that polygamy
did not constitute religious belief).
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to the size of its existing building.194 Church autonomy was not
viewed as a sufficient reason to create an exemption from a generally
applicable zoning ordinance. This case was significant also because it
was the vehicle the Supreme Court used to strike down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, in which Congress had attempted to
restore the compelling state interest standard to free exercise
jurisprudence.195
The Supreme Court has been very protective of church
autonomy in matters relating to personnel and doctrine. The state
cannot dictate to a church who it hires or fires as a minister, or what
the church’s doctrine will be.196 Indeed, church autonomy over
personnel and doctrine extends beyond employees with a directly

194. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
195. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws that burden
religion need not be subject to heightened scrutiny, but are valid if neutral and of general
application). Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which attempted to restore the compelling-state-interest test. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb
to 2000bb-4 (1993). The Supreme Court declared the RFRA unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Boerne case elicited a broad scholarly response. In
support of the Court’s finding RFRA unconstitutional, see, for example, Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998); Ira C. Lupu, Why
the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right—Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 793 (1998). For a sampling of scholarly criticism of the Court’s decision
in Boerne, see, for example, David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v.
Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31; Robert F.
Drinan, Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 86 GEO. L.J. 101
(1997); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City
of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious Liberty at
the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459 (1998).
196. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, Theory and Reality in Statutory Interpretation, 15
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 32 (2002) (asserting that “it would be hard to imagine a more flagrant
interference with the free exercise of religion than for Congress to dictate to a respectable
church . . . whom it might or might not choose as its minister”); Laura L. Coon, Note,
Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV.
481, 531 (2001) (“Courts holding that the adjudication of negligent hiring and supervision
claims against church employers necessarily violates the First Amendment emphasize that in all
decisions regarding hiring, firing, or discipline, the church’s determination is necessarily guided
by religious doctrine and practice. These courts reason that, regardless of whether or not a
religious institution has a doctrinal reason for the challenged employment decision, examining
church employment policies regarding ministerial employment to determine what is reasonable
conduct necessitates ‘inappropriate governmental involvement’ in violation of the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses.” (footnote omitted)).
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ecclesiastical function. For example, in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos,197 the Court unanimously held that even a churchowned nonprofit organization that did not have a directly religious
mission was exempt from the general law prohibiting discrimination
in employment based upon religion. In that case, the Church
operated a gymnasium and was allowed to limit employment to
individuals who adhered to certain religious tenets. The Court’s
reasoning invoked autonomy concerns, noting that a religiousemployment exemption alleviated “significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions.”198
As these cases illustrate, in sensitive matters involving church
property, personnel, and doctrine, the Supreme Court has based its
jurisprudence on a conception of autonomy that reflects a high
degree of concern for the independence of churches, although in
recent cases that degree of concern has apparently diminished.
Europe: The European Court has allowed quite a high degree of
state involvement in issues involving church property, officials, and
doctrine. For example, in Holy Monasteries v. Greece, the court
dismissed a claim from a church involving transfer of land from
monasteries to the government.199
The European Court has also been deferential to state control of
personnel and doctrine of a state church. For example, in Knudsen v.
Norway, the Commission upheld the right of the state to dismiss a
pastor of a state church on the grounds that the pastor had revoked
his oath of loyalty to the state, thus implying that if there is an
established church, the state has the right to set forth conditions for
employment in the church generally or for a particular post.200 In
another case, Karlsson v. Sweden, the Commission upheld the

197. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). For additional cases concerning corporeal punishment, see
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 93 n.132.
198. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335.
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious
mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is
thus a means by which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church’s
ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.
Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. 301 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347 (1994), 20 E.H.R.R. 1 (1994) (Westlaw).
200. 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247 (1985), 8 E.H.R.R. CD 63 (1985)
(Westlaw).
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decision of an employment board to deny a position to a pastor
because he opposed the ordination of women.201
State control of nonestablished churches is more limited. In Serif
v. Greece, the court held that the Greek government violated Article
9 by prosecuting a man who claimed to be the Mufti of a local
Muslim community, when another man had been appointed Mufti
by the Greek government.202 The court stated that to punish a
person “for merely acting as the religious leader of a group that
willingly followed him can hardly be considered compatible with the
demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society.”203 The
court’s holding was quite limited, however, noting that a different
outcome might be warranted if the Mufti attempted to carry out
functions with legal effect, such as marriage ceremonies.204
In an established church, the court has held that the state has the
right to control church doctrine, and ministers can be required to
comply or resign. For example, in X. v. Denmark, the state
disciplined a clergyman in the state Church of Denmark who
attempted to impose a requirement that parents take five lessons of
religious instruction before he would baptize their children.205 The
Commission upheld the state’s control over the clergyman’s
behavior, taking the position that clergymen’s “individual right of
thought, conscience or religion is exercised at the moment they
accept or refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to leave
the church guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose
its teachings.”206 State control of religious doctrine was affirmed
again by the Commission in Knudsen v. Norway, a case in which the
state-appointed minister of religion was permitted to dismiss a
clergyman who refused to carry out certain of his functions in protest
of a new liberal abortion law.207
In cases involving church property, personnel, and doctrine, the
European Court has based its jurisprudence upon a conception of
autonomy that reflects the assumptions of interdependence of church
201. 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 172 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
202. App. No. 38178/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 1999), 31 E.H.R.R. 20 (1999)
(Westlaw).
203. Id. at para. 51.
204. Id. at para. 52.
205. 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 157, 158 (1976).
206. Id.
207. Knudsen, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 63.
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and state. A very high degree of state involvement in church affairs
has been permitted.208
6. Church standing
From the perspective of independence and inter-independence, a
church’s standing to sue to protect its legal rights would be viewed
as an elementary component of church autonomy. A conception of
autonomy based upon interdependence, on the other hand, would be
less concerned with the ability of churches to have standing to
pursue and vindicate their rights.
United States: The Supreme Court has long recognized standing
for both individuals and churches in Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause disputes. Churches have standing in U.S. courts,209 and for
the most part standing issues have not been important in religious
liberty jurisprudence in the United States.210 The Court’s
jurisprudence involving standing issues reflects the view that church
autonomy is based upon a degree of independence.
Europe: The autonomy of churches was dealt an early blow by
the Commission in the 1968 case of Church of X v. the United
Kingdom,211 in which the Commission dismissed the case on the
208. The degree to which state involvement is permitted, however, may turn, to some
degree, on whether the state is regulating a state church or another religion. When the state is
regulating the state church, it will, of course, have greater latitude than when it is regulating
other religions. In either scenario, though, the degree of state involvement permitted is
demonstrative of interdependence.
209. See, e.g., United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,
487 U.S. 72 (1988) (holding that the Catholic church had standing to challenge a district
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982) (holding that a church and its followers had standing to challenge the Minnesota
Charitable Solicitations Act).
210. But see Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (denying
standing to the respondent in a high school religious club controversy); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying
standing to a citizen/taxpayer group in a constitutional challenge of the conveyance of a
military hospital to a church-related college under a statute permitting “surplus property” to
be conveyed to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions).
211. 13 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 306 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (1968),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. In Church of X v. United Kingdom, a church brought a complaint
claiming its rights of religious freedom had been violated when the British government made a
determination that it was a “cult” that was dangerous to society and took a variety of measures
to limit the activities of the church, including deregistering its educational institutions, refusing
to allow individuals into the country who wished to study or work with the church, and
refusing entry to hundreds of delegates to an international conference of the church. The
church, which was a corporation, brought the action on its own behalf and on behalf of its
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grounds that a church does not have standing. The Commission
reasoned that “a corporation being a legal and not a natural person,
is incapable of having or exercising the rights mentioned in Article 9,
paragraph 1 of the Convention and Article 2 of the First
Protocol.”212 In 1971 the Commission reiterated that churches have
no standing in X v. Sweden,213 although it revised its decision and
granted standing to a church in the 1979 case, X and the Church of
Scientology v. Sweden.214 The Commission explained that it was
overruling its earlier decisions that denied standing to churches,
stating that the Commission was
now of the opinion that the . . . distinction between the Church
and its members under Article 9(1) is essentially artificial. When a
church body lodges an application under the Convention, it does
so in reality, on behalf of its members. It should therefore be
accepted that a church body is capable of possessing and exercising
the rights contained in Article 9(1) in its own capacity as
representative of its members.215

This change of view represents some movement away from a
view of autonomy based upon interdependence towards a view of
autonomy based upon a measure of independence for religious
institutions. But Professor Evans notes, “[t]he right of a Church to
bring a claim is derivative, however, based on aggregating . . . the
rights of its members. It cannot claim a breach of its own rights.”216
Thus, even under the revised doctrine, religious institutions still do
members, but no individual member was a named party to the complaint. Carolyn Evans
maintains that “[t]he dismissal of cases on the grounds that they were brought by Churches
rather than individuals allowed the Commission to refuse to deal with cases of widespread
government action against particular religious groups on largely technical grounds.” EVANS,
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 15 & n.76 (acknowledging that in Church of X v.
United Kingdom, the Commission stated that even if the case had been brought by individuals,
none of the actions taken by the United Kingdom amounted to a violation of a right under the
Convention).
212. 13 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 314.
213. Karnell and Hardt v. Sweden, 14 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.)
(1971) (denying standing under Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the EvangelicalLutheran Church of Sweden to bring an action regarding religious education in schools).
214. 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1979) (granting standing to the Church of
Scientology in a challenge to prohibitions of advertisements of the “E-meter,” a device which
the Church said measured individual mental well-being).
215. Id. at 70.
216. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 14 (citing X & the Church of
Scientology, 14 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. at 70).
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not have standing in their own rights, but only as an aggregation of
the rights of their members. The Commission has confirmed this
view by holding that a legal person cannot exercise freedom of
conscience,217 and in continually denying standing to for-profit
corporations who have lodged complaints regarding freedom of
conscience or religion under Article 9.218 Thus, the European
Court’s jurisprudence on church standing does not reflect a
conception of autonomy requiring a muscular institutional
independence of churches.
7. Church right to have organization and legal personality
Even more fundamental than the right to have standing to sue in
order to protect one’s rights is the right to organize oneself as a legal
entity. A conception of autonomy based on independence and interindependence would view the right to have a legal personality as a
basic requirement for churches to have a measure of autonomy. A
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence, however,
might not recognize the importance of being able to organize a
church and have a legal personality.
United States: In the United States anyone can create a church
under the nonprofit corporation statutes of any state.219 No
permission of any government official or body is required. Having a
legal personality is viewed as a basic requirement of exercising church
autonomy. This is consistent with a conception of autonomy based
upon independence or inter-independence.
Europe: While Article 9 states that the right to manifest one’s
religion is to be protected “either alone or in community with
217. Kontakt-Information-Therapie and Hagen v. Austria, 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 81, 88 (1988), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. Although the legal person at issue was a
drug rehabilitation center and not a church, the Commission seemed to state the general rule
and specifically mentioned that churches do not have rights of freedom of religion.
218. See, e.g., Company X. v. Switzerland, 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85
(1979) (dismissing a claim that requiring a company to pay ecclesiastical taxes breached its
freedom of religion on grounds that it had no rights under Article 9(1)).
219. See HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 1099–119 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing the various tax
exempt and nonprofit incorporations available to religious organizations); see also Catherine M.
Knight, Must God Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious
Corporations Provisions of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721,
721 n.3 (1993) (“Religious corporations are both a subset of and distinct from general
nonprofit corporations. The lack of regulation over nonprofit corporations is an oft-sung
lament in legal commentary.”).
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others,” and the Commission has recognized a group dimension to
certain religious liberty rights,220 the Commission has also stated that
Article 9 does not entitle a religious group to be formally recognized
or registered as a religion and that states are permitted to distinguish
between recognized and non-recognized religions. In X v. Austria,
the court upheld the government’s refusal to allow followers of
Reverend Moon to set up a legal association on the grounds that this
did not interfere with the group’s right to worship in association
with others because it was not “necessary” to have a legal association
in order for members to be able to practice their beliefs.221 On the
other hand, the court has held that state interference with the ability
of a minority religion to set up a place of public worship can result in
a violation of rights of worship and observance.222 More recently, in
the case of Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, the court held that
every religious denomination has the right not only to de facto
existence, but also to be granted legal personality under rules that are
fair and similar to those applied to other denominations.223
The European Court’s jurisprudence in this area reflects an
increasing degree of concern about the institutional independence of
churches, although much of the court’s work in this area reflects a
conception of autonomy reflecting the assumptions and concerns of
interdependence.
8. Exemptions from general laws for churches
One of the most significant recurring problems in church-state
relations is the extent to which churches and individuals224 should be
exempt from generally applicable laws. If churches are always exempt
from such laws, then churches are in an important sense above the
220. See X v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27, 33 (1981), 4
E.H.R.R. 126 (1982) (Westlaw) (ruling that a Muslim school teacher who wished to take time
off on Friday afternoons to attend worship at a local mosque was not sufficiently
accommodated by being given a room within the school where he could pray in private).
221. 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 89 (1981).
222. Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347, 1361 (1996–
IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw).
223. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 (1999) (Westlaw); see also Metro. Church of Bessarabia v.
Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2001), http://hudoc.ehr.coe.int
(stating that Article 9 includes right of new churches to obtain legal personality on conditions
equal to registered churches).
224. The subject of exemptions is also addressed below in the section on individual
autonomy. See infra Part V.F.
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law. On the other hand, if the state is unwilling to make exceptions
for churches and religious adherents in order to protect religious
observance, then the state can interfere significantly in the
independence and self-direction of the church and of religious
adherents.
If stark independence is the goal, then a concern for church
autonomy and the autonomy of religious adherents might seem to
require an extensive network of exemptions when state laws conflict
with religious beliefs and obligations, since the state might
vigorously try to create a separated social space for religious
activity.225 If autonomy is based upon inter-independence of church
and state, a more limited set of exemptions would seem to be
recognized. Desired exemptions would be evaluated based upon
their impact upon the independence of churches and their adherents,
and based upon the independence and autonomy of the state. For
example, exemptions that are deemed to threaten the state’s ability
to fulfill its functions of protecting public safety and morals would
not be recognized. A conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence would recognize an even narrower set of
exemptions, since what is good for the state and what is good for the
church might be seen as being harmonious. When interdependence
prevails, the state is likely to be quite sensitive to the religious needs
of majority religion adherents, and laws that facilitate religious belief
and observance of powerful religions would be commonplace. A
high degree of concern for the needs and claims for exemptions from
adherents of minority religions, however, would be much less likely
to prevail.

225. While it would seem that independence would recognize the need to protect
religious exercise from encroachment (based upon a commitment between church and state to
mutual noninterference), the reality is rather more complicated. It is possible that a conception
of autonomy based upon independence could result in very limited recognition of exemptions.
For example, if the realm of protected religious independence is limited to “belief” and the
realm of government oversight is said to encompass everything that includes “action,” then as
a practical matter most assertions of a right to an exemption will be denied (since religious
beliefs often require specific actions), while the state will claim (somewhat disingenuously) to
be protective of institutional and individual independence with respect to religious freedom.
This approach has been common in United States free exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (“Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion [or belief], but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order.”); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990).
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United States: In recent cases the Supreme Court has exhibited
remarkably little concern for church autonomy in situations
involving religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. This
was not always the case. Historically, churches have been granted
exemptions from certain generally applicable laws, which had the
effect of preserving the autonomy of both churches and religious
adherents. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court
granted an exemption to Amish school children based upon freedom
of religion from a state law requiring compulsory education until the
age of sixteen.226 The Court focused on whether the exemption in
question was based upon religious belief or more general cultural
factors and concluded that the Amish objection to compulsory
education beyond the eighth grade was based upon religious
belief.227
Additionally, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,228 the Court
ruled that church-run schools were exempt from a national law
requiring schools to recognize unions.229 And in Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos,230 the Court upheld a federal statute that
exempted religious organizations from Title VII requirements
forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring for
church-related nonprofit enterprises that did not have a directly
religious function. In that case, the Court explicitly invoked
autonomy concerns in justifying its holding.231

226. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
227. In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Supreme Court exhibited a high degree of concern for the
autonomy of the Amish religion. The Court held that laws that impose burdens on religious
belief must be subject to heightened scrutiny. This means that the state must show a
compelling state interest in order to justify such burdens. Id. at 210–11.
228. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
229. The Court determined that “[t]he church-teacher relationship in a church-operated
school differs from the employment relationship in a public or other nonreligious school. We
see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in
church-operated schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions that would
follow.” Id. at 504.
230. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
231. Id. at 345–46 (“Sensitivity to individual religious freedom dictates that religious
discrimination be permitted only with respect to employment in religious activities. Concern
for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that we avoid the entanglement and the
chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determination would produce. We cannot
escape the fact that these aims are in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I
believe that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately balances these
competing concerns.”).
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The right of churches and religiously affiliated organizations to
receive exemptions, however, has never been unlimited, especially
when exemptions apply to commercial for-profit operations. For
example, in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
Labor,232 the Court held that a religious organization’s commercial
enterprises were not exempt from the requirements of a labor
statute. The Supreme Court also struck down a state statute that
granted a sales tax exemption to religious publications but not other
publications233 and upheld a state sales tax that covered the sale of
religious materials.234
A conception of autonomy based on inter-independence would
predict that a lesser degree of autonomy would be granted to
churches when they are engaged in commercial activities as opposed
to more overtly religious or nonprofit activities, since the regulation
of economic affairs is an area of high engagement of churches with
the regulatory powers of the state. If stark independence were the
goal, then it would seem that exemptions for commercial activities
should exist as well as other types of exemptions.235 Rather than
treating sales of religious literature as ordinary commerce, a stark
independence view would endeavor to separate transactions by
churches from ordinary commerce.
In Oregon v. Smith,236 the Supreme Court retreated dramatically
from its earlier approach of subjecting general laws that burden
religion to heightened scrutiny (which required a compelling state
interest and further required that the state employed the least
restrictive available means of effecting the interest). Instead, the
Court held that a law that burdens religion is permissible, as long as
it is general and neutral, and does not specifically target religious
belief.237

232. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
233. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
234. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
235. As noted above, this assertion must be qualified because the belief-action distinction
can be used to bring all religious “action,” including commercial transactions, within the
sphere of state regulation. So interpreted, an independence-based conception of autonomy
would not recognize assertions of exemptions involving action as opposed to pure belief.
236. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court subsequently struck down as
unconstitutional a federal statute enacted to return free exercise jurisprudence to a pre–Oregon
v. Smith footing. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
237. The Smith decision elicited a wide range of scholarly commentary. In defense of
Smith, see, for example, William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
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The Court’s approach in Smith reflects a view of autonomy that
approaches the European interdependence conception of autonomy.
If autonomy requires independence, or even inter-independence, then
one would expect a higher degree of concern about the religious
beliefs and needs of minority religious adherents.238 Instead, a view
of autonomy based on interdependence would be satisfied if laws are
neutral on their face and general in application, since the interests
and needs of churches and the state are not viewed as being in
conflict with each other. It is unlikely that majority or powerful
religions will be burdened by laws that are on their face neutral and
general, but as the Smith case illustrates, it is much less likely that the
religious claims and needs of minority religions will be protected.239
Since Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court’s treatment of
religious exemptions has exhibited a general pattern of transition
from a conception of autonomy based on independence of church
and state, to a conception based on inter-independence (for example,
involving for-profit activities of churches), to a conception in Oregon
v. Smith that approaches a model of autonomy based on
interdependence of church and state.
Europe: There do not appear to have been any cases decided as of
yet by the European Court concerning claims that churches are
entitled to an exemption from generally applicable laws. There are,
however, cases involving individual claims (based upon religion) for
exemptions from generally applicable laws, which are discussed in
Part V.F below.

58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). In opposition to the Court’s holding in Smith, see, for
example, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109 (1990).
238. In Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia acknowledges that the
approach taken by the Court affords less protection to minority religions. Justice Scalia wrote,
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodating to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id. at 890.
239. Thus while sacramental use of peyote by the Native American Church may not be
exempted, it is much more likely that sacramental use of wine in a Catholic Mass will receive
legislative protection.
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9. Summary of church autonomy issues
Figure 1 summarizes the approaches of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the European Court to issues involving the autonomy of
churches.
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Figure 1
Institutional Autonomy: The Autonomy of Churches

Issue

United
States

Conception of
Autonomy

Europe

Conception of
Autonomy

State
church

prohibited

independence
or interindependence

permitted

interdependence

Direct state
aid to
churches

not permitted
(although this
may be
changing)

independence or
interindependence

permitted,
including
preferential
treatment

interdependence

Tax
exemptions

permitted
(but not in
commercial
affairs)

interindependence

permitted,
including
preferential
treatment

interdependence

State aid to
religious
schools

increasingly
permitted

move from
independence
towards interindependence

direct state aid
permitted

interdependence

Church
property,
officials,
doctrine

strong limits
on state
involvement

independence or
interindependence

high degree
of state
involvement
permitted

interdependence

Church
standing

recognized

independence or
interindependence

originally not
recognized;
now is
recognized

some movement
from
interdependence to
inter-independence

Right to
legal
personality

recognized

independence or
interindependence

not
recognized

interdependence

Exemptions
from
generally
applicable
laws

movement
towards less
recognition of
exemptions

move from
independence to
interindependence and
towards
interdependence

no cases

interdependence

In cases generally involving church autonomy in the United
States, there has been a struggle between a conception of autonomy
based on independence and a conception of autonomy based on
inter-independence. This struggle has been particularly apparent with
respect to laws concerning state aid to religious schools, where a
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view of autonomy based on independence has been supplanted by a
view based on inter-independence. In Europe, a conception of
autonomy based on interdependence has been dominant in cases
involving the autonomy of churches.
For those who believe that interdependence is not a compelling
conception of autonomy to guide U.S. church-state relations, one
area of potential concern in the United States is the availability to
churches of exemptions from generally applicable laws. The cases in
this area have evinced a gradual movement from a conception of
autonomy based on independence to a conception based on interindependence, and ultimately towards a conception based on
interdependence.
B. Autonomy of the State
In church-state relations there are two dimensions to the concern
about institutional autonomy. A highly integrated relationship
threatens not just the independence of the church, but also creates
the possibility of domination of the state by a church.
Concern for the autonomy of the state can be seen in a variety of
contexts, including cases involving various forms of religious
expression or teaching of religious viewpoints in public schools, cases
involving religious expression in the public sphere outside of schools,
cases concerning the permissibility of churches conducting functions
usually associated with the state, and cases about the permissibility of
state policies that converge with or reflect religious beliefs.
In each of these areas, the Supreme Court has vacillated between
a conception of autonomy based upon the independence of church
and state, which has exerted a particularly strong influence in the
public school setting, and a conception of autonomy based on the
inter-independence of church and state. In Europe, cases involving
the autonomy of the state have for the most part reflected a
conception of autonomy based on the interdependence of church and
state.
1. Religious expression in public schools
If autonomy requires independence of church and state, then
religious expression in public schools would be prohibited. If
autonomy is based on interdependence, then a high degree of
religious expression in public schools would be permitted, at least of
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favored religious views. A view of autonomy based on interindependence would be sensitive to concerns about the independence
of the state and so religious expression in public schools will be
limited, especially when there is concern that a particular religious
viewpoint is exerting a dominant force. On the other hand, some
religious expression would be tolerated in view of countervailing
concerns such as the burdens of exclusion and the requirements of
mutual respect.
United States: Religion in public schools has been a source of
tremendous controversy in the United States, and the Supreme
Court’s concern for the autonomy of the state is perhaps more
evident in this context than in any other group of cases. Compared
with other contexts where state autonomy is an issue, a conception
of autonomy based on the independence of church and state is much
more prevalent in public schools than in other settings. To some
extent this is understandable, since public education is of particular
importance to maintaining and preserving the autonomy of the state.
Because public schools are subject to a high degree of local control,
the threat posed by churches to state autonomy is unusually high,
since in a particular school district it is much more likely than on a
larger political stage that one religion might be dominant. As a
result, public school settings are perhaps the single place where the
Supreme Court of the United States has had the greatest concern
about religious expression. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
evinced a high degree of concern for the autonomy interests of
children in the public school setting. Young children are viewed as
particularly vulnerable and impressionable, and the Court has
expressed concern that their autonomy may be compromised by
allowing high levels of sectarian religious expression.
Europe: In Europe, by contrast, a much higher degree of
religious expression and teaching is permissible in public schools. As
discussed earlier, under the jurisprudence of the European
Convention, a state can subsidize religious education in public
schools, and can pay for certain types of religious instruction in
either state-sponsored or religiously sponsored schools. As Professor
Evans explains, “The concern of the drafters of the Convention was
not (compared with the framers of the United States Constitution)
to keep the State out of religion, including religious education, but
rather to ensure that the State was not subject to financial demands
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that it did not wish to meet.”240 The European Court has, however,
set some parameters on religious speech in schools. For example, in
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark,241 although the
court rejected parents’ complaint that an integrated sex education
curriculum violated their right to choose the religious and moral
education of their children, the court stated that the State “must
take care that information or knowledge included in this curriculum
is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State
is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be
considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical
convictions.”242
I will survey three areas of concern about religious speech in
public schools in the U.S. and Europe: (a) cases involving release
time (the practice of excusing students from secular school activities
to receive religious instruction); (b) cases involving mandatory Bible
reading, prohibitions on the teaching of evolution, and requirements
for posting the Ten Commandments; and (c) cases involving access
to public school facilities by private groups that are religious in
nature.
a. Release time from public schools. One early dispute concerning
the constitutional limits upon the interaction of church and state in
public schools involved “release time,” the practice of excusing
students from class to receive religious instruction. If the autonomy
of church and state requires complete independence, then release
time during the school day would violate the Establishment Clause,
regardless of the particulars involved. In contrast, if the autonomy of
church and state is based on the interdependence of church and state,
then religious instruction in the schools would be permissible and
the formalities of release time would not be needed. If the
relationship between church and state is based on a conception of
autonomy that emphasizes inter-independence, attention would focus
on the particular context and implications of the different types of
release time programs.
United States: The approach taken by the Supreme Court in the
release time cases reflects sensitivity to the inter-independence of

240. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89.
241. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26, para. 53 (1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
242. Id.
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church and state. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education,243 the Supreme Court struck down a release time
program that allowed public school students to be dismissed from
their secular instruction for a period of time to receive optional
religious instruction on school premises. Emphasizing the
independence of church and state, the Court stated that “[T]he First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere.”244 The Court also
emphasized the important individual autonomy concerns at stake,
declaring that neither the federal government nor a state “can force
or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”245
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter defended an even more
strongly separationist vision of the Establishment Clause, especially
in the public school setting.
Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for
promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people,
the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement
in the strife of sects. The preservation of the community from
divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by
religious groups, of religion from censorship and coercion however
subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to
instruction other than religious, leaving to the individual’s church
and home, indoctrination in the faith of his choice.246

Justice Frankfurter concluded, “If nowhere else, in the relation
between Church and State, ‘good fences make good neighbors.’”247
Based upon the strong separationist rhetoric in McCollum, one
might have thought that any release time program would violate the
Establishment Clause. A few years later, however, in Zorach v.
Clauson,248 the Supreme Court allowed a release time program in

243. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
244. Id. at 212.
245. Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)).
246. Id. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter states, “In no activity
of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing,
not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.” Id. at 231.
247. Id. at 232.
248. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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which religious instruction took place off school property.249 In
Zorach the Court retreated from the ideal of stark separation.250
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas said, “The First
Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the
manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other.”251 The Court noted that
the release time program in Zorach involved neither the expenditure
of public funds nor the use of public school classrooms and
concluded that there is no system of coercion to get public school
students into religious classrooms.252

249. Some years later, in School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Supreme Court explained the different outcomes
in McCollum and Zorach as follows:
The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain the difference between the cases.
The symbolic connection of church and state in the McCollum program presented
the students with a graphic symbol of the ‘concert or union or dependency’ of
church and state. This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in the Zorach
program.
Ball, 473 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted). By focusing on symbolic “concert or union or
dependency,” the Court focused on the institutional autonomy of both church and state.
250. The retreat is accompanied, however, by a denial that a retreat is being made. The
majority opinion in Zorach states,
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference
with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ of religion are concerned,
the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the
scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
251. Id. at 306. That, the Court states, is
the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to
each other—hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be
required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to
render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped
parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in
our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief
Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; ‘so help me God’
in our courtroom oaths—these and all other references to the Almighty that run
through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First
Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication
with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and this
Honorable Court.’
Id. at 312–13.
252. Id. at 308–11.
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When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That
would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe.253

In the release time cases, the stage is set for much of the debate
between separation and accommodation over the next fifty years in
the U.S. Much of the rhetoric in favor of a strict independence of
church and state can be traced to McCollum, and much of the
rhetoric calling for an accommodation of religion in public life can
be traced to Zorach.
Forbidding release time on school property but permitting it off
school property might appear to be a distinction without a
difference, but such a division is quite sensitive to the concerns of
inter-independence and the different implications of the programs for
state autonomy. On the one hand, the independence of churches
from the state and of the state from churches is one of the primary
ideals the Establishment Clause was meant to protect. On the other
hand, the Court identifies a number of undesirable implications of a
conception of autonomy that rests upon an ideal of stark separation.
The legitimate threat to the autonomy of the state that exists when
children receive religious instruction in public schools during the
school day is significantly ameliorated when the instruction takes
place off school property and without the expenditure of public
funds. The possibility of “concert,” “union,” or “dependence” of
church and state, and the risk of “coercion” is less when religious
instruction takes place off school premises. A small degree of
cooperation with religion and encouragement of religious instruction
is seen to be consistent with the relational dimension of church
autonomy, and also consistent with state autonomy.
Europe: In Europe, the state is permitted to sponsor religious and
devotional exercises in public schools, so the issue of release time
does not arise. Students do have a right to opt out of religious
instruction, but the European Court has been quite insensitive to the

253. Id. at 313–14.
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subtle coercive pressures that can exist in such situations. In C.J., J.J.,
and E.J. v. Poland, the Commission denied admission of applicants’
claims that discrimination that resulted from a student’s decision not
to participate in religious instruction did not constitute a violation of
the student’s Article 9 rights.254 The decision was made in spite of
the pressure that both students and teachers put on the student to
attend and evidence that she was ostracized until she finally
conceded. The European approach to these issues rests upon a
conception of autonomy based on interdependence, which permits a
high degree of cooperation and mutual support of church and state.
b. Requiring Bible reading, prohibiting teaching evolution, and
posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools. Another
controversial set of issues involving the interactions of church and
state in public schools has been various state and local laws that
attempt to inject religious instruction or viewpoints into the official
school day, by requiring Bible reading, forbidding the teaching of
evolution (or permitting it only if it is accompanied by teaching of
creation science), or requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms.255
Autonomy based upon independence would forbid such infusions
of religion into public schools, whereas autonomy based upon
interdependence would probably permit such efforts to include
religious speech of favored religions in public schools. Autonomy
based upon inter-independence would take a highly contextualized
approach to analyzing whether the required religious expression in
question threatens the ability of the school to conduct its educational
mission, or whether the requirements represent an effort by a
particular religious viewpoint to dominate or dictate the content of
public education. The key question is whether the religious
expression poses a threat to the independence of the state, or of
individual school children.
United States: In the United States, cases involving required
Bible reading, forbidding the teaching of evolution or requiring the
teaching of creation science, and requiring schools to post copies of
the Ten Commandments are examples of efforts by a particular

254. 84-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
255. Another example is school prayer, which I discuss in detail below. See infra Part
VI.A.
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religious viewpoint to infuse the public school curriculum with
teachings that reflect particular religious ideology or tenets. The
independence of the state is undermined when it is used as a vehicle
for conveying the doctrinal views of particular religious groups.
Thus, it is not surprising that these cases have elicited strong
separationist responses from the Supreme Court.
For example, in Abington Township v. Schempp, which held that
requiring Bible reading in public schools violates the Establishment
Clause, the Court stated that the purpose of the Establishment
Clause was not merely to outlaw the official establishment of a single
sect, “[i]t was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.”256 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas surveyed several ways in which
an establishment of religion could be achieved.
The church and state can be one; the church may control the state
or the state may control the church; or the relationship may take
one of several possible forms of a working arrangement between
the two bodies. . . . The vice of all such arrangements under the
Establishment Clause is that the state is lending its assistance to a
church’s efforts to gain and keep adherents. Under the First
Amendment it is strictly a matter for the individual and his church
as to what church he will belong to and how much support, in the
way of belief, time, activity or money, he will give to it.257

The key to the autonomy of church and state is freedom from the
control or domination of one institution by the other. Justice
Brennan strikes a similar chord of concern for the autonomy of
church and state in his concurring opinion in Abington.
What Virginia had long practiced, and what Madison, Jefferson and
others fought to end, was the extension of civil government’s
support to religion in a manner which made the two in some
degree interdependent, and thus threatened the freedom of each.
The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the

256. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (quoting Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1947)).
257. Id. at 227–28 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any
purely religious end.258

A similar concern for the autonomy of the state from the
injection of sectarian doctrines into public education is evident in the
cases involving the teaching of evolution. In Epperson v. Arkansas,
the Supreme Court held that a state statute that made it unlawful for
public school teachers to teach evolution is unconstitutional.259
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas stated that the statute violates
the Establishment Clause because it “selects from the body of
knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole
reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious
doctrine.”260 The Court voiced similar concerns about the autonomy
of the state from the imposition of religious viewpoints in Edwards v.
Aguillard, in which the Court held that a state law forbidding the
teaching of evolution unless accompanied by instruction in creation
science violates the Establishment Clause.261 The Court concluded
that “[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind.”262 According to the Court, the autonomy of
the state is jeopardized when schools become tools for teaching
religious doctrine, and the state’s autonomy is arguably jeopardized
to a greater degree when religious viewpoints are used to censor or
restrict what may or may not be taught in public schools.
Similarly, in Stone v. Graham, in which the Supreme Court
struck down a statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms, the Court was
258. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 465 (1961)). Justice Brennan suggests that rather than focusing on whether Jefferson or
Madison would have found a particular religious exercise to be permissible, “[a] more fruitful
inquiry . . . is whether the practices here challenged threaten those consequences which the
Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence
between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id. at 236.
259. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
260. Id. at 103. The Court states,
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its
teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief
of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the
origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas’ law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens.
Id. at 107.
261. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
262. Id. at 591.
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concerned about efforts of one religious viewpoint to dominate or
dictate classroom content.263 In striking down the statute, the Court
held that it had no secular purpose, “and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.”264 The Court
said,
Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no [appropriate]
educational function. If the posted copies of the Ten
Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce
the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and
obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a
matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective
under the Establishment Clause.265

In cases involving efforts to promote a particular religious
viewpoint in public schools, the Supreme Court has responded by
vigorously rejecting such efforts. In doing so, the Court has based its
reasons, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, upon a
conception of autonomy that reflects the concerns of independence.
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases decided by the
European Court concerning challenges to the permissibility of Bible
reading, teaching evolution, or posting the Ten Commandments in
public schools. This is not surprising, since concern about such
practices reflects a conception of autonomy that is concerned
primarily with independence, whereas the European approach in such
cases rests upon a view of church-state relations reflecting
interdependence.
c. Use of public school facilities for religious clubs. A third set of
public school cases has involved claims for equal access by religious
clubs who want to use school facilities for religious instruction or
worship on the same basis as other student clubs. Autonomy based
on independence would suggest that such access should not be
allowed, whereas autonomy based on interdependence would find the
inclusion of religious groups unobjectionable. A conception of
autonomy based on the idea of inter-independence would be
concerned not only with the independence of the state, but also the
263. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
264. Id. at 41–42; see also J. David Smith, Jr., Stone v. Graham: A Fragile Defense of
Individual Religious Autonomy, 69 KY. L.J. 392 (1981).
265. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
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demands of mutual respect and the possibility that exclusion might
reflect hostility rather than neutrality.
United States: In a series of cases involving equal access claims by
religious groups, the Court has evidenced sensitivity for the
independence of the state but, at the same time, has been sensitive to
the autonomy consequences for religious groups if they are excluded
from forums that are generally open. In this area, the Court has, for
the most part, reflected a view of autonomy sensitive to the concerns
of inter-independence, taking a position that autonomy does not
require religion to be separated from the state, but rather requiring
equal treatment with respect to religious and nonreligious groups or
clubs seeking access to school facilities.
The Supreme Court has used equality, rather than autonomy, as
the principal rationale for permitting certain forms of studentsponsored religious speech on school property. In Widmar v.
Vincent,266 the Supreme Court focused on First Amendment freespeech rights in holding that a university’s policy of denying access
to religious groups to conduct meetings in facilities generally
available to other student groups was an unconstitutional violation of
the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be
content neutral. The Court reached a similar result in Board of
Education v. Mergens,267 in which the Court held that a high school
that makes its facilities generally available to student clubs cannot
specifically refuse access to a religious club. In a similar vein, the
Court held in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District268 that a religious group could show religious films on public
school property after school hours, and in Rosenberger v. University
of Virginia,269 the Court held that a public university could not
discriminate in withholding funds from a school newspaper with a
religious viewpoint.
These cases represent a significant departure from a model of
autonomy based on a wall of separation between church and state.
From a strict separationist viewpoint, religious groups should be
excluded from public schools and universities. Instead, the Court
asserts that the state risks greater “entanglement” with religion by

266.
267.
268.
269.
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496 U.S. 226 (1990).
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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attempting to exclude all religious speech and religious worship from
forums that are generally available to everyone.270 In Widmar, the
Court noted that “an open forum in a public university does not
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or
practices” and endorsed the court of appeals’ conclusion in the case
that “such a policy ‘would no more commit the University . . . to
religious goals’ than it is ‘now committed to the goals of the
Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,’ or
any other group eligible to use its facilities.”271 In a similar vein, in
Mergens, the Court held that extending the equal access policy to
secondary schools likewise did not violate the Establishment
Clause.272 In Mergens the Court states that an equal access policy
does not have the principal effect of advancing religion.273 Thus, the
independence of the state is not jeopardized by the policy. To the
contrary, “the message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement;
if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others,
then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward
religion.”274 In recognizing that some forms of separation of church
and state would represent hostility rather than neutrality, the Court
appears to acknowledge that autonomy is not always facilitated by
complete independence, but rather rests on the inter-independence of
church and state.
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases decided by the
European Court concerning challenges to the permissibility of
granting religiously affiliated student organizations access to school
facilities. This is to be expected, given the interdependence
perspective prevalent in Europe.
2. Religious expression outside of schools
Controversies involving religious expression in the public domain
also arise outside the public school context. Two prominent areas of
controversy have involved legislative prayer and the display of
religious artifacts on public property. As with religion in public
schools, a model of autonomy based on complete independence

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11.
Id. at 274 (quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
496 U.S. at 248–49.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 248.
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would forbid all religious expression in the public square. A model of
autonomy based on interdependence would permit religious
expression by favored religious voices. A model of autonomy based
on inter-independence would be sensitive to the implications of
exclusion versus inclusion, as well as the possible interference with
the independence of either religion or the state by a particular type
of religious expression.
United States: The Supreme Court has demonstrated concern for
the independence of the state by placing restrictions on religious
expression on state property outside of the school context, although
the Court has been somewhat more willing to allow religious
expression outside the school context. Although autonomy
conceived as requiring independence is very influential, a conception
based on inter-independence also asserts itself. For example, in
contrast to the Court’s rulings on prayer in schools, in Marsh v.
Chambers,275 the Supreme Court ruled that a state could hire a
minister to deliver official prayers at the beginning of legislative
meetings. Remarkably, in evaluating the constitutionality of
legislative prayer, the Supreme Court ignored the Lemon test
altogether, conducting instead an analysis of the longstanding
historical precedent of allowing legislative prayer.276
At times the line drawn by the Supreme Court between
permissible and impermissible religious expression appears—to put it
charitably—somewhat strained. For example, in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU,277 the Court ruled against the display of a crèche in a
country courthouse. However, it reached the opposite conclusion in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 278 when the display in question contained a
menorah, a Santa Claus house, reindeer, and a Christmas tree as well
as a crèche.
Unpopular or dissenting speech that might have a religious
component has also been given protection. In Bristol Square Review
and Advisory Board v. Pinette,279 the Court held that the
Establishment Clause was not violated by a Ku Klux Klan display of

275. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
276. See id. at 786 (“The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public
bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”).
277. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
278. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
279. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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an unattended cross on state property that constituted a public
forum, equally accessible to all community groups.
Europe: I have not been able to locate any cases in which the
European Court or Commission have expressed concern for the
autonomy of the state in nonschool settings.
3. Church conduct of state functions
A model of autonomy based on independence would forbid
churches from performing state functions. A model of autonomy
based on interdependence would permit churches to perform a wide
variety of functions that might be thought to fall within the state’s
domain. A model of autonomy based on inter-independence would
make a context-sensitive inquiry into the implications for state and
church independence of allowing churches to perform particular
state functions, as well as the implications for each institution of
disallowing such activities.
United States: Concern for state independence is evident in the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to let churches exercise powers that are
normally reserved for the state. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel’s
Den, Inc.,280 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that gave
schools and churches power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses
for premises within a 500-foot radius of church or school property.
Evidencing similar concern for state autonomy, in Board of
Education v. Grumet,281 the Court struck down a school districting
plan that created a school district along the boundaries of an
exclusively Hasidic Jewish community, on the grounds that the state
had relinquished control over public education to a religious
community.
Europe: The European Court, in contrast, has been quite willing
to allow churches to perform state functions and to receive state
funding for conducting functions such as keeping records of births
and deaths, providing welfare services, performing marriages and
funerals, and maintaining cemeteries. The court has allowed
mandatory taxes that apply to members as well as nonmembers of a
Church performing such functions. Professor Evans explains, “The
individual may be forced to pay this tax even though he or she is
280. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
281. 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A
Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433 (1995).
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strongly opposed to the relationship between the State and Church
that these ‘secular functions’ imply.”282 Allowing church
performance of state functions reflects a view of autonomy based on
interdependence.
4. State laws and policies that converge with religious beliefs
None of the conceptions of autonomy outlined above would
prohibit all state laws and policies that reflect or correlate with
religious beliefs, but each conception of autonomy would adopt a
different approach toward assessing when laws that reflect religious
beliefs are permissible. Autonomy conceived as requiring
independence of church and state would be most skeptical of
convergence, and might question state practices such as Sundayclosing laws, or even policies that close public facilities on religious
holidays, such as Christmas or Easter. Autonomy based on a
conception of interdependence of church and state would be unlikely
to find problematic clear causal connections between religious beliefs
and state laws, even concerning controversial and morally charged
issues such as abortion and divorce. A conception of autonomy based
on inter-independence would be skeptical of laws and policies that
reflect religious viewpoints, especially when there are no (or very
weak) independent nonreligious bases for such policies and laws.
United States: For the most part, the Supreme Court has adopted
a view consistent with a conception of autonomy based on the interindependence of church and state. In the Court’s view, state
autonomy does not demand that laws consistent with religious belief
be deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has been willing to
tolerate government policies that coincide with religious beliefs of a
particular religion, provided there is a legitimate secular purpose for
the regulation and the effect is not primarily to endorse a particular
religion. For example, in Harris v. McRae,283 the Supreme Court
upheld federal regulations that forbade the use of federal funds for
performing abortions under the Medicaid program, noting that “the
fact that the funding restrictions . . . may coincide with the religious
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more,

282. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 82 (citing Kustannus Oy Vapaa
Ajattelija AB and others v. Finland, 85-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29 (1996), 22
E.H.R.R. CD 69 (1996) (Westlaw)).
283. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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contravene the Establishment Clause.”284 In McGowan v.
Maryland,285 the Supreme Court upheld Sunday-closing laws on the
grounds that while such laws were originally motivated by religious
beliefs, their contemporary purpose was to afford a uniform day of
rest for citizens. On the other hand, in Wallace v. Jaffree,286 the
Supreme Court struck down a law providing for a mandatory
moment of silence in public schools, on the grounds that there was
no plausible secular rationale for the law.
Europe: The European Court’s jurisprudence in this area has
reflected a conception of autonomy based on the interdependence of
church and state. Under Article 9, one of the grounds upon which a
state may restrict a manifestation of religious belief is for the
protection of morals. As Professor Evans notes, “One complex
question that arises in this area is whether a general law based on
moral conceptions that are part of the morality of the dominant
religion, but not of some minority religions, is a justifiable
infringement on freedom of religion or belief.”287 Such an issue arose
in Johnston v. Ireland,288 in which the Commission held that no issue
arose under Article 9 with respect to a Protestant who claimed his
religious freedom was abridged by an Irish law that reflected the
Catholic Church’s prohibitions concerning divorce.289
5. Summary of state autonomy issues
Figure 2 summarizes the issues involving the autonomy of the
state.

284. Id. at 319–20.
285. 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting
claims of Jewish merchants that Sunday-closing laws violated their free exercise rights),
overruled in part by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
286. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
287. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 159.
288. 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 8 E.H.R.R. CD 214 (1986) (Westlaw).
289. The Commission held that the case did not even raise an Article 9 issue, since Article
12, dealing with the freedom to marry and have a family, was the lex specialis of the
Convention relating to marriage. Id. Professor Evans notes that “[t]he case has been criticized
for its focus on the right of the State to set out marriage and divorce regulations, without
looking at whether such regulation, while not a limit on the right to marry, was an improper
restriction on freedom of religion.” EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 160.
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Figure 2
Institutional Autonomy: Autonomy of the State
Issue

United States

Conception of
Autonomy

Europe

Conception of
Autonomy

Religious
expression in
public schools

trend towards
less religious
expression
permitted
during school

movement from
inter-independence
to independence

permitted

interdependence

Release time

prohibited on
site; permitted
off school
property

inter-independence

permitted

interdependence

Bible reading,
evolution, Ten
Commandments

prohibited

independence

permitted

interdependence

Use of school
facilities by
religious clubs

permitted,
based upon
neutrality

inter-independence

permitted

interdependence

Religious
expression in
the public
domain

more
permitted than
in schools;
trend towards
exclusion

movement from
inter-independence
to independence

permitted

interdependence

Church
conduct of state
functions

very limited

independence, but
to some extent
inter-independence

permitted

interdependence

Laws and
policies that
mirror religious
beliefs

permitted, but
subject to
heightened
scrutiny

inter-independence

permitted

interdependence

In cases involving the autonomy of the state, the jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of
Human Rights are based on very different conceptions of autonomy.
U.S. cases involve a struggle between a conception of autonomy
based on a categorical independence of church and state and a
conception of autonomy based on inter-independence. In Europe, a
conception of autonomy based on interdependence has prevailed,
with a much greater institutional engagement and cooperation
between the state and favored churches or religious viewpoints.
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As noted above, the Establishment Clause was based in large part
on a concern for the autonomy of the state. Today it is easy to lose
sight of that fact, because the state has grown so large and powerful.
Thus, it would be easy to overlook the large number of contexts in
which concern for the autonomy of the state remains an animating
concern in cases involving the relationship between church and state.
Although American society is much more secular and pluralistic than
it was two hundred years ago, concerns for the autonomy of the state
arise in a surprisingly large number of situations.
V. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
We have seen that in cases involving institutional autonomy, the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the jurisprudence of the
European Court are informed by very different conceptions of
autonomy. This may come as little surprise, since this difference
could be attributable to the fact that the U.S. Constitution includes
not only a free exercise provision, but also prohibits an establishment
of religion. The European Convention, in contrast, provides for
freedom of religion or belief, but does not prohibit the existence of a
state church and does not have an equivalent of the Establishment
Clause.
In cases involving individual religious liberty, in contrast, we
might expect greater convergence in the approaches and outcomes in
the United States and Europe. After all, Article 9 of the European
Convention contains a clear guarantee of religious liberty that is
much more explicit and detailed than the Free Exercise Clause and
would appear to guarantee at least as broad a protection of religious
freedom as exists in the United States. Thus, while we might expect
that cases involving institutional autonomy, which are more likely to
be categorized in the United States as Establishment Clause cases,
are likely to have different outcomes, we might expect that cases
involving individual religious freedom will have similar outcomes in
the United States and Europe.
Such an expectation is not, for the most part, borne out by the
cases. In cases involving the freedom of religion or belief of
individuals, we see that the same conceptions of autonomy are
prevalent. U.S. free exercise jurisprudence (at least until quite
recently) has exhibited quite a high degree of concern for a
conception of individual autonomy based on the idea of
independence. In contrast, cases decided under the European
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Convention have reflected a view of autonomy based on the idea of
interdependence, exhibit a higher degree of deference to state goals
and can more often be described as paternalistic. Because its
jurisprudence often reflects a view of autonomy based on
interdependence, the European Courts do not see individual
autonomy being infringed when the state directly supports, or
interferes with, church affairs.
I will briefly survey six categories of cases that raise religious
freedom issues involving the autonomy of the individual: (a) whether
a state can impose oaths and religious requirements for office; (b)
whether there is a right to conscientious objection; (c) whether an
individual has a right not to work on his or her Sabbath; (d) whether
there is a right to religious education; (e) the scope of the right to
proselytize; and (f) whether and upon what grounds an individual
may receive an exemption from a generally applicable law that
burdens his or her religion or belief.
A. Oaths and Religious Requirements for Office
A conception of autonomy based on independence of church and
state would prohibit all oaths and religious requirements for public
office. A conception of autonomy based on interdependence, in
contrast, would allow oaths and religious requirements for public
office. A conception based on inter-independence would be very
suspicious of such requirements, although it would be more likely
than a view based on independence to tolerate a practice of taking
oaths that are religious in nature if nonreligious variations are
permissible or if such oaths are not mandatory.
United States: Religious oaths are specifically prohibited by the
U.S. Constitution.290 In 1961, in Torcaso v. Watkins,291 the Supreme
Court invalidated a requirement that candidates for public office
profess a belief in God. In McDaniel v. Paty,292 the Court ruled that
a Tennessee state constitutional requirement that certain public
officials could not be “minister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any
denomination whatsoever”293 was unconstitutional. Thus, religion

290. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
291. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
292. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
293. Id. at 620 (citing TENN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1796)).
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may not be used as either a requirement or as the basis for excluding
someone from holding public office. These holdings reflect a view of
autonomy based on the independence of church and state. On the
other hand, oaths that invoke God are permitted for those taking
public office or giving evidence in a legal proceeding, but exceptions
are available for those who object to making such an oath.294 This
reflects a view of autonomy that does not require stark independence
of church and state, but rather one that envisions a degree of interindependence.
Europe: In Buscarini v. San Marino,295 the European Court ruled
that the requirement of taking a religious oath to hold political office
may be an impermissible limitation on the manifestation of religion.
The court, quoting the Commission, stated that “it would be
contradictory to make the exercise of a mandate intended to
represent different views of society within Parliament subject to a
prior declaration of commitment to a particular set of beliefs,” thus
making the requirement of the religious oath unnecessary in a
democratic society.296 However, in Kalac v. Turkey,297 the Court,
reversing a Commission decision, held that Article 9 was not violated
when a military judge was dismissed from his job because he
belonged to a fundamentalist Islamic group, even though there was
no evidence that his religion was interfering with his performance of

294. “In response to pressures from atheists and other religious objectors, courts in
recent years have gone beyond traditional oaths and affirmations and have allowed other
alternative formulations such as ‘declarations’ or ‘promises’ to tell the truth.” Jonathan
Belcher, Note, Religion-Plus-Speech: The Constitutionality of Juror Oaths and Affirmations
Under the First Amendment, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 289 (1992). For example, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the following:
[W]hen a judge is confronted with a prospective juror’s refusal, on grounds of
constitutionally protected beliefs, to swear or affirm to answer voir dire questions
truthfully, the judge should either allow the person to withdraw from jury duty
without penalty or allow the prospective juror an alternative that requires him or her
to make some form of serious public commitment to answer truthfully that does not
transgress the prospect’s sincerely held beliefs.
Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991).
295. App. No. 24645/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 30 E.H.R.R. 208 (2000) (Westlaw)
(invalidating a requirement that members of parliament swear an oath “on the Gospels” on the
grounds that this “required them to swear allegiance to a particular religion”).
296. Id. at 221.
297. 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1199 (1997-IV), 27 E.H.R.R. 552 (1997) (Westlaw).
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his role as a military judge.298 In Kalac, religious status was viewed to
be a permissible basis for disqualifying someone from certain types of
public office. These holdings exhibit a degree of concern for
individual religious independence, but are broadly consistent with a
view of autonomy based on a conception of interdependence.
B. Conscientious Objection
A constitutional guarantee of the right of conscientious objection
would be unlikely under any of the three conceptions of autonomy.
If autonomy is based on the independence of church and state, we
would expect the state to disallow conscientious objection on the
grounds that matters of self defense and national security fall
squarely within the sphere of the state, and religious preferences and
convictions are irrelevant to a determination of whether an individual
is obliged to serve in the military. Stark independence would view
religious conviction as irrelevant to a determination of civic
obligation. A conception of autonomy based on inter-independence
might be more willing to accept or accommodate conscientious
objectors, since religion is not seen as being totally separate from and
unconnected with the concerns of the state. Nevertheless, the
parameters of conscientious objection will likely be carefully
circumscribed and would be set by the state with an eye towards
protecting the state’s ability to defend itself and its interests. A
conception of autonomy based on interdependence would not be
likely to guarantee rights of conscientious objection, unless a religion
favored by the state had a strong doctrinal basis for guaranteeing
conscientious objection. For basic reasons of self-preservation, it
seems unlikely that a state would ally itself with a church that is
strongly passivist, or one that asserts a robust guarantee of each
individual’s right to assert a claim of conscientious objection.
United States: While the United States recognizes conscientious
objection, it receives statutory rather than constitutional protection.
298. Professor Evans notes that this case seems to fall into the category of forum
internum, or religious beliefs that are to receive absolute protection, but the Court in reversing
the Commission’s finding that his dismissal constituted a breach of Article 9
used such a narrow definition of freedom of religion or belief that it is difficult to see
how any but the most totalitarian State could breach it. Thus, in most cases, the
State can make it unpleasant or burdensome to hold a religion or belief without
actually intruding on the forum internum.
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 78–79.
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Conscientious objectors have been the beneficiaries of a long history
of legislative recognition reaching back as early as 1661 in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony299 and continuing to the present day by
federal statute. The United States Code permits a conscientious
objector to avoid combat service if his opposition is based on
“religious training and belief.”300
Scholars disagree on whether a free exercise right to
conscientious objection exists, but it seems fairly unlikely the
Supreme Court would recognize a free exercise exemption for three
reasons.301 First, while the Court has never squarely addressed the
question, there is dictum indicating that there is no such
constitutional right.302 Second, the Court has granted a high degree
of deference to Congress and the military on matters of national

299. CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION IN AMERICA, 1757–1967, at 17 (Lillian Schillissel ed., 1968).
300. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000).
301. The basic framework of the arguments presented in this paragraph can be found in
Spencer E. Davis, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace? The Status of
Conscientious Objection Exemptions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191 (1991).
302. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), the Court stated:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience
to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it
has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. . . . The privilege of
the . . . conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the
Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the
exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the . . . conscientious
objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible
with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war powers.
Id. at 623–24.
Several years later, in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245
(1934), the Supreme Court quoted that language approvingly. Id. at 264. Neither case dealt
directly with conscientious objectors nor free exercise claims (Macintosh concerned an alien’s
refusal to comply with naturalization requirements, while Hamilton dealt with the
unwillingness of religiously sensitive students to attend a university-mandated class on military
science and tactics) but they have given rise to the assumption that “[i]t is well settled that
‘exemption from military service is a matter of legislative grace and not a matter of right.’”
Korte v. United States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958). Beyond the dicta in Macintosh and
Hamilton, the Court came closest to squarely addressing a conscientious objector’s free
exercise claim in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), but in that case the petitioner
was a selective (opposed to a particular war) as opposed to a general (opposed to fighting in all
wars) conscientious objector, and the Court’s free exercise analysis was extremely cursory.
Nevertheless, the Court’s rejection of a selective conscientious objector’s free exercise claim in
that case is also probably indicative of the Court’s attitude towards general conscientious
objector claims as well.
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defense and security.303 The third reason to suspect that the Court
would not recognize a constitutional exemption from military service
on religious liberty grounds is the Court’s relatively recent decision
in Oregon v. Smith,304 which eliminated requiring strict scrutiny of
generally applicable laws that burden religion. In sum, while
conscientious objection receives statutory recognition in the United
States, it is unlikely that there is a constitutional right to an
exemption from military service. Statutory rather than constitutional
protection of conscientious objection is consistent with a view of
autonomy based on inter-independence of church and state.
Europe: There is no right to conscientious objection under the
European Convention, and it is left to individual states to provide, or
to choose not to provide, exemptions from military service for
conscientious objectors. As early as 1966, and consistently since, the
Commission has held that there is no right under Article 9 that
covers conscientious objectors.305 This holding was based on Article
4 of the Convention, which prohibits slavery or forced or
compulsory labor, but which specifically creates an exception in cases
of “conscientious objectors in countries where they are
recognized.”306 The Commission emphasized that because Article 4
contemplated that countries might not recognize conscientious
objectors, there could be no obligation for countries to recognize
them.307
Nevertheless, a sea change may be afoot. A more liberal approach
to conscientious objector claims appears to be evident from two

303. See Davis, supra note 301, at 205–06; C. Thomas Dienes, When the First
Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other Special Contexts, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779
(1987). “[J]udicial deference to . . . congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when
legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules
and regulations for their governance is challenged.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70
(1981). This deference means the Court does not probe constitutional challenges in the
military context with the same level of scrutiny. Id. at 70–71 (citing numerous representative
cases); Dienes, supra. Military interests simply carry more weight in any balancing analysis than
do governmental interests in most other areas. Any petitioner fighting for recognition of a
constitutional right to conscientious objection will have to overcome this barrier.
304. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
305. Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 626
(1966), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int; N v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203 (1984), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (upholding the practice of allowing
exemptions from military service only to Jehovah’s Witnesses).
306. Id. (citing European Convention, art. 4(3)(c)).
307. Id.
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recent cases. In Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece,308 the European
Court held that while ministers do not have a right to conscientious
objection, lengthy imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witness ministers
violated their Article 9 rights, since under the law providing
exemption for members of a “known religion,” Orthodox ministers
had no difficulty obtaining exemptions. In an unreported case,
Thlimmenos v. Greece,309 the European Court held that a Jehovah’s
Witness who passed a public exam to become an accountant, but was
denied entry into the profession based upon a criminal conviction for
refusing to serve in the armed forces, had his Article 9 rights violated
since there was no option of substitute service available at the time of
his conviction for a serious criminal offense. These recent decisions
reflect a higher degree of concern for individual equality and
autonomy rights, perhaps signaling some movement away from a
conception of autonomy based on interdependence to a conception
based on inter-independence.
C. Sabbath Work
A conception of autonomy based on independence would
probably not permit Sunday-closing laws (since such laws use state
power to further religious ends), but might recognize a right to have
one’s work schedule structured to accommodate Sabbath-day
observance.310 In contrast, autonomy based on interdependence
would likely allow Sunday-closing laws and would also allow laws
that protect religious adherents from Sabbath work. These
protections and guarantees, however, while likely protecting
preferred churches and their adherents, would not necessarily afford
similar protections to religious believers who do not observe the
same Sabbath day as the preferred churches. Autonomy based on
inter-independence would be suspicious of Sunday-closing laws,

308. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1997-III), 25 E.H.R.R. 198 (1998) (Westlaw).
309. App. No. 34369/97 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 4, 1998), 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15
(2001).
310. As noted above in the discussion of religious-based claims for an exemption from
generally applicable laws, while it might seem that independence would require a broad
recognition of claimed exemptions, if the sphere of religious life is limited to “belief” and the
sphere of government oversight is said to encompass everything that includes “action,” then
independence will be viewed as requiring very little recognition of claims for an exemption from
generally applicable laws, including the claims of Sabbatarians for an exemption from
requirements to work on their Sabbath day.
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although if such laws had a credible secular basis, and if such laws
had an appropriate set of exemptions and exceptions, they might be
permitted. Autonomy based on inter-independence might also
recognize that the state’s failure to accommodate Sabbath-day work
preferences imposes a burden on individual religious freedom, and
state policies that burden religious observance might be subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny.
United States: In 1961, in Braunfeld v. Brown,311 the Supreme
Court held that the free exercise rights of Jewish merchants were not
violated by Sunday-closing laws, although the Court suggested that
the state could enact an exemption from such laws for merchants
whose religious beliefs required them to close on another day.312
This case represents one of the few early instances in which a
conception of autonomy based on interdependence seems to underlie
the Supreme Court’s analysis. In Braunfeld, the Court upheld a state
law that was intended to protect and further the interests of a
majority religious viewpoint, finding reciprocal benefits to the state
for providing this preference and protection, while being dismissive
of the burdens that such a law placed upon adherents to another
Sabbath day.313
A few years later, the Supreme Court modified its approach to
laws that burden religious freedom by subjecting such laws to
heightened scrutiny. In Sherbert v. Verner,314 the Court held that a
Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment

311. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
312. However, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Supreme
Court invalidated an effort to follow such an approach, striking down a statute providing
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath.
313. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599, 605 (“[T]he statute at bar does not make unlawful any
religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as
applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more
expensive.”) The court also asserts that the legislation “imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion.” Id. at 606. The Court further states:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or
is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect
of which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. at 607.
314. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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compensation because she refused to work on Saturday was entitled
to receive unemployment benefits because the denial of benefits
constituted a “substantial infringement”315 or “coercive effect on her
religious beliefs.”316 In so holding, the Court exhibited a high
degree of concern for the autonomy of religious believers whose
religious convictions put them at odds with state law. If a petitioner
could demonstrate that a law created a “substantial burden” on his
religious liberty rights, then the state was required to show that the
burden was justified by a “compelling state interest” and that the
government’s program was the “least restrictive means” to vindicate
that interest.317 In Sherbert, the Court held that the state failed to
prove either a compelling state interest (the Court rejected the
argument that the law prevented spurious claims by “claimants
feigning religious objections to Saturday work”)318 or that the law
was the least restrictive means for combating such alleged abuses.
Following Sherbert, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission,319 the Court declared unconstitutional a denial of
unemployment benefits to an employee who refused to work on
Saturdays after converting to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. In
1989, in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,320 the
Court required the State of Illinois to provide unemployment
benefits to a man who refused to work on Sunday because it was the
“Lord’s day,” even though the petitioner who said he was a
Christian did not claim membership in a particular religious group.
These outcomes are consistent with a conception of autonomy
based on the inter-independence of church and state. One of the
strategies that will often be adopted under a conception of interindependence is heightened scrutiny, where under the autonomy
interests of individuals (Is there a substantial burden placed on
religious observance?) will be weighed against the autonomy
interests of the state (Is there a compelling state interest and is the
state policy narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest?). In Oregon
v. Smith,321 decided a year after Frazee, the Court signaled a sharp
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 402–10.
Id. at 407.
480 U.S. 136 (1987).
489 U.S. 829 (1989).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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retreat from subjecting facially neutral laws to heightened scrutiny
when the autonomy interests of religious adherents are burdened by
such laws. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutrally
applicable laws that burden religion are not subject to heightened
scrutiny, implicitly adopting a conception of autonomy based upon
the interdependence of church and state.322
In these cases, we see the Supreme Court taking positions that
rely on shifting conceptions of autonomy. In Braunfeld, the Court
relies on a conception of autonomy based on interdependence. The
Court sees a high degree of integration and cooperation between the
goals of the state and those of a preferred religious group, and the
Court is very deferential to state action that has a negative impact on
the religious liberty of individuals who do not belong to that group.
In Sherbert and Frazee, the Court reflects a greater sensitivity to
burdens that facially neutral laws may place on religious observance
and subjects such situations to heightened scrutiny, reflecting a
conception of autonomy based on inter-independence. In Smith, the
Court abandons heightened scrutiny and returns to a conception of
autonomy based on the interdependence of church and state, with the
state being trusted to adequately protect religious rights and
interests. State action is presumed to protect religious freedom unless
it overtly discriminates against a religious group.
Europe: The European Court’s stance on Sabbath-day work has
not been fully tested. In Konttinen v. Finland, 323 the issue of
Sabbath work was raised by the applicant Konttinen, who worked for
the State Railway for several years before becoming a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church. As part of his new religious
conversion, Konttinen was required to “refrain from working on the
Sabbath (Saturday) which starts at sunset on Friday.”324 At certain
times of year, based upon the time of sundown, Konttinen left work
early to avoid working on the Sabbath day. Despite informing his
employer of his religious convictions and his need to leave early on

322. Id. at 882–89. One might think that the Supreme Court in Smith relies upon a
conception of autonomy that reflects independence, since churches are not given special
treatment. Such an interpretation of independence, however, is possible only if the wall of
separation is moved very far into the realm of religious practice. If religious practice is isolated
and marginalized sufficiently a government can always claim that it leaves religion alone within
its very constricted sphere.
323. App. No. 24949/94 (Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 3, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
324. Id.
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occasion, Konttinen was dismissed by the Railway for leaving work
early.325 The Commission ruled that because the applicant was a civil
servant of the State Railway, he had an obligation to his employer to
observe the rules governing his work hours. The Commission also
found that Konttinen was not dismissed because of his religious
beliefs but rather because of his failure to comply with his specified
work hours.326 The Commission also emphasized that the applicant’s
dismissal was not a violation of his right to freedom of religion
because the applicant was free to relinquish his post.327 Thus, to date
the European Court has not exhibited a high degree of concern for
individual religious needs in cases involving Sabbath-day work, and
the limited jurisprudence in this area seems to reflect a conception of
autonomy based on interdependence.
D. The Right to Religious Education
A conception of autonomy based on independence might not
recognize the right of parents to send their children to churchsponsored schools, since education could be viewed as a secular
function of the state. Even if there is a right to receive religious
education, autonomy based on independence would forbid the state
from providing funding and other support for religious schools. In
contrast, a conception of autonomy based on interdependence would
recognize the right of parents to send their children to churchsponsored schools, at least to schools sponsored by preferred
churches. Autonomy based on interdependence would also permit
the state to provide financial and other forms of direct aid to schools
sponsored by preferred churches. A conception of autonomy based
on inter-independence would be sensitive to the implications for the
state, for churches, and for children of being sent to religious
schools. While the autonomy interests of parents, children and
churches might weigh in favor of guaranteeing a right to attend
church-sponsored schools, direct financial aid to church-sponsored
schools would not be allowed, since this would jeopardize the
independence of church and state. In addition, the state’s autonomy
interests will weigh in favor of giving the state a voice in the content
and character of the education provided.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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United States: In the United States, parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to parochial schools,328 but private
schools may not receive direct state aid.329 In a highly anticipated
decision handed down in the summer of 2002, the Supreme Court
upheld a voucher program that allows parents to use vouchers to
send their children to parochial schools.330 In cases involving
parochial schools, the Supreme Court has exhibited a trend from a
view of autonomy based on independence to a view of autonomy that
reflects the assumptions of inter-independence. Indeed, if the recent
voucher case is a precursor of things to come, the Supreme Court
may be poised to allow programs that indirectly provide significant
quantities of financial benefits to churches, which would mark a
significant move in the direction of a conception of autonomy based
on the assumptions of interdependence. Recently, the Supreme Court
decided Locke v. Davey, 331 which dealt with a provision in the
Washington State Constitution that prohibited a student from using
a particular state scholarship program in pursuit of a degree in
theology. In considering the case, the Supreme Court held that a
state may provide scholarship funds to a student in pursuit of a
degree in theology without violating the Establishment Clause, but a
state was not obligated to make those funds available by the Free
Exercise Clause.332 Such an approach is indicative of interindependence; the state may provide funding if it chooses, and even
under the Washington plan, the scholarships may be used by
students attending religious schools without pursuing a degree in
theology. However, it is also sensitive of the concerns of
independence by not requiring that the states use taxpayer funds to
support religious ministry. The sort of balancing evident in Davey is
suggestive of an inter-independence approach.
Europe: In Europe, parents have the right to send their children
to church-sponsored schools. Additionally, under the European
Convention states can subsidize religious schools or pay for certain
types of religious education in public or religious schools, although
minority religions have no basis to claim a right to state funding for
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their schools.333 Parents are quite limited in their ability to insulate
children from types of teaching in public schools that they find
objectionable from a religious point of view.334 Even the ability to
receive an exemption from religious instruction is limited.335 These
outcomes reflect a view of autonomy based on the interdependence of
church and state.
E.

The Right to Proselyte

A conception of autonomy based upon independence would
provide a broad guarantee of the right to engage in proselyting
activities and other forms of religious persuasion. A conception of
autonomy based upon interdependence would provide protection for
public dissemination of preferred religious viewpoints, although
equal access would not necessarily be guaranteed to less favored
religious groups. Inter-independence would provide broad protection
for religious persuasion, but some narrow limitations might be
allowed that would not be permitted by a view of autonomy based
upon independence, particularly when the autonomy interests of
other individuals or of the state were significantly compromised by
such activities.
United States: In a series of cases decided in the 1940s, Cantwell
v. Connecticut,336 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,337 and Follett v. McCormick,338
333. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 89 (citing cases).
334. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26,
para. 53 (1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. In Kjeldsen, the court held that Denmark could
impose integrated sexual education curriculum over parents’ religious objections, although it
“must take care that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an
objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosophical
convictions.”
335. Angeleni v. Sweden, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41 (1986), 10 Eur. H.R.
Rep. CD 123, 125–26 (1988) (Westlaw) (denying an exemption from religious instruction to
an atheist on grounds that Sweden had entered a reservation to Article 2 of the First Protocol
stating that exemptions from teachings in Christianity could be granted only to “children of
another faith than the Swedish Church in respect of whom satisfactory religious instruction had
been arranged”).
336. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness convicted
under a statute forbidding solicitation without a license). While the Cantwell Court invoked
the belief/action distinction, and reiterated that actions may be regulated for “the protection
of society,” it stated that such regulation must not “unduly infringe” upon religious practice.
Id. at 296, 304.
337. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a license tax imposed on door-to-door
proselytizers).
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the Supreme Court struck down license and occupation taxes imposed
on Jehovah’s Witnesses who sold religious reading materials through
door-to-door proselytizing. In the summer of 2002, in another case
involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Supreme Court held that a
city regulation requiring religious door-to-door solicitors to receive a
state license violated their free exercise rights.339 The Supreme
Court’s decisions in this area reflect a conception of autonomy based
upon independence.
Europe: The first case in which the European Court held that
there had been a violation of the right to freedom of religion and
belief was Kokkinakis v. Greece,340 which involved a Jehovah’s
Witness convicted of violating the Greek law prohibiting
proselytism.341 Minos Kokkinakis was convicted of proselytism after
he went to the house of the local Greek Orthodox cantor and told
his wife about the Jehovah’s Witnesses. While the cantor’s wife was
not persuaded by Mr. Kokkinakis’ appeals and did not even
remember much about the conversation, which she said had not
affected her religious beliefs, and even though there was no evidence
that she was particularly naïve or vulnerable, Mr. Kokkinakis was
convicted of improper proselytism, and his conviction was upheld in
a series of appeals through the Greek courts. The European Court
ruled that the Greek law violated Article 9 on the grounds that the
law was an unnecessary limitation on Mr. Kokkinakis’s right to
manifest his religious beliefs.
This holding reflects a view of autonomy based upon interindependence. The court did not hold that Mr. Kokkinakis’s
proselyting activities were absolutely protected by Article 9(1), which
states that everyone has the “freedom to change his religion or
belief.”342 Such a holding would have reflected a view of autonomy
338. 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (reversing a conviction for selling religious tracts door-to-door
without a license).
339. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
340. 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 397 (1994) (Westlaw).
341. The Greek law in question defined proselytism as:
in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a
person of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos), with the aim of undermining
those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or
moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage
of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety.
Id. at 404.
342. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 9, para. 1.
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based upon independence. Instead, the Court held that the case
involved an impermissible limitation on the ability of Mr. Kokkinakis
to manifest his religion and belief because the limitation was not
“necessary in a democratic society.”343 The Court noted that “the
Greek courts established the applicant’s liability by merely
reproducing the wording of section 4 [of the governing Greek law]
and did not sufficiently specify in what way the accused had [violated
the law].”344 Thus, it was not “shown that the applicant’s conviction
was justified in the circumstances of the case by a pressing social
need.”345 In Kokkinakis, the European Court balanced the state’s
autonomy interests in protecting public safety, order, health, and
morals on the one hand against Mr. Kokkinakis’s autonomy interests
in manifesting his religious beliefs, and the balance was found to
weigh in favor of Mr. Kokkinakis. This type of balancing analysis is
what one would expect from a conception of autonomy based upon
inter-independence.
The Kokkinakis case, however, brought to the fore strong
differences of opinion in the European Court about the scope of the
freedoms protected by Article 9, including the right to change one’s
religion. Judge Martens, in a concurring opinion, noted that under
the Convention, freedom of religion is an “absolute” value and
stated that the Convention “leaves no room whatsoever for
interference by the State” in freedom to have or change religions.346
343. Kokkinakis, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 436. Judge Martens goes on to note that teaching is explicitly protected in the
Convention, and that such teaching may “shade off into proselytizing” and cause some conflict
with the rights of others to maintain their beliefs.
In principle, however, it is not within the province of the State to interfere in this
‘conflict’ between proselytizer and proselytized. First, because—since respect for
human dignity and human freedom implies that the State is bound to accept that in
principle everybody is capable of determining his fate in the way that he deems best—
there is no justification for the State to use its power ‘to protect’ the proselytized (it
may be otherwise in very special situations in which the State has a particular duty of
care but such situations fall outside the present issue). Secondly, because even the
‘public order’ argument cannot justify use of coercive State power in a field where
tolerance demands that ‘free argument and debate’ should be decisive. And thirdly,
because under the Convention all religions and beliefs should, as far as the State is
concerned, be equal.
Id. at 436–37. The dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, which goes beyond what the majority
of the Court was willing to hold, evidences a real concern for the independence-based
autonomy of the individual that is mostly missing in European Court cases.
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Judge Martens would have placed Mr. Kokkinakis’s activities within
Article 9(1)’s sphere of absolute protection, which would reflect a
conception of autonomy requiring a high degree of independence
between the state and individuals’ decisions with respect to religious
belief and association. The Greek member of the panel, Judge
Valticos, in a dissenting opinion, expressed a broad willingness to
permit the suppression of the evangelical efforts of Mr. Kokkinakis.347
He described Mr. Kokkinakis’ activities as a “rape of the belief of
others” and concluded that his behavior did not constitute a
manifestation of religion or belief.348 This view reflects a particularly
strong take on the interdependence of church and state, where the
interests of a favored church are seen as being highly integrated with
the state’s interest. Thus, in the set of opinions in the Kokkinakis
case we see all three conceptions of autonomy reflected in the
respective opinions of the majority, concurring, and dissenting
judges.
A few years later, in Larissis v. Greece,349 the European Court
upheld limitations on proselytizing activities of military superiors of
their subordinates. According to Professor Evans, “In this case, the
Court was willing to accept that any attempt at proselytism by senior
officers was an abuse of power, despite the arguments in the
dissenting judgment of Judge Van Dijk, who considered this
absolute approach to be disproportionate.”350 Although the outcome
347. Id. at 429–32 (Valticos, J., dissenting).
348. Judge Valticos characterized the situation in the Kokkinakis case as follows:
Let us look now at the facts of the case. On the one hand, we have a militant
Jehovah’s Witness, a hardbitten adept of proselytism, a specialist in conversion, a
martyr of the criminal courts whose earlier convictions have served only to harden
him in his militancy, and, on the other hand, an ideal victim, a naïve woman, the
wife of a cantor in the Orthodox Church (if he manages to convert her, what a
triumph!). He swoops on her, trumpets that he has good news for her (the play on
words is obvious, but no doubt not to her), manages to get himself let in and, as an
experienced commercial traveler and cunning purveyor of the faith he wants to
spread, expounds to her his intellectual wares cunningly wrapped up in a mantle of
universal peace and radiant happiness. Who, indeed, would not like peace and
happiness? But is this the mere exposition of Mr. Kokkinakis’s beliefs or is it not
rather an attempt to beguile the simple soul of the cantor’s wife? Does the
Convention afford its protection to such undertakings? Certainly not.
Id. at 430–31 (Valticos, J., dissenting).
349. 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363 (1998–V), 27 E.H.R.R. 329 (1999) (Lexis).
350. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 145. Judge Van Dijk felt
there should be a presumption of abuse in such cases but that it should be
rebuttable. He decided that the presumption should have been rebutted in regard to
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in Larissis is opposite of the outcome in Kokkinakis, the Larissis case
also reflects a conception of autonomy based upon interindependence. The European Court weighed the autonomy interests
of the state against the autonomy interests of the individuals
involved. In the military context, however, the autonomy interests of
the state and of individuals are weighed differently than in the
civilian context. In Larissis, the European Court justified limitations
on proselyting based upon the state’s autonomy interests of
maintaining order and discipline, which in the military are
particularly acute, and upon individual autonomy interests, which
also have a different complexion in the military context, where
subordinate military personnel might feel pressured or coerced to be
positively responsive to the proselytizing activities of superior
officers. The court notes that because of the hierarchical structure of
the military, “what would in the civilian world be seen as an
innocuous exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to accept or
reject, may, within the confines of military life, be viewed as a form
of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of
power.”351
F.

Exceptions to Generally Applicable Laws

A conception of autonomy based upon independence would
provide broad exceptions to generally applicable laws based upon
religious belief, with possible limitations based only upon the serious
threat that granting an exemption would pose to the autonomy of
others or the autonomy of the state. A conception of autonomy
based upon interdependence would not recognize exceptions to
generally applicable laws, although laws that accommodate the
religious beliefs and needs of adherents of preferred faiths would be
expected. Autonomy based upon inter-independence would subject
laws that placed burdens upon religious belief or practice to
heightened scrutiny, examining carefully the effects upon the
autonomy of other individuals and the state of failing to recognize an
exemption.

one junior officer who claimed that he first approached the senior officers, that they
never pressured him, and that he converted to the Pentecostal Church of his own
free will.
Id. (citing Larissis, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363 (1998–V) (Van Dijk, J., dissenting)).
351. Larissis, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 363, para. 51 (1998–V).
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United States: Early U.S. free exercise jurisprudence was very
skeptical about recognizing exemptions based upon religious
conviction from generally applicable laws. For example, in Reynolds
v. United States,352 the Court rejected the argument of a Mormon
who claimed that the Free Exercise Clause provided an exemption
from laws prohibiting polygamy because the practice was mandated
by church doctrine. The Court cited Jefferson’s letter to the
Danbury Baptist association that made a distinction between beliefs
and actions and held that while religious beliefs receive absolute
protection, religious actions are not protected when they are “in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”353 This
outcome was consistent with a view of autonomy based upon the
inter-independence of church and state, with the balance found
weighing in favor of state autonomy,354 which appeared to be
jeopardized by the practice of polygamy. Individual autonomy
interests were discounted because they were limited to the sphere of
belief and held inapplicable to the sphere of action.355
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court for a time adopted a
different approach to free exercise claims for exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Beginning in Sherbert v. Verner,356 a case
involving a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied unemployment
compensation for refusing to work on Saturday, the Court subjected
state action that placed a substantial burden on religion to
352. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court also upheld Congress’s right to seize the Church’s
property, calling the claim that polygamy is a religious belief that falls under the Free Exercise
Clause “altogether a sophistical plea,” and stating, “No doubt the Thugs of India imagined
that their belief in the right of assassination was a religious belief; but their thinking so did not
make it so.” Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890) (“Bigamy and
polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,” and “[t]o call their
advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.”).
353. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
354. Id. at 166–67 (“So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”).
355. This holding reflected strong Protestant assumptions about the centrality of belief in
contrast with action to religious obligation, since upon a Protestant view salvation can be
accomplished through proper belief alone. In other religious traditions, including Catholicism,
protecting only belief and not action might not be sufficient to enable an adherent to do
everything necessary to assure his or her salvation.
356. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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heightened scrutiny if it placed a substantial burden on religion. This
meant that the state was required to show that its actions were
justified by a compelling state interest and that there was no less
restrictive means for affecting that interest. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,357
this approach resulted in an exemption for Amish schoolchildren
from state compulsory education beyond the eighth grade, and, in
Thomas v. Review Board,358 it resulted in unemployment
compensation for a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job because his
religious convictions prevented him from participating in the
production of war materials. These cases also reflect a view of
autonomy based upon inter-independence, although the outcomes
favored the autonomy interests of those seeking passive exemptions
based upon religious beliefs.
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court became more reluctant to
recognize exceptions to general and neutral laws based upon
religious freedom claims.359 For example, in Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States,360 the Court rejected the free exercise
claim of a school that refused admission to blacks based upon a
reading of the Bible; in Bob Jones University v. United States,361 the
Court held that the state had a compelling interest in preventing
racial discrimination and rejected the free exercise claim of a
university that did not allow interracial dating or marriage; in
Goldman v. Weinberger,362 the Court upheld a military regulation
that forbade the wearing of a yarmulke while on duty; in Bowen v.
Roy,363 the Court denied an exemption for religiously motivated
objections to the use of Social Security numbers in welfare programs;
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,364 the Court
allowed the U.S. Forest Service to build a road through a Native
American burial ground in spite of the religious objections of three
tribes that used the grounds for religious rituals; and in Hernandez v.
357. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
358. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
359. For a discussion of the Court’s pattern of rejecting such claims, see Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1410 (1990); see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
360. 454 U.S. 1121 (1981).
361. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
362. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
363. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
364. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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Commissioner,365 the Court rejected a claim by members of the
Church of Scientology who argued their free exercise rights were
violated when the Internal Revenue Service denied a tax deduction
for their payments for “auditing” on the grounds that the payments
did not represent a contribution but rather a quid pro quo exchange.
Although religious exemptions were not permitted in these cases, the
analysis was nevertheless based upon the inter-independence of
church and state, with the Court usually subjecting laws burdening
religious beliefs to heightened scrutiny. While these cases illustrate
that heightened scrutiny does not guarantee that a religious claim
will be vindicated, the cases weighed state autonomy claims against
individual autonomy claims as one would expect from a conception
of autonomy based upon inter-independence.
About a decade ago, the Supreme Court abandoned altogether
its method of subjecting claims for an exemption from general and
neutral laws to heightened scrutiny. In Employment Division v.
Smith,366 the Court held that a law that burdens religion is
constitutional as long as it is general and neutral. This standard is not
entirely incapable of protecting religious liberty interests, as
demonstrated a few years later in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,367 in which the Supreme Court held that
ostensibly neutral laws setting standards governing animal slaughter
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they had been drafted to
apply only to the ritual sacrifice of animals by the Church of Lukumi.
Nevertheless, the Court in Smith moved sharply toward a conception
of autonomy based upon the interdependence of church and state.
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA),368 designed to restore the compelling state interest test
to free exercise jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, however,
declared the RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores369 and
rejected the claim of a church seeking a free exercise exemption from
a prohibition on enlarging its church, in contravention of a historic
landmark preservation ordinance. Under the Supreme Court’s
365. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
366. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
367. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
368. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb).
369. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional because it
exceeded Congress’s remedial authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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current view, general and neutral laws that burden religion are
permitted. Thus, concerning religion-based exemptions, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has shifted from a view of autonomy
based upon inter-independence to a view that reflects a conception of
autonomy based upon interdependence.
Europe: According to Professor Evans, the Commission and the
Court have adopted three different approaches for dealing with
neutral and general laws that have the effect of burdening religious
belief or observance. “The first approach is to hold that, as long as a
law is genuinely neutral and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner,
it cannot breach Article 9.”370 A second approach “is to hold that
restricting a person’s freedom of religion under a general and neutral
law could breach Article 9(1), but that this breach could be justified
in appropriate circumstances under Article 9(2).”371 A third
approach, illustrated in cases involving conscientious objection to
military service, is to deal with such issues by “specific reference to
another article of the Convention.”372 I will focus here primarily
upon the second approach, in which the limitations clause of Article
9(2) is invoked to determine whether a restriction on a
“manifestation” of religious belief is permissible.
In deciding whether to grant an exception to a generally
applicable law based upon freedom of religion or belief, the
Commission and the court have developed a test which focuses upon
whether a particular manifestation is necessary in order for someone
to practice his or her religion (in which case an exemption is
available), as opposed to situations in which the behavior in question
is simply inspired by religious motives or beliefs (in which case an
exemption is unavailable). This test was first articulated by the
Commission in Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom,373 a case
involving the right of a pacifist to distribute leaflets to soldiers urging
them to refuse a tour of duty. In Arrowsmith, the Commission

370. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 169.
371. Id. For example, in Seven Individuals v. Sweden, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 104 (1982), 5 E.H.R.R. 147 (1983) (Westlaw), parents were unsuccessful in arguing for
a religious exemption from a state law prohibiting corporal punishment based upon a
biblically-based belief that corporal punishment of children was biblically mandated, on the
grounds that a prohibition of corporal punishment was permitted by Section 9(2)’s limitation
on manifestations of religious belief on the grounds of health and safety.
372. EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 169.
373. 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 (1978), 3 E.H.R.R. 218 (1978) (Westlaw).
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concluded that distributing leaflets did not constitute a “practice” of
pacifism, but rather political opposition to a particular government
policy.374
According to Professor Evans,
[t]here have been a large number of claims made in relation to
general and neutral laws (such as laws on taxation, compulsory
vaccination, pension schemes, and planning) on the basis that they
interfere with religion or belief. In the vast majority of these cases,
the Commission has utilized the Arrowsmith test to hold people
claiming exemptions from such laws were merely influenced or
motivated by religion or belief rather than practicing their religion
or belief.375

For example, in Khan v. United Kingdom,376 the Commission
upheld the criminal conviction of a twenty-one-year-old man who
was married in an Islamic ceremony to a fourteen-year-old girl
against her parents’ wishes. Under Islamic law, a girl is permitted to
marry without the consent of her parents at age twelve, whereas
under British law the age is eighteen. In dismissing his complaint
that his conviction for abducting the girl violated his rights of
religious freedom, the Commission reasoned that his actions did not
constitute a manifestation of religious belief because while Islamic
law permitted marriage at an earlier age than British law, it did not
require it.377
On other occasions, the Commission seems to distort the
necessity test in order to reach outcomes that are deferential to state
actions that burden religious expression. In Karaduman v. Turkey,378
a Muslim woman who declined to remove her headscarf for an
identity photograph was refused the right to graduate from a
university. Departing from the approach outlined in the Arrowsmith
case, the Commission did not focus, as one might expect, upon
whether wearing the headscarf was necessary under Islam. Rather,
the Commission focused on the taking of the photograph, stating
that “[t]he purpose of the photograph affixed to a degree certificate

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

1324

Id. at 228–30.
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is to identify the person concerned. It cannot be used by the person
to manifest his religious belief.”379
One difficulty that arises under Arrowsmith’s necessity test is that
the Commission and the court are put in the position of determining
whether a particular action is required by one’s religion or belief, or
whether an action is merely motivated by one’s religion or belief. In
practice, this has resulted in the Commission and the court being
dismissive of petitioners’ claims about whether an action is required
by their religious beliefs.380 A second difficulty under the Arrowsmith
approach is that it may be more difficult to establish necessity for
petitioners who base their claims on beliefs or religions that are
nonhierarchical, or when petitioners’ beliefs depart from those of
their church.381 A final difficulty that arises is that despite a general
law’s ostensibly neutral language, a law may actually be targeted at
limiting particular religious practices, either as the law is written, or
as it is enforced.382

379. Id. at 109. Evans notes that,
While the decision was ultimately made on other grounds, the Commission
indicated that the refusal of the University to allow Miss Karaduman to wear a
headscarf in her photograph was probably not a restriction on her right to manifest
her religion. . . . The normal, Arrowsmith approach to this question would have
been to question whether the wearing of the headscarf and refusing to remove it for
a photograph was required by Islam. The shift of emphasis away from the issue of
religious apparel, which seemed to be at the heart of the application, and on to the
taking of the photograph, suggests a level of conceptual confusion within the
Commission as to the appropriate way to apply the Arrowsmith case.
EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 118.
380. See, e.g., Valsamis v. Greece, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 2312 (1996-VI), 24 E.H.R.R.
294 (1996) (Westlaw); Efstratiou v. Greece, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 2347 (1996), E.C.H.R.
24095/94 (Lexis) (upholding the suspension from school of Jehovah’s Witness children who
refused to participate in a Greek National Day parade on the grounds that doing so violated
their pacifist beliefs, stating that the Court saw nothing in the parade that could offend
petitioners’ religious convictions, and discounting evidence from petitioners that participating
in such a parade conflicted with their religion); cf. D. v. France, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 199, 202 (1983), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (relying upon expert evidence in State court
from religious leaders to support the conclusion that certain action was not a necessary
manifestation of religious belief); cf. also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943).
381. See EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, supra note 3, at 122–23.
382. See, e.g., Manoussakis and others v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1347 (1996–
IV), 23 E.H.R.R. 387 (1996) (Westlaw) (planning laws regarding places of worship used to
discriminate against some religious groups); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 397 (1994) (Westlaw) (law against improper proselytism used only
against members of unpopular religious groups); Tsavachidis v. Greece, App. No. 28802/95
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The Arrowsmith necessity test looks like a paradigmatic balancing
test that would be expected from a conception of autonomy based
upon inter-independence, but in practice the European Court has
weighed state interests so heavily that the jurisprudence seems to
reflect a conception of autonomy based upon the interdependence of
church and state.
G.

Summary of Individual Autonomy Issues

Issues involving religion
summarized in Figure 3.

and

individual

autonomy

are

(Eur. Comm’n H.R. Mar. 4, 1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (state used general national
security surveillance laws to target minority religious groups).
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Figure 3
Individual Autonomy

Issue

United
States

Conception of
Autonomy

Europe

Conception of
Autonomy

Oaths and
requirements
for office

prohibited

independence and
inter-independence

limited

inter-independence
or interdependence

Conscientious
objection

permitted
but probably
no
guaranteed

inter-independence

not
recognized

interdependence

Sabbath work

historically
subject to
heightened
scrutiny; less
certain today

movement from
inter-independence
possibly toward
interdependence

not
recognized

interdependence

Right to
religious
education

recognized;
indirect state
funding
permitted

movement from
inter-independence
toward
interdependence

recognized;
direct state
aid
permitted

interdependence

Right to
proselyte

recognized

independence

recognized
to some
extent

inter-independence

Exceptions to
generally
applicable laws

previously
subject to
heightened
scrutiny;
now
exceptions
generally not
available

movement from
inter-independence
toward
interdependence

limited
based upon
necessity

interindependence,
bordering on
interdependence

The story with respect to individual autonomy issues is more
complex than that regarding institutional autonomy. In Europe,
while a conception of autonomy based upon interdependence is still
dominant, at least with respect to several issues including whether
the state can require religious oaths and the availability of exceptions
to generally applicable laws based upon religious belief, the
European Court has relied upon a conception of autonomy that
reflects the concerns of inter-independence.
In the United States, the story is also more muddled. With
respect to some of the most significant issues involving the
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autonomy of individuals, the Supreme Court has moved sharply
away from a conception of autonomy based upon independence, or
even inter-independence, toward a conception of autonomy based
upon interdependence. There are two areas where this movement is
most evident. The first involves the right to religious education,
where the Court has moved from the view that there is a right to
religious education to a view that the state can indirectly provide
large amounts of funding to support religious education. This would
seem to rest upon a significant discounting of the core Establishment
Clause concern that financial appropriations from the state to
churches jeopardize both the autonomy of churches and the
autonomy of the state. The second area involves the availability of
exemptions from generally applicable laws based upon religious
grounds. With the Smith decision, the Supreme Court has moved
away from subjecting claims for a free exercise-based exemption from
generally applicable laws to heightened scrutiny, as suggested by a
conception of autonomy based upon inter-independence, toward
presuming that such burdens are permissible as long as they are
based upon laws that are neutral and general. These developments
represent significant movement in the direction of a conception of
autonomy based upon interdependence that, while influential in
Europe, has for the most part not been influential in the United
States, due to fears that it runs counter to the core Establishment
Clause concerns about independence of church and state.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CONCEPTIONS
IN AREAS OF DISPUTE
Parts IV and V addressed the implications of the three
conceptions of autonomy on a number of issues involving
institutional and individual autonomy. I also discussed the
approaches taken to these issues by the Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights and the conceptions of autonomy
that underlie these outcomes. In this Part, I will discuss five
significant current controversies in the United States involving the
interactions of church and state and consider how each of the three
conceptions of autonomy addresses these issues. These highly
charged issues include school prayer, the use of educational vouchers
at religious schools, charitable choice, public displays of the Ten

1328

3SCH-FIN

12/1/2004 7:07 PM

1217]

The Autonomy of Church and State

Commandments, and the constitutionality of the words “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.383
A.

Prayer in Public Schools

Daily classroom prayer raises significant issues for the autonomy
of the state as well as of individual children. As noted above,384 the
centrality of public education to the state’s mission, the possibility of
religious domination, and the vulnerability of children combine to
make public schools a particularly interesting context to consider the
implications of different conceptions of autonomy for church-state
and religious liberty issues. This is in part due to the importance of
public schools in the state’s mission of educating children and
inculcating in the rising generation a set of attitudes and attributes
that will be conducive to good citizenship. Additionally, public
schools are a place where the state is particularly vulnerable to the
influence or even domination by a particular religious group, since
even in a large and religiously pluralistic society such as the United
States, many particular locales are very religiously homogeneous. The
possibility of one religious perspective dominating is heightened
when the religious convictions of individual teachers are taken into
account, and because for the most part there is very little oversight
or supervision of what takes place within individual classrooms.
Given the age and impressionability of young children, autonomy
concerns about the individual children also loom large in primary
and secondary school classrooms.
In contrast, it might seem that graduation prayer would present
much less of a threat to the autonomy of the state. Adult supervision
and oversight of the school’s practice is assured, the possibility of
ensuring that a broad spectrum of religious viewpoints are
represented in invocations and benedictions is much easier, and the
solemn and ceremonial nature of the occasion might seem to make
prayer an appropriate component of the proceedings. Graduation
383. My discussion of the Pledge of Allegiance issue is somewhat more detailed than my
discussion of other issues because this issue was the subject of an important recent Supreme
Court case, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), and remains
unsettled, since the Supreme Court in Newdow dismissed the case for lack of standing and did
not address the merits of the case. In addition, I believe the Pledge issue is an area where the
value of focusing upon autonomy and competing conceptions of autonomy is a promising way
to break the doctrinal logjam that surrounds establishment and free exercise issues.
384. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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prayer would also seem to pose less of a threat to the religious
autonomy of children, since a large number of adults are present and
aware of what is taking place, and since the possibility of
indoctrination through daily repetition of a particular viewpoint does
not exist.
From the perspective of independence, both daily classroom
prayer and graduation prayer would be prohibited, since each would
represent an intrusion of religion into the public sphere. From the
perspective of interdependence, both daily classroom prayer and
graduation prayer would be unproblematic, since approved prayer
would be viewed as supportive of the purposes and roles of both
church and state. In addition, interdependence might not object to
preferences being granted to one or a small number of select
churches in deciding whom to invite to offer prayers.
From the perspective of inter-independence, however, daily
classroom prayer and graduation prayer might be treated differently,
since each has different implications for the autonomy of the state
and of individuals present in classrooms and at graduation
ceremonies. Inter-independence would focus upon the context and
the specific implications for the independence of the state, of
churches, and of individuals. Rather than entirely excluding prayer
from ceremonial occasions such as public school graduation (as an
independence model would dictate), or including only prayers of a
religious majority (as an interdependence model might allow), an
understanding of autonomy based upon inter-independence would
recognize the importance of independence, of inclusion, of mutual
respect, of commitment to a discourse of public reason and
justification, and of empowerment of all members of the political
community. Rather than striving completely to exclude religion
from public life, or seeking a lowest common denominator that is
designed to offend no one (and probably succeeds in offending
nearly everyone), such a vision would encourage each of us to listen
with reverence and respect to the prayers of others with religious
backgrounds and faith traditions to which we do not belong. A
vision of autonomy based upon inclusion would replace a vision of
autonomy based upon separation.
The Supreme Court’s case law on the subject of school prayer
has not been sensitive to such possible distinctions but has hewn a
separationist course based upon a conception of autonomy requiring
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independence of church and state. In 1962, in Engel v. Vitale,385 the
Supreme Court held that a state-composed prayer read aloud in
public school classes violates the Establishment Clause. A year later,
in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,386 the Court held
that daily Bible reading and daily recitation of the Lord’s Prayer
violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. And two
decades later in Wallace v. Jaffree,387 the Court held that a state law
authorizing a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day
in public schools violates the Establishment Clause. These cases all
reflect a conception of autonomy based upon independence of church
and state. From these cases it was clear that daily classroom religious
observances violated the Establishment Clause. What remained
unclear was whether prayer on occasions such as school graduation
or at sporting events was permissible or impermissible.
The Court answered the question regarding graduation prayer in
1992, in Lee v. Weisman,388 holding that a nonsectarian prayer
offered by a Rabbi at a middle-school graduation ceremony violated
the Establishment Clause because it was impermissibly coercive. The
Court reasoned that “[s]tate officials direct the performance of a
formal religious exercise at [the] graduation ceremonies,” and
students’ “attendance and participation in the state-sponsored
religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the
school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt
of the diploma.”389 The emphasis on the coercive nature of the state
action illustrates the Court’s underlying autonomy concerns. In a
subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that student-sponsored
prayer at a high school football game also violated the Establishment
Clause.390 The outcome in these cases reflects a conception of
autonomy based upon the independence of church and state.
B.

Vouchers and Other Forms of Indirect Aid to Churches

One very controversial issue over the past several decades
involving the relationship of church and state has centered on

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

370 U.S. 421 (1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 586.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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whether parents should be able to utilize education vouchers to send
their children to schools sponsored by or affiliated with a church, or
that reflect a particular religious viewpoint. An extensive literature
has been written assessing the advantages and disadvantages of
voucher programs and the constitutionality of including religiously
affiliated schools in such programs.391 In 2002, the Supreme Court
held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that religiously affiliated schools
could be included in a city voucher program.392 The key to the
Supreme Court’s analysis was the concept of neutrality and the fact
that the vouchers were issued to parents who in turn decided
whether or not to use the vouchers at religiously affiliated schools.393
While the Court acknowledged that in Cleveland ninety-six percent
of vouchers would be used to send children to religiously affiliated
schools, that seventy-six percent of the religiously affiliated schools
participating in the program are affiliated with the Catholic Church,
and that this would constitute a significant indirect benefit to
religion, vouchers were permitted.394 As noted above, in 2004, the
Supreme Court decided that a student studying for religious
ordination can be excluded from a state-funded scholarship
program.395
Autonomy based upon independence of church and state would
not allow religiously affiliated schools to participate in voucher
programs, since indirect as well as direct benefits to schools would be
prohibited. While certain very general benefits, such as police and
fire protection, and inclusion in public utilities, are not prohibited
under independence, programs that result in public funds ending up
391. See, e.g., Allen M. Brabender, The Crumbling Wall and Free Competition: Formula
for Success in America’s Schools, 79 N.D. L. REV. 11 (2003); Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers:
The Answer to a Failing Public School System, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 73 (2001); Mark
V. Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2002).
392. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The Court reasoned that the government aid program was
neutral with respect to religions because the funding was dispersed to the parents who then
directed the funds to religious schools in accordance with their private choice: “The incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends
with the disbursement of benefits.” Id. at 652.
393. For a critique of the concept of neutrality in religion clause jurisprudence, see Steven
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No
Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987).
394. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681.
395. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), overruling 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir.
2002).
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in the hands of church-sponsored institutions would be prohibited.
Autonomy based upon interdependence would allow public funding
of religiously affiliated schools, both indirectly and directly. In
Europe, where a model of autonomy based upon interdependence
prevails, the European Convention does not prohibit a broad array
of types of state aid to religious schools.
Autonomy based upon inter-independence would be very
skeptical of indirect aid to religiously affiliated schools, since financial
aid affects the core autonomy value of independence. From the
perspective of inter-independence, indirect aid to parochial schools
would be critically evaluated based not upon the principal of
neutrality or whether parents served as an intervening mechanism,
but based upon the possible effects such aid would have upon the
independence of the state, the independence of churches and
church-sponsored schools, and individual autonomy. A variety of
threats to the independence of both institutions might militate
against including parochial schools in such programs. For the state, if
a large percentage of voucher recipients opt for religiously affiliated
schools, this might have a negative impact upon the state’s ability to
conduct the core public function of educating children and
inculcating in children the attitudes and attributes deemed desirable
for good citizenship. Poorly performing public schools, in particular,
might be further incapacitated or killed by a reduction in funding.
The state’s autonomy could also be undermined if a particular
religious constituency wielded sufficient political power to enact
voucher programs that resulted in significant financial resources
being channeled to one or a few religions. For churches, their
autonomy could be seriously undermined if they become dependent
upon state largess, in which case they may become vulnerable to
demands upon the curriculum and teaching that conflict with or
even directly contradict religious tenets.
On the voucher issue, the Supreme Court has not only eschewed
a conception of autonomy based upon independence, it has also been
quite dismissive of the core autonomy concerns raised by a
conception based upon inter-independence. In allowing religiously
affiliated schools to participate in state-funded programs, and in
allowing a large percentage of available funds to be channeled to a
small number of religious groups, the Court has moved towards a
conception of autonomy based upon interdependence.
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Charitable Choice

Many of the same issues that come up in the voucher context are
mirrored in the charitable-choice context. Excluding religiously
affiliated service providers from participation in social service
programs would seem to violate the principle of neutrality. On the
other hand, allowing religiously affiliated organizations to receive
direct state aid in furtherance, at least indirectly, of their religious
mission raises significant concerns for both the autonomy of the state
and of the religious groups.
A conception of autonomy based upon the independence of
church and state would not allow religiously affiliated groups to
receive direct or indirect funding to participate in social service
programs. A conception of autonomy based upon interdependence
would welcome such cooperation and integration of efforts to
address serious social ills. A conception of autonomy based upon
inter-independence would analyze the issue based upon the principles
of independence, inclusion, mutual respect, and empowerment.
D.

Public Displays of the Ten Commandments

In August of 2001, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court, Judge Roy Moore, placed a 5200-pound statue of the Ten
Commandments in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial
Building396 and later refused to obey an injunction from the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to remove it.397 As
a result of Judge Moore’s actions, a highly publicized controversy
erupted over whether the public display violated the Establishment
Clause.398 On one side of the debate, Judge Moore and his
supporters argued that “[t]he real purpose of the First Amendment
was and is to protect the states’ and their citizenry’s rights to
396. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Ten Commandments
Display in Alabama Judicial Building Violates Constitution, Say Civil Liberties Groups (Oct.
30,
2001),
at
http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id=
6008&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=1384.
397. See William H. Pryor, Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 1
(2003) (citing Glassroth v. Moore, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (final judgment
and injunction)).
398. Judge Moore’s prominent supporters felt so strongly about the issue that “they
surrounded the State Judicial Building in hopes of preventing the removal of the
monument . . . compar[ing] their struggle with that of the civil rights movement led by Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.” Id. at 2.
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acknowledge God according to the dictates of their own
conscience.”399 Others argued that a strict separation between church
and state prohibits a religious display in a public building, especially
one that favors a particular religion.400 Before Judge Moore placed
the statue in the rotunda, he had already sparked an earlier
controversy by displaying the Ten Commandments in his courtroom
and inviting local clergy to open court sessions with prayer.401
Responding to public reaction following Moore’s original actions,
Governor Fob James even “vowed to call out the militia to defend
the Commandments if necessary.”402 Moore was eventually removed
from office for his defiance.
A conception of autonomy based upon independence would
prohibit all religious displays on public property, including the Ten
Commandments. A conception of autonomy based upon
interdependence would permit religious displays on public property
and would not demand equal treatment of minority religious
viewpoints. Some religious viewpoints could be included and others
excluded, based upon the state’s assessment of whether the display
was desirable or not. A conception based upon inter-independence
would focus upon the impact of the display on the autonomy of the
state and of religion, based upon the principles of independence,
inclusion, mutual respect, and empowerment.
Jurisprudence based upon inter-independence might result in
nuanced differences between situations that might appear similar.
For example, in the case of a state supreme court justice who is
aggressively trying to make a political statement about the supremacy
399. See Hon. Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 349
(1998). Moore’s supporters justified disobeying the federal court injunction because they were
under a higher “legal and moral duty to acknowledge God.” Pryor, supra note 397, at 2.
400. One commentator noted:
If we do yield to a system such as Moore’s, we quickly are relegated to a system in
which the Christian majority determines what type of prayers or documents will be
posted, the result of which is a continuation and enlargement of Christian privilege.
Moore’s idea that it is coercion to require Christian majority silence is mistaken.
Requiring the majority, and everyone for that matter, to be silent in regards to religion
in public settings is simply the removal of a privilege unsupported by any right.
Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility, and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege That
Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617, 633 (2003).
401. See id. at 630.
402. See Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth
Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1
(1998).
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of God’s law over the Constitution—and the idea that judges
consider themselves to be subject to a law higher (one that is not
democratic) than the Constitution, which could reasonably be
interpreted as an effort to communicate to dissenters and those of
minority faiths that they are not equal before the law—by placing a
large monument conspicuously in a state courthouse, such a display
might be deemed unconstitutional based upon the effect it has on
the independence of the state from the undue influence of a
particular religious viewpoint.403
On the other hand, a relatively inconspicuous Ten
Commandments monument in a public park or other place where
state judicial or legislative authority is less omnipresent might be
permitted. Allowing such a monument would not necessarily create a
public forum in which all “religious” expressions, no matter how
odious and harmful, must be allowed. The Supreme Court will have
an opportunity to address a comparable situation in Van Orden v.
Perry,404 in which it will consider whether a monument displaying
the Ten Commandments on the state capitol’s grounds violates the
First Amendment. The monument, according to the district court
and Fifth Circuit decisions, is one of many monuments on the
grounds displaying the secular and religious history of the state. It
might be the type of situation in which the Supreme Court might
conclude, “a reasonable viewer would not see this display either as a
State endorsement of the Commandment’s religious message or as
excluding those who would not subscribe to its religious
statements.”405
If a view of autonomy based upon inter-independence were
adopted, a complete elimination of religion from public life is not
required, as would be demanded by a view of autonomy based upon
total independence of church and state. Indeed, complete content
neutrality might not be required under inter-independence, either.
Rather, religious monuments and other forms of religious expression
in public life would be assessed based upon the effect they have upon

403. The Supreme Court will be taking up a similar issue when it decides ACLU v.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6693 (Oct.
12, 2004). In McCreary, the Sixth Circuit held that the Ten Commandments had been posted
in the courthouses not for a secular purpose, or as part of some historical display, but to
promote a particular religious belief. Id. at 449.
404. 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6691 (Oct. 12, 2004).
405. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2003).
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the independence of the state and the independence of churches and
of individuals. If a type of religious expression jeopardizes or
threatens the independence of the state, then that would be a
ground for excluding it. If excluding a type of religious expression
jeopardizes or threatens the independence of churches or their ability
to be reasonably included and accommodated in public life, then
that would be a ground for including such an expression. If the
autonomy of speakers is unduly thwarted by excluding a type of
religious expression, then that would be a ground for including it. If
the autonomy of unwilling listeners is unduly thwarted by including
a type of religious expression, that would be a ground for excluding
it. Of course, some of these considerations will push and pull in
different directions, and reasonable people will disagree about where
lines should be drawn. But the likelihood of reaching appropriate
answers in such disputes is enhanced if we are focusing upon the
right questions.
E.

The Pledge of Allegiance

In 1954, at the height of the cold war, Congress amended the
text of the Pledge of Allegiance to add the words “under God.”406 In
a response to a perceived threat of the spread of communism,
Congress intended “the inclusion of God in our pledge . . . [to]
further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.”407 Including
a reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance would also “serve to
deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism.”408
Congress indicated that the phrase “under God” was not intended
to promote the establishment of religion, emphasizing that “[a]
distinction must be made between the existence of a religion as an
institution and a belief in the sovereignty of God.”409 A Supreme
Court decision cited in the congressional reports was used to support

406. The revised Pledge of Allegiance now reads, “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
407. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 2340 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339,
2339.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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the idea that a reference to God does not necessarily establish
religion.410
1. The Newdow bombshell
In June 2002, in Newdow v. United States Congress, a threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a split
decision that California’s policy requiring the recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance in public school classrooms was a violation of the
Establishment Clause because of the inclusion in the Pledge of the
words “under God.”411
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle condemned the ruling as
“outrageous,” “nuts,” and “stupid.”412 In the immediate aftermath
of the decision, “[t]he U.S. Senate was so incensed by the decision
that it passed a resolution 99-0 ‘expressing support for the Pledge of
Allegiance’ and asking Senate counsel to ‘seek to intervene in the
case.’”413 The House of Representatives passed a resolution 416-3
protesting the decision.414 Republican House Speaker Dennis Hastert
of Illinois opined, “Obviously, the liberal court in San Francisco has

410. The Court reasons that the First Amendment
[D]oes not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common
sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly . . . Prayers in our legislative halls; the
appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations
making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; “so help me God” in our courtroom oaths—
these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1952).
411. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), petitions for reh’g and petitions for reh’g en banc
denied, 321 F.3d 772 (2003). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion in a factually similar case. See Sherman v. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437 (7th
Cir. 1992). For commentary on the correctness of the Ninth Circuit decision, see, for example,
Peter Brandon Bayer, Is Including “Under God” In the Pledge of Allegiance Lawful? An
Impeccably Correct Ruling, 11 NEV. L. 8 (2003) (defending the Ninth Circuit decision). But
see, e.g., Lisa Trinh, Note, Newdow v. U.S. Congress: One Nation Indivisible, 24 WHITTIER L.
REV. 807 (2003) (arguing that contrary to the Newdow court’s holding, the 1954 Act and the
school district’s policy should have passed scrutiny under the Lemon test).
412. Lawmakers Blast Pledge Ruling, June 27, 2002, at http://archives.cnn.com/
2002/LAW/06/26/pledge.allegiance/index.html?related.
413. Id.
414. Jesse J. Holland, U.S. Lawmakers Stand Up To Show Support for Pledge; House OKs
Resolution Protesting Decision, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2002.
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gotten this one wrong.”415 Democratic Senate Majority Leader
Thomas Daschle called the ruling, “just nuts.”416
According to one news account, “[c]ritics of the decision were
flabbergasted and warned that it calls into question the use of ‘In
God We Trust’ on the nation’s currency, the public singing of
patriotic songs like ‘God Bless America,’ even the use of the phrase
‘So help me God’ when judges are sworn into office.”417 Other
commentators focused attention on the source of the ruling, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a reputation for liberal
activism and which has the highest rate of reversal by the Supreme
Court of any of the circuits.418
“Where’s a San Francisco earthquake when you really need one?”
cracked the New York Post in a lead editorial titled “Left Coast
Lunacy.” Even the New York Times, which editorialized that the
circuit court decision was “well meaning,” dismissed the bombshell
ruling saying it “trivializes” serious constitutional debates about the
separation of church and state.419

In the wake of the public furor, the author of the opinion, Judge
Alfred Goodwin, stayed the panel’s ruling pending a review by the
entire Ninth Circuit. In March 2003, the Ninth Circuit denied
applications to review the case en banc and issued a modified opinion
upholding the decision.420

415. See Lawmakers Blast Pledge Ruling, supra note 412.
416. Flap After Court Rules Pledge of Allegiance Unconstitutional, June 27, 2002, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0%2C2933%2C56310%2C00.html.
417. Id.
th
418. Brad Knickerbocker, One 9 Circuit Appeals Court, Under God, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0808/p02s01-usju.html (Aug. 8, 2002).
419. Josh Getlin, In New York, It’s Outrage Followed by ‘Consider the Source,’ L.A. TIMES,
June 28, 2002, at A20.
420. See Newdow v. United States Congress, 321 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying
petitions for rehearing and denying petitions for rehearing en banc). The Washington Post
reported:
Over the public dissent of nine members, the 24-judge U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit, based in San Francisco, rebuffed requests from the Bush
administration and a California school district to have the court reconsider its
decision last June. . . . The court did take one step back, however. Its original ruling
not only barred schools from sponsoring the pledge but also struck down the 1954
federal law that officially added the words ‘Under God’ to the pledge—thus making
the pledge itself unconstitutional. That was omitted from an ‘amended’ version of
the court’s opinion issued yesterday.
Charles Lane, Pledge of Allegiance Ruling Is Upheld, WASH. POST, March 1, 2003, at A01.
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis
While one can dispute whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision was a
correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause,421 the panel and
its defenders can claim that it represents a faithful, unremarkable
application of what can only be described as the Supreme Court’s
confusing and chaotic doctrine in this area of the law.422 As Professor
Jamin Raskin said, “the case is going to have an explosive effect on
public opinion but from the legal perspective, I think it’s firmly
rooted in the logic of prior cases.”423 Indeed, the panel covers all
bases by going to great lengths to analyze the case from every
possible doctrinal perspective.

In a dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc, Judge O’Scannlain argues that the
Ninth Circuit should have reheard the case en banc,
not because it was controversial, but because it was wrong, very wrong—wrong
because reciting the Pledge of Allegiance is simply not ‘a religious act’ as the twojudge majority asserts, wrong as a matter of Supreme Court precedent properly
understood, wrong because it set up a direct conflict with the law of another circuit,
and wrong as a matter of common sense.
321 F.3d at 776–77 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). Judge O’Scannlain also characterizes the
panel’s work as “an exercise in judicial legerdemain which, not surprisingly, produced a public
outcry across the nation.” Id. at 776. Judge Reinhardt, who was a part of the original twomember majority in the Newdow case, writes an opinion concurring in the order to deny en
banc review, in which he blasts Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent on the grounds that it “reflects a
serious misconception of fundamental constitutional principles and the proper role of the
federal judiciary.” 321 F.3d at 772 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in the order). According to
Judge Reinhardt, “The dissent suggests that this court should be able to conclude that the
panel’s holding was erroneous by observing the ‘public and political reaction’ to its decision.”
Id. at 775. Judge Reinhardt states that “Article III judges are by constitutional design
insulated from the political pressures governing members of the other two branches of
government.” Id. “When the federal judiciary is so firmly separated by constitutional structure
from the direct influence of politics, we must not undermine that structure by allowing
political pressures, polls, or ‘focus groups’ to influence our opinions, even indirectly.” Id. at
776.
421. A number of interesting articles have been written about the constitutionality of the
Pledge. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” The Pledge of Allegiance and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865 (2003); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995).
422. See, e.g., Philip N. Yannella, Stuck in the Web of Formalism: Why Reversing the Ninth
Circuit’s Ruling on the Pledge of Allegiance Won’t Be So Easy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 79, 80 (2002) (“On its own terms, the opinion is a cogent and proper application of
existing Supreme Court case law.”).
423. Oliver Libaw, Is the Pledge of Allegiance Religious? Supreme Court Likely to Have
Final Say on First Amendment Issue, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91507&page=1
(June 27, 2002).
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The Newdow panel begins by noting that, “[o]ver the last three
decades, the Supreme Court has used three interrelated tests to
analyze alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in the realm of
public education.”424 The first approach is the three-prong test set
forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.425 The second approach is the
“endorsement” test first articulated by Justice O’Connor in her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly426 and later adopted by a
majority of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.427 The third
approach is the “coercion” test first used by the Court in Lee v.
Weisman.428
Rather than attempting to divine which approach the Supreme
Court would adopt in analyzing the constitutionality of the Pledge
of Allegiance, the panel considered each approach seriatim and
concluded that the Pledge violates each of the three tests.429
a. The Lemon test. In order to survive scrutiny under the Lemon
test, the challenged conduct or policy (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.430 If any prong of the Lemon test is not
satisfied, the Establishment Clause is violated.
In assessing the purpose of the words “under God” in the
Pledge, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 1954 Act, which added the
words to the Pledge of Allegiance, and concluded that,
“[h]istorically, the primary purpose of the 1954 Act was to advance
religion, in conflict with the first prong of the Lemon test.”431 While
defendants argued that the pledge “as a whole” has a secular
424. Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
425. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
426. 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (allowing a crèche to be
included in a multifaceted public holiday display).
427. 492 U.S. 573, 616–21 (1989) (prohibiting the display of crèche at a country
courthouse).
428. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (public school graduation prayer violates the
Establishment Clause).
429. 292 F.3d at 597. “In its most recent school prayer case, the Supreme Court applied
the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test to strike down a school district’s
policy of permitting student-led ‘invocations’ before high school football games.” Id. at 607
(citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310–16 (2000)). “We are free to
apply any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them.” Id.
430. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
431. 292 F.3d at 609.
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purpose—i.e., “solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence
in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society”—the Ninth Circuit took the view that it
must focus specifically upon the 1954 Act432 and concluded that
notwithstanding Congress’s statement that the inclusion of the
words “under God” was not an establishment of religion, the
purpose for including the words “under God” in the Pledge was
entirely religious rather than secular, and thus a violation of the
purpose prong of the Lemon test.433
b. Endorsement. In a concurring opinion in the 1984 Lynch case,
which allowed a nativity scene to be included in a city’s Christmas
display, Justice O’Connor wrote to suggest a “clarification” of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. She argued that the
establishment clause
[P]rohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political
community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two
principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religions
institutions. . . . The second and more direct infringement is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.434

The Supreme Court later adopted this endorsement test in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, which prohibited the display of a crèche at a
county courthouse.435
Applying the endorsement test, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that, “[i]n the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United
States is a nation ‘under God’ is an endorsement of religion. It is a

432. Id. at 610 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)). The panel
notes that in Wallace v. Jaffree, which struck down Alabama’s statute mandating a moment of
silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer,” the Court did so not because the final version “as
a whole” lacked a secular purpose, “but because the state legislature had amended the statute
specifically and solely to add the words “or voluntary prayer.” Id. at 610 (citing Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985)).
433. Id. at 610–11.
434. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
435. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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profession of a religious belief, namely a belief in monotheism.”436
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Pledge “impermissibly takes a
position with respect to the purely religious question of the existence
and identity of God.”437 The school district’s practice of teacher-led
recitation of the Pledge “amounts to state endorsement” of the
ideals set forth in the Pledge, and even though students are not
forced to participate in reciting the Pledge, “the school district is
nonetheless conveying a message of state endorsement of a religious
belief when it requires public school teachers to recite, and lead the
recitation of, the current form of the Pledge.”438 Citing Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Pledge “is an impermissible government
endorsement of religion because it sends a message to unbelievers
‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.’”439
c. Coercion. In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court utilized a
“coercion” test to find unconstitutional the practice of including
invocations and benedictions in the form of “nonsectarian” prayers
at public school graduation ceremonies.440 Rather than applying the
Lemon test, the Lee Court stated that, “at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in
a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith or tends
to do so.’”441 The Court then held in Lee that graduation prayer was
unduly coercive in that it put impermissible pressure on students to
participate in, or at least show respect during, the prayer.442
With respect to the Pledge, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
436. 292 F.3d at 607.
437. Id. The panel goes on to say,
[a] profession that we are a nation ‘under God’ is identical, for Establishment Clause
purposes, to a profession that we are a nation ‘under Jesus,’ a nation ‘under Vishnu,’
a nation ‘under Zeus,’ or a nation ‘under no god,’ because none of these professions
can be neutral with respect to religion.
Id. at 607–08.
438. Id.
439. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
440. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
441. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)).
442. Id. at 593.
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policy and the Act fail the coercion test. Just as in Lee, the policy
and the Act place students in the untenable position of choosing
between participating in an exercise with religious content or
protesting. As the Court observed with respect to the graduation
prayer in that case: “What to most believers may seem nothing
more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their
religious practices, in a school context may appear to the
nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery
of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”443

3. Evaluating the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
There are two primary ways to critically analyze the Ninth
Circuit’s conclusions in Newdow. The first is to argue that the panel
misapplied the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine
concerning the permissible interactions of church and state in public
schools. The second is to argue that although the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion is a faithful, or at least plausible, application of that doctrine,
the doctrine itself is a misguided understanding of the Establishment
Clause.
Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
deny an en banc rehearing of the case adopts the former approach.
He argues that in Engel v. Vitale,444 the “fountainhead of all school
prayer cases,”445 the Supreme Court “drew an explicit distinction
between patriotic invocations of God on the one hand, and prayer,
an ‘unquestioned religious exercise,’ on the other.”446 After
reviewing the Supreme Court’s school prayer cases,447 Judge
O’Scannlain concludes that two fundamental principles may be
derived. First, “[f]ormal religious observances are prohibited in
public schools because of the danger that they may effect an
443. 292 F.3d at 608–09 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 592).
444. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
445. Newdow v. United States Congress, 321 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2003)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of petitions for rehearing and denial of petitions for
rehearing en banc).
446. Id. at 779 (Judge O’Scannlain, dissenting).
447. Lee, 505 U.S. at 580 (striking down school-sponsored prayers at graduation as an
“overt religious exercise”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down a moment of
silence law on grounds that the legislature’s sole purpose in enacting the law was to “return
prayer to the public schools”); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking
down Bible reading and recitation of the Lord’s prayer in public schools, but saying nothing
about the recitation of the pledge).
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establishment of religion.”448 Second, “[o]nce it is established that
the state is sanctioning a formal religious exercise, then the fact that
the students are not required to participate in the formal devotional
exercises does not prevent those exercises from being
unconstitutional.”449 Judge O’Scannlain concludes that the Pledge
does not trigger an Establishment Clause violation because it does
not involve the state directing the performance of a “formal religious
exercise.”450
Judge O’Scannlain’s argument is not without merit, and had it
not dismissed the case on standing, it is possible that the Supreme
Court might have followed his lead and concluded that the Pledge
did not raise Establishment Clause issues because it is simply not a
“formal religious exercise.” In order to do so, however, it would
seem that the Supreme Court would have to ignore or finesse its
own doctrinal approaches to Establishment Clause cases. From the
perspective of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine,
the Ninth Circuit’s arguments in Newdow appear to be quite strong.
The Ninth Circuit stretches to conclude that the Pledge violates
the Lemon test, since it is by no means clear that the Pledge should
not be considered in its entirety, rather than solely from the
perspective of the 1954 Act’s inclusion of the words “under God,”
in which case it would seem that the primary purpose and primary
effect of the Pledge is patriotic rather than religious. But it is less
clear that the Pledge is not coercive, at least in the very broad sense
that the Supreme Court has used to find graduation prayer to be
psychologically coercive. Most tellingly, if the concepts of
“endorsement” and “neutrality” are the lodestars for Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, then it is difficult to see how the Pledge can
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. It seems difficult to dispute
that the insertion in 1954 of the words “under God” in the Pledge
“endorses” religion or is at least not “neutral” with respect to
religious belief. If neutrality and endorsement are the appropriate
tests for Establishment Clause cases, then the Court may be required
to sweep religion completely outside of public life.

448. 321 F.3d at 778.
449. Id. at 782.
450. Id.
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4. Autonomy
A second approach to evaluating the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
in Newdow is to analyze the case from the perspective of autonomy.
If the Establishment Clause requires the independence of church and
state, then the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, if
religious liberty rests upon the interdependence of church and state,
then opposition to “under God” in the Pledge would be nonsensical.
Inter-independence, in contrast, would focus upon the effects that
school-sponsored recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance has upon the
autonomy of the state, the autonomy of churches, and the autonomy
of individuals.
The Pledge, at least when viewed in its entirety and not just from
the perspective of the 1954 addition of the words “under God,” is
primarily patriotic in nature, rather than religious. It is difficult to
imagine how recitation of the Pledge could undermine the
autonomy of the state. Rather, it facilitates the state’s goal of
inculcating unity and patriotism in its citizens. It is also difficult to
imagine how recitation of the Pledge undermines the autonomy of
churches, or of individuals (as long as they are not forced to
participate).451 Listening respectfully to views we may not share,
including in government-sponsored speech, does not violate
individual autonomy. If I am troubled by the inclusion of the words
“under God” in the pledge, I can abstain from reciting it, or I can
omit those words when I participate in reciting the Pledge. From the
perspective of inter-independence, the Pledge case is not particularly
difficult, since allowing the Pledge does not pose a serious threat to
the independence of either the state or of churches, and the
constitutional right to opt out of saying the Pledge provides
adequate protection to dissenters.

451. See W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (reversing
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)) (holding that a state could compel
public school students to participate in a flag salute). In Gobitis, the Court emphasized the
state’s autonomy interests in facilitating national cohesion. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595 (“We are
dealing with an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the
basis of national security.”). On the other hand, in Barnette, the Court focused on whether
compulsion can be used to achieve it. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
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VII. CONCLUSION

Finding an adequate doctrinal framework for analyzing and
deciding cases involving the relationship between church and state
and religious freedom claims has proven extremely difficult, both in
the United States and in Europe. I have suggested that the primary
concern underlying both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause is autonomy—of the state, of churches, and of
individuals. But the cases decided by the Supreme Court over the
past fifty years in this area are difficult to reconcile into a coherent
body of jurisprudence in large part because the Court has vacillated
among different underlying conceptions of autonomy and different
assumptions about what is required in order for individuals or
institutions to exercise autonomy. Two conceptions of autonomy
have vied for preeminence in the United States, one based upon the
ideal of complete independence of church and state, having
separation as it goal, and the other based upon the ideal of interindependence, which tries to ascertain the proper manner in which
the state can accommodate religion. The European Court of Human
Rights has for the most part based its religious-freedom
jurisprudence upon a different conception of autonomy, one that
rests upon the interdependence of church and state.452
While differing assumptions about the conditions and
requirements of autonomy underlie jurisprudence in this area, to
date neither the Supreme Court nor the European Court has
devoted significant critical attention to the question of which of the
various competing conceptions of autonomy is really the best or
most appropriate understanding of what autonomy is, and what the
conditions are under which it can thrive. Both courts have been for
the most part silent about which conception of autonomy does the
best job of capturing the conditions that will facilitate the autonomy
of church and state, and the religious autonomy of individuals.

452. In several important areas of the law, however, the Supreme Court has been
influenced in recent years by a conception of autonomy based upon interdependence. These
include allowing parochial schools to receive significant money from the state in voucher
programs, and eliminating heightened scrutiny over free exercise claims for exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Similarly, the European Court has not exclusively relied on the
interdependence model of autonomy; for example, with respect to oaths and requirements for
office, the right to proselytize, and exceptions to generally applicable laws, the Court has
tended toward a conception of autonomy based on inter-independence.
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In this Article, I have argued that an important step toward
developing a coherent approach to the interpretation of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment and the religious liberty provisions
of the European Convention is to think critically about the
conditions that should exist to enable the state, churches, and
individuals to exercise autonomy. Autonomy provides a better
framework than existing doctrinal approaches for the resolution of
difficult and controversial issues that arise in this area of the law. If
one of these three conceptions of autonomy, or perhaps a different
conception of autonomy, provides the most compelling
understanding of the meaning of autonomy and the conditions and
types of relationships that are necessary for autonomy to flourish,
that would provide invaluable guidance for analysis and deliberation
in cases involving the proper interactions of church and state and
cases involving individual freedom of religion or belief.
In order to effectively analyze issues involving religious liberty
and the relationship of church and state, courts should engage in a
three-step analytical process. First, a court should clearly identify the
autonomy interests at stake in a particular case. Sometimes one
autonomy interest will be predominately at issue, while at other
times there will be more than one. Clearly identifying the autonomy
interests and issues in a case will help define and refine what is at
stake in a case. Second, the court should define and defend a
conception of autonomy to be used in comparing and evaluating the
autonomy interests at stake. Since the conception of autonomy that
animates the court’s analysis will largely dictate the outcome in a
case, it is important that the court understands and explicitly defends
the conception of autonomy that it believes to be correct. Third, the
court should then assess how the autonomy interests at stake
coupled with the particular conception of autonomy that is
appropriate apply to the case at hand. For the most part, both the
Supreme Court and the European Court have failed to do this. This
largely accounts for the fragmented, inconsistent, and ultimately
unsatisfying jurisprudence in this area, both in Europe and in the
United States.
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